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Abstract
The modern form of financial cooperatives have existed since the mid-1800s and were a
response to economic hardship and exclusion.  The response created a people centred
institution which was not driven by the state or the market but emerged from the collective
action of people. The power of cooperation, solidarity and mutual aid, the building of
trust, and the strengthening of social connections permeated into other areas of
community life and interaction.  There is historical and contemporary evidence within this
research of the influence of financial cooperatives to play a role in transforming and
empowering communities through the generation of social capital. Social capital is now
seen as an instrument to understand “the social” within business, economics,
organisational behaviour, political science, and sociology, and is often defined as the
advantage created by a person’s location in the structure of relationships.
The aim of this thesis was to research the generation and expenditure of social capital
within financial cooperatives in Cambodia, Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands to
uncover the reasons why in some communities where social capital looks to be in
abundance, financial cooperatives appear to fail and yet in other communities that suffer
from a lack of trust, and where it appears there is a lack of social capital, financial
cooperatives are successful.
Utilising the Social Capital Schematic results and the Social Capital Development
Framework I developed within this study, I have compared and contrasted the similarities
and cleavages in the location and the creation and destruction of social capital. The
research data demonstrates that the financial cooperatives in each of the research
locations were clearly in different stages of their lifecycle in terms of their social capital
and institutional development.  The financial cooperatives which are contained within this
research can be categorized in three ways.  Those that are emerging and developing or
in other words in their infancy, those that are perhaps young adults and are socially strong
although perhaps not financially independent and those that are on the road to maturity.
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1Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 Background
This thesis originated from a desire to understand what I was seeing out in the field as a
development practitioner.  I have worked across the Asia Pacific region in a number of
post conflict zones where people were rebuilding their lives and reestablishing not only
social relationships but institutions.  They wanted better lives that saw their children
getting an education that they had been denied, or access to health care that they had
been unable to secure, or simply to build some assets to protect their family from future
economic shocks. I wanted to understand the role of the financial cooperatives in the
development of social capital and how this could impact on people’s lives.
In this study I look at three countries, Timor Leste, Cambodia and the Solomon Islands.
I have utilized an applied approach as the data within this research and the resulting
analysis can be used to inform further work in the field. The research covered 3 countries,
33 site locations and 1,425 respondents. As a financial cooperative development
practitioner in the Asia Pacific region I am involved in the decision making of how best to
utilize Australian aid and publically donated funds to develop financial cooperatives to
assist in the efforts of alleviating poverty through a range of financial inclusion strategies.
The implementation and the resulting impacts and outcomes of the development of
financial cooperatives in the Asia Pacific region is reported to the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade which contributes to the Australian Government’s decision making in
terms of the alignment of their strategic objectives with the aid budget.
Each of the countries studied have been through significant social upheaval, some
externally influenced and others internally influenced.  The common experience is the
effect this upheaval has had on the economic and social life of the people.  In each case
I wanted to examine the interplay between the people and the economic institution where
they were both members and owners, and to examine the tensions that lie between the
institutions and the people as they go about trying to build a better life for their family and
their communities. I wanted to understand the space between the people and the
institution.  This space is often ignored and yet has a dramatic impact on the social and
in this case the economic health of the community.
This thesis examines the generation and expenditure of social capital within financial
cooperatives in Cambodia, Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands.  By utilizing an
institutional lifecycle approach I seek to uncover the reasons why, in some communities
where social capital looks to be in abundance, financial cooperatives appear to fail and
2yet in other communities that suffer from a lack of trust, and where it appears there is a
lack of social capital, financial cooperatives are very successful.  The scaling of the
institution within a lifecycle framework helps to position the financial cooperatives
comparatively at a macro country level.  From this macro level the social capital
determinates can then be discussed in relation to the financial cooperative’s
development.
Financial cooperatives develop both at an economic and social level.  The social
development of financial cooperatives has to date, been mostly explored from a
functionalist perspective, that is, from the mechanisms that are used by the membership
to engage with the institution (Brian Branch and Baker 2000; Lennon and Richardson
2002).  An objective of this research is to understand not only the structural reasons for
member participation but also the cognitive and social aspects of engagement and the
contribution this has to the institution’s success.  I have developed a theoretical
framework to uncover these areas by looking at the environment within which the
financial cooperatives and the members are located.  I look at the structural and cognitive
effects of the organisational governance as well as the trust inherent within the
community and the institution.  I seek to examine the role leadership and reciprocity play
as well as the connections of network and the resulting norms that emerge from the
financial cooperatives and the resulting consequences for not only the institution but also
the community.
1.1.1 Research Purpose and Approach
The research undertaken within this thesis was informed by the need of the writer to
understand what was being observed in the field.  What are the social capital impacts on
the success or otherwise of financial cooperatives in the Asia Pacific region?  This
research seeks to understand why in communities where there appears to be strong
cultural and social bonds the financial cooperatives struggle to develop and mature yet
in locations where there appear to be weak societal bonds the institutions thrive and
grow.  As my field work continued questions kept emerging as to whether the strength of
the financial cooperatives was due to cultural differences within those communities or
simply if it was subject to good leadership, strong solidarity, processes of reciprocity or a
sense of trust.  Was it a combination of these and other factors and what was the agency
of the individuals and the community?
In order to gain a detailed understanding of the dynamics that were occurring in the
locations studied, I used an approach that not only considered the quantitative
environmental, that of the social and economic data but to also ensured that the voices
3of the members within and outside of these institutions were evident in the findings of this
research.  This approach uncovered a more comprehensive understanding of the
perceptions and the lived experiences as members, participants and beneficiaries of
these institutions.
The lived experience of respondents within this research speaks to their agency within
the development of the financial cooperative.  The role of everyday life (de Certeau 1984;
de Certeau et al. 1998; Lefebvre 2003) and the ‘reflexive re-enactment of a proscribed
series of roles and expectations … provides spaces for minor occurrences of subversion’
(A. Bennett 2005: 3).  The social identity and the performances (Goffman 1973) within
both the community and the individual play a role in the financial cooperative’s operations
and its potential to meet the needs of the community.
1.1.2 Objectives of the Research
The objective of the research is to understand the impact of social capital on the
development of financial cooperatives in three culturally and geographically different
locations.   This research will seek to position the various components of social capital
within the community, the individual or the institution to understand their ongoing survival
and longevity.  This research will attempt to speak to policy makers and development
practitioners to demonstrate the position of financial cooperatives within the community
and therefore the value they have and create for their communities. The research
endeavours to show financial cooperatives provide not only financial services and
products but broader community benefits that can emerge from the social capital inherent
in the act and activities of the financial cooperative.
Over the years financial cooperatives have fallen in and out of favour with development
practitioners.  During the 80’s and early 90s cooperatives were seen as a viable option
to bring financial services to the underserved1.  Later in the 1990’s microcredit arose as
a “silver bullet” to alleviate poverty (Bateman 2011; Dichter and Harper 2010).  In the
early part of the first decade of the twenty first century it was evident to many microfinance
organisations that savings products that were absent in microcredit programs were
1 The underserved is a phrase that is used to refer to those that are unbanked, they have little to no
access to financial services.  Development organisations have extended this concept to create a
discourse around the term “financial inclusion” that refers to a broad range of financial products including
savings, loan and insurance.
4critical for poor people in their fight to lift themselves out of poverty (Conroy 2003; Westley
and Branch 2000).  The second decade of the twenty first century has seen many NGO’s
move away from shifting external capital into communities in favour of generating savings
within communities for creating loan capital.  Financial cooperatives have for over 160
years focused on providing somewhere safe for people to save and to borrow (Seibel
2003).  Financial cooperatives in one form or another operate in over 100 countries
(World Council of Credit Unions 2011b)2 and have been adapted by their members to fit
within a multiplicity of economic, geographic, cultural and political environments.  As
evidenced within Timor Leste and Solomon Islands they have endured and survived civil
conflict and social upheaval.
The common factor underpinning all of these institutions regardless of their environment
is the ownership structure.  A structure that deserves a detailed examination to seek to
understand why they continue to survive and in many cases thrive, and to understand
what is the engine that drives these institutions and their membership to continue to
provide financial products and services to their community.
There is still debate within development circles (Simbe 2011) as to the value and utility
of financial cooperatives, especially as the bottom up or group approach frustrates many
development practitioners and multinational organisations due to it being a slower
grassroots type of approach.  And while the development sector community espouses
participatory development practices none are all too keen on participatory approaches
that allow more than the donor allocated time to produce impact.  Commercial and/or top
down NGO supported Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) suit multilaterals and the donor
and market imposed time constraints that they must work within.  Financial cooperatives
operated by community members whom may have little education and even less
knowledge of running a financial institution often make mistakes, are very risk averse and
who are usually volunteers, are not seen by the development sector as necessarily the
right vehicles to drive forward a financial institution and therefore their development
agenda.  However, financial cooperatives have longevity, sustainability and a durability
that appears to not always be present in other types of top down financial institutions.
Financial cooperatives outlive conflict, social upheaval, political change, natural disasters
2 The official statistics only recognise financial cooperatives that are formally linked through regional bodies
to the World Council of Credit Unions.  Countries such as Federated States of Micronesia, Timor Leste,
Tuvalu, Samoa etc. are not counted in the official statistics regardless of their operational longevity.
5and government and outside interference.  The essence of their indefatigability I will
argue within this thesis is within the social capital that is generated.
1.2 Financial Cooperatives and Social Capital
The reason I seek to view the financial cooperatives through the concept of social capital
is due to the applicability of the theory’s utility. Financial cooperatives cannot develop
and grow without the development of social capital.  Without mutual aid, solidarity and
cooperation, financial cooperatives will not thrive, conversely financial cooperatives and
the principles upon which they are founded are fertile soil for social capital. The
theoretical utility of social capital was chosen due to its universality across cultural and
political contexts (Bjornskov and Svendsen 2003; Svendsen and Svendsen 2004). The
indicators through which to view social capital are applicable to the very principles upon
which financial cooperatives are founded and can therefore be universally applied.
Additionally the dual endogenous and exogenous nature of social capital allows the
research to understand not only the institutional influences but also the individual and the
community influences in the creation of the financial cooperative. The influences,
development and maturation of the financial cooperative using social capital can be
understood from a holistic viewpoint which has enabled this research to position the
institution in relation to its development and provide an understanding of where it is in its
lifecycle.
1.2.1 Financial Cooperatives
In the following section I lean heavily on my field experience of working with financial
cooperatives in a range of developed and developing countries particularly in the Asia
Pacific region. 3 Understanding the influences in the emergence of financial cooperatives
will help to position the social capital in the following chapters.  As the concluding chapter
will demonstrate the context and environment within which financial cooperatives develop
significantly impact on the inherent social capital and therefore on the lifecycle of the
institution and the members resulting interaction.
The membership of each financial cooperative institution originates differently depending
upon the socio-economic, political and geographical environment in which the people find
3 Australia, Cambodia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Myanmar, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore,
Solomon Islands, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
6themselves.  Often the institutions arise through the endeavors of individuals within the
community and at other times through government or INGO or local NGO intervention.
These factors can affect the institutional sustainability, ownership and commitment not to
mention the types of social capital that may be generated and expended during the
organisation’s emergence and development.
Financial cooperatives that emerge through the efforts of a local group of people can be
in response to a number of external and societal factors, including the exclusion from the
formal economy, that is, through the exclusion from access to the various commercial
forms of financial services.  Often this is due to geographical isolation such as the case
in many places in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste.  Sometimes the desire to
develop a financial cooperative is in response to the local financial institutions not
meeting the needs of the community, due not only to access but the types of financial
products these institutions offer, perceived unaffordability of interest rates, or financial
products that do not meet cultural, social or agricultural needs.  Other causes of the
development of financial cooperatives is that of a sense of control, a desire to put in the
hands of the community the financial destiny and control of the financial resources that a
community generates.  Often there are outside influences that have sought to convince
the local community of the need to develop their own institution.  Sometimes the main
actor influencing community action is the government that seeks to address a market
failure. Commercial financial entities may deem the geographic location is an inhibiting
factor or that the demographic that is to be served is not seen as commercially viable due
to the lack of assets.  The population may have a high risk profile due to their economic
activities such farming which has a high risk of crop failure or low crop yields.
The emergence of collective action through a group coalescing together has numerous
motivating factors which are not always necessarily driven by external forces. Bonds of
membership are often driven by the desire to strengthen existing bonds of relationship
and community similarities.  Many of the Timorese and Solomon Island financial
cooperatives have been developed based on an existing sense of commonality and
sense of belonging.  Some of the Dili based financial cooperatives have emerged from
individual public service entities whereby the employees have banded together, albeit in
small groups, to create their own employee credit unions.  Similarly one of the largest
financial cooperatives in the Solomon Islands is the Public Service Credit Union, however
there are also financial cooperatives for other types of employees such as Police, Nurses
and Health Workers, Teachers and Prison Workers along with communities of interest
such as the Melanesian Crusaders Credit Union which is an Anglican Church credit union
for employees.  Other groups have also created their own financial cooperative such as
7the Lord Howe Island credit union which is made up of internally displaced people living
in a small enclave along the ocean front of Honiara. It must be recognized that many of
these financial cooperatives were the result of proactive stance of the Solomon Island
Government and the Department for International Development (DFID) in the late 1980s
early 1990s.
In summary, financial cooperatives can be broadly based on geographical bonds and
industry or professional sector bonds.  They emerge due to varying circumstances but
can develop due to internal efforts of community leaders or self-identified needs,
government activity or through either local or international NGO initiatives.
1.2.2 Social Capital
Utilizing social capital as a tool to examine the “social” in financial cooperatives is fitting
for a number of reasons, firstly it speaks a language that is appropriate and familiar to
those within the financial cooperative movement. ‘Social capital is coming to be seen as
a vital ingredient in economic development around the world,’ (Putnam 1993a: 5). Social
capital can be quantifiable in nature and discussed and aligned in the form of a type of
capital. It is however, as discussed in proceeding chapters, a neo-liberal hijacking of
social impact and development analysis that is an anathema to many scholars in the
social sciences.
‘In the past, economics imperialism achieved a modicum of success, not
least where rational choice approaches have been accepted.  The old
imperialism depended upon treating non-market phenomena as if they
were like market phenomena or, at least. As if each agent pursued their
own self-interest regardless of activity and context’ (Fine 2003: 10).
It is nevertheless a useful and connective language in relation to financial cooperatives
which are driven by rational systems and processes.  It fits neatly into the lexicon of
financial cooperatives.  My approach in using what can be quantified and measured and
identified speaks to those outside the social sciences in a way that may resonate and
ultimately provide a gateway for those that value the economic over the social to engage
more deeply with the importance of the social within the development of financial
cooperatives.
1.3 Significance of the Study
This research fills a gap in the literature in a number of ways.  Firstly the current literature
is heavily influenced by a focus on economic features and performance issues (Matthews
2006; Richardson 2002; Sharma and Matthews 2010; Westley and Branch 2000) with a
8dearth of literature that examines the social capacities and impacts of financial
cooperatives.  Secondly there is little published research in any form on the financial
cooperatives in the countries contained within this research and there has certainly been
no comparative study undertaken.  To date there has not been a synthesis of the social
capital theories into a cohesive framework that enables the study of institutions that also
considers the community and the individual and their role and contribution in generating
social capital from a financial institutional context.  I have developed the Social Capital
Schematic (Figure 6) as a way to compare and contrast from a country perspective the
institutional performance as it pertains to social capital.  This thesis could be the
beginning of further exploration and development of a tool that could be used by
governments and multilateral development organisations at not only a macro level but
also by NGOs and community organisations at a regional or individual institution level.
The schematic could be further enhanced to identify the minutiae of individual
communities and the impacts at a very micro level.
This study can contribute to how individuals and their associated communities can
contribute to not only financial cooperative development but other forms of institutional
development where a community driven approach is applied. The new frameworks and
schematics which have been developed in this thesis contribute to the study of
cooperation, mutual aid and solidarity and could be adapted to examine community
strengthening approaches taken in other institutional development contexts.
1.4 Research Methodology
Chapter Three provides an outline of the research methodology in a comprehensive
manner, however it is necessary to state early in this thesis that given the type of research
which I have undertaken has never been done in any other geographic locations, there
was the need to build on existing survey tools and theories to develop a way of examining
and positioning the phenomena of social capital within financial cooperatives.
The use of the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) tool ensured the data, both
quantitative and qualitative, had foundations in a survey tool that had been extensively
tested by the World Bank (De La Pena 2008; Grootaert and Van Bastelaer 2001;
Grootaert et al. 2004; Harpham 2008; Kahkonen 2002; Krishna and Shrader 2002;
Pantoja 2002; Reid and Salmen 2002; Yuasa et al. 2007) and utilized in a variety of
geographical environments and for a range of social capital research purposes.  It also
addressed my need to understand the location of social capital, be it in the institution, the
community or the individual.
9The methodology that I have developed ensures that the data I have collected can be
analyzed and discussed in a manner that answers the research question posed by this
thesis. The biggest challenge found in undertaking this research was attempting to
consider the theoretical elements of each component of the community, the institution
and the individual, and to encompass all of these in a cohesive and theoretically sound
framework.  The Social Capital Schematic is the end point of this part of the journey which
brings together the data as well as the theory in a form that allows a comparative analysis.
This new way of presenting social capital development allows the conversation to open
up from viewing only the economic impacts to also include the social impacts of the
development of financial cooperatives.
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured into seven chapters.  Chapter Two provides a literature review of
both financial cooperatives and social capital.  The chapter provides an historical view of
financial cooperatives and examines the structural position of the institutions in the
community and the broader economy.  A detailed view of the philosophy and principles
that underpin financial cooperatives is provided as well as an examination of how
financial cooperatives emerge within the community. Chapter Two also includes a
detailed study on the contested nature of social capital and its theorist’s arguments.  It
also seeks to unpack the concept to provide an appreciation of the elements that
contribute to the development and destruction of social capital.  Lastly the chapter
endeavours to connect social capital to “the economic”, that is, the role and function of
the financial cooperative to provide financial services and products within an environment
that is developed utilizing social assets.
The theoretical framework and research design is discussed in Chapter Three and seeks
to step the reader through the development of a methodology that is practical,
philosophical and theoretically rigorous. This then forms the basis for the author’s own
work in developing a theoretical framework and consequently a Social Capital Schematic
that provides the basis for comparative analysis. The chapter also acknowledges some
of the challenges encountered and the strategies and tactics employed to address these
issues.
The research findings for each country are found in Chapters Four, Five and Six and
speaks to the environment in which the communities and the financial cooperative
resides.  Using the Social Capital Schematic the research findings are unpacked and
analyzed for unique characteristics from both a cognitive and structural perspective
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(Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002a; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002d; Grootaert and
van Bastelaer 2002c).
A comparative analysis and conclusion is detailed within Chapter Seven and seeks to
provide the reader with both a headline analysis at a broad institutional, community and
individual level as well as discuss and compare the various elements contained within
the schematic.  At the conclusion of the chapter the consequences and outcomes are
outlined. This chapter discusses the lifecycle of the financial cooperative and how social
capital affects, and is affected by, its own generation, expenditure and destruction.  The
chapter also outlines how this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge in relation to
financial cooperatives and social capital and the implications of the study in terms of the
duality of the economic and social nature of financial cooperatives. The thesis has
uncovered many more areas for further research which are also outlined in this chapter.
1.6 Limitations of the Research
The research question is ambitious and the difficulty in understanding and representing
how the structural and cognitive components of the financial cooperatives, the community
and individuals are composed is immense and required numerous decisions in order to
develop a suitable framework in which to analyse the data and answer the research
question.  While the assumptions and decisions made during the development of the
Social Capital Schematic and Framework could be disputed, I have ensured that the
methodology and assumptions are clear within this thesis so that the results could be
replicated and tested.
This study looks at three countries that have financial cooperatives, Cambodia which is
firmly rooted in Asia, Solomon Islands which is clearly located in the Pacific and Timor
Leste which could be argued is in Asia but is made up of a predominately Melanesian
and Austronesian population with European roots and religious beliefs whom have until
recently lived within a dominate Malay political and cultural environment.  Three distinct
locations within the Asia Pacific region with definite cultural identities.  The research is,
however in some ways, reductionist in its examination especially where quantitative
results are utilized. I want to recognize that the participants within this study cannot be
reduced to necessarily be representative of the entire country.  For example, the people
interviewed in Honiara whom are urban middle class and whose ideas and comments
are not representative of the people that may live only two kilometers away who are from
Lowe Howe Island and who are internally displaced. I have endeavoured to address this
limitation within the quantitative data collected by ensuring the voice of the participants
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within this research is evident to temper the perceptions of the reductionist nature of
some sections of the thesis.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides an outline of the main components of the thesis and the
background for why this research is necessary.  The purpose of this research is explained
along with the objectives and the structure of the thesis.  There is also a small discussion
of the necessity to develop a framework and schematic to view and analyze the data.
While I have outlined the limitations of the research I have also detailed the significance
of this thesis and referred to its contribution to the body of knowledge of both social capital
and financial cooperatives.
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Chapter Two: Financial Cooperatives and Social Capital: A
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I wrote of my objective to understand how financial cooperatives
can build social capital, I continue this journey by providing an understanding of what a
financial cooperative is and its place and function within the community.  I will also outline
the current social capital debates and offer a brief literature review and demonstrate the
intersections through which financial cooperatives and social capital connect. This
chapter will assist in understanding how financial cooperatives function in relation to the
development of social capital.  The following sections outline the activities that occur in
the operations of financial cooperatives which act as tools in the generation and
expenditure of social capital.  The social capital discussion flowing from understanding
how financial cooperatives operate will assist to frame the social capital development
tools which are unpacked in more detail within Chapter Three.
2.2 Financial Cooperatives
Financial cooperatives in various guises have a long history of people coming together
to informally save and borrow from each other (Moody and Fite 1984).  They are an
expression of people understanding that together they can improve their individual
circumstances (Evans et al. 2006). While financial cooperatives are spread across the
globe in 103 countries (WOCCU 2013)4 the effectiveness and utility of financial
cooperatives is often contested. Many local and international NGOs and multilaterals
which are tasked to alleviate poverty seek to “deliver” services ‘that tends to reward need
rather than initiative’ (Ellerman 2010: 153) and are too impatient to build capacity of the
community. They attempt to deliver economic development outcomes from a top down
rather than a bottom up or grassroots directed approach of financial cooperatives.   Often
the failure of the cooperative model (Harper 2010) is deemed to be too higher a price for
the agency and initiative that is derived from those institutions. Additionally there is a
neo liberal tendency to conflate the process of empowering communities with economic
growth (Y. Levi and Davis 2008; Parzen and Kieschnick 1992).  Economic development
through top down financing models is often privileged (Christen and Drake 2002) over
4 The WOCCU official statistics only account for those organisations/countries that provide data.  Unofficially
there are financial cooperative movements in numerous other countries.
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empowering and building long term capacity of communities through a slower, often more
sustainable model of cooperative development (Lewis 1996; Robb et al. 2013).
For the purposes of this research I have used the term financial cooperative to capture a
wide range of institutions that have at their core, a number of key elements which I will
explore later in this chapter.  Timor Leste, Cambodia and the Solomon Islands each have
a range of financial institutions that vary in form, procedures and processes but their
commonality is that they are owned and managed by their community.  In the Solomon
Islands there are Credit Unions, Savings Clubs as well as Village Savings and Loan
Associations (Drummond 2008; Government of Solomon Islands 2002a) similarly in
Timor Leste industrially bonded credit unions prevail along with numerous self-help
groups (Ferreira 2012). Cambodia has Village Savings Banks, Community Based
Microfinance Organisations, Credit Unions and various forms of Tontien5 and many
village based Self-Help Groups (Matthews 2005).  The commonality of these institutions
lies within the member based ownership and control, and in most cases the democratic
nature of the institutional structure.  Many of these institutions emerge from a desire to
have access to simple savings and loan services (Robb et al. 2013).  Many of the
communities may not have access to formal commercial financial institutions or the
formal financial institutions do not meet their needs or are unavailable in their village
(Matthews 2005; Moody and Fite 1984). Many commercial financial institutions do not
wish to service the needs of the poor as they are only able to deposit and borrow small
amounts of money. A high volume of small transactions from the poor can make the
community commercially difficult to service (Slocomb 2010).  Other socio-economic
segments of the community may be unattractive to commercial financial institutions due
to their location in sparsely populated areas or because of the geographical barriers that
also make servicing their financial needs unprofitable. Similarly this has now become
the experience of many larger microfinance organisations who were originally
established to serve the poor but who now have moved to serve the middle class
(Slocomb 2010) due to the high costs associated with high volume of small transactors.
5 Tontien, named after the Neapolitan banker Lorenzo de Tonti, are a method for groups to raise capital and
traditionally features an annuity and a lottery.  In Asia Tontiens are found in various forms and are used for
securing loans from the members of the group.  This is often seen as a form of gambling and does not play
a formal role in the microfinance sector.
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Financial cooperative members, especially in the rural areas tend to include both the poor
and those that have greater financial means.
2.2.1 Brief Global History of Financial Cooperatives
Mutuality and reciprocity have been the cooperative tools of communities for centuries.
They provided socially structured protection for common risks, crop failure, poor health,
old age, and death, access to reasonably priced food and/or access to finance.  The
cooperative nature of communities is evident throughout history.  The reciprocity of
people providing communal solutions to everyday individual problems.  In the
development of European economies, cooperatives emerged and started to become
institutionalized in the eighteenth century. This was partly due to the urbanization of
communities along with the movement of people from their birthplace.  Additionally, as
the markets were beginning to develop there were deficits within what the market was
beginning to supply, as the market was not yet sophisticated enough to address all of the
needs that were becoming evident in the rapidly changing social and economic
environment.
This thesis is focused on the emerging economies of South East Asia and the Pacific,
however the history outlined below of the development of financial cooperatives in
Europe draws on lessons of rapidly changing social, political and economic environments
similar to that which is occurring in the regions of this research.  The comparative lessons
can be drawn from both the macro level historical and environmental influences as well
as the micro communal resources that communities possess. The necessary shift of
reciprocity founded in personal relationships to that of institutionalized provision of goods
occurred during the industrial revolution in Europe.  These same shifts in the Asia Pacific
region are now occurring as the movement of population increases and the economies
of the countries studied formalize and are incrementally being linked to the global
economy.
Cooperatives were emerging around Europe in the mid nineteenth century (Birchall
2013b) in response to a number of political, economic and social factors occurring at the
time.  Britain was undergoing a fast transformation through the industrial revolution, the
German states where serfdom had been abolished in the earlier part of the century saw
independent farming arising where farmers were having to cope with a more market
driven environment with a monetized economy taking the place of subsistence and a
trade based exchange environment.  The mid nineteen hundreds also saw famine
throughout Europe due to poor wheat harvests and a blight on the potato crop in Ireland.
Throughout Europe there was a lack of affordable food due to the shortages.
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The emergence of institutionalized cooperativism in Britain was caused by the
depression in the weaving industry (Birchall 2013b).  The contributing factors included
the consolidation of the sector from an artisan lead sector to that of large merchants who
were able to force the earning capacity of the weavers down through their monopolistic
behavior.  Additionally the arrival of mass production and the development of a factory
system further alienated the workers from their output and began to create a divided and
deskilled labour force.  There was loss of status among the people along with an
urbanization and a rise of various health problems that created a dramatic change to
people’s lives. The consumer cooperative, Rochdale Pioneers, arose in 1944 partly due
to the ‘under-developed nature of the retail trade at the time’(Birchall 2013b: 184).  While
there was a distribution system available to the upper classes, a reasonably priced, well
stocked retail system was not available to the working class.  The Rochdale Pioneers
incorporated some simple principles into their business model.  That of a business that
was democratically controlled where surpluses would be given back to their membership
on a regular bases.  Each member would receive one vote regardless of their
shareholding.  This structure ensure that the very poorest of the community could
participate. When the Rochdale Savings Bank collapsed people put their money into the
retail coop as it was the only place they deemed safe to put their money.  This saw the
Rochdale Pioneer retail cooperative develop a financial cooperative component of their
cooperative model (Lewis 1992, 2006).
Hermann Schulze-Delitzch is credited as the founder of industrial cooperatives and the
originator of cooperative jurisdiction in his role as a member of the Reichstag (Asian
Confederation of Credit Unions 2002: 11).  Founded on the basis of self-help the
cooperatives were established in response to the difficulties that were felt by the urban
labourers and trades people during a particularly hard winter of 1846 (Cutcher and Mason
2013).  Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen established the Verein fur Selbstbeschaffung von
Brod Fruchten (the society for bread and grain supply) based on the same principles of
self-help and benevolent assistance whereby bread was provided on credit to the poorest
in the community (Asian Confederation of Credit Unions 2002: 4).  Based on these
principles Raiffeisen had, by 1864, developed and established the Thrift and Loan
Society.  In 1866 Raiffeisen published Credit Unions as a Remedy for Poverty of Urban
and Industrial Workers and Artisans (Raiffeisen 1866) which was credited for spreading
the message of credit unions around the world.
While the modern financial cooperative movement is attributed to the work of Raiffeisen
and Schulze-Delitzch, (Lewis 1996) in Asia forms of cooperativism had long been
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practiced and can be seen within the reliefs of Angkor Thom in Cambodia6. Before the
event of the modern day financial cooperative, Cambodians accessed credit through
Tontines. These were a form of pool-sharing which were imported from France.  It was
Lorenzo de Tonti who developed the Tontines as a way of enabling Louis XIV of France
to improve the revenues of the state in the early 1650s’ (McKeever 2008: 1).  Similarly
Oliver reminds us that pool-sharing has been an important part of the Solomon Island
custom and ‘occurred at the community level of organisations’ (Oliver 1989: 76).  Pool-
sharing saw cooperative pooling of both physical and human resources for the benefit of
the whole community.  The pooling or in Siuai language7, anurara was a form of sharing
based on the ability of one individual to contribute to the well-being of the group which
was usually close family. The pooling process did not involve any type of formal financial
interest however there was an expectation that a social obligation would emerge from
the transaction that could be called upon at a later time.  Commercial transactions of
loans requiring the payment of interest or Totokai were made by men which could have
also included livestock (Oliver 1955: 229).
Mutuality and reciprocity are common traits throughout all communities however the
institutionalization of the relationships has occurred at different times in different parts of
the world depending upon the influences present.  Timor Leste, Cambodia and the
Solomon Islands are each at different stages of their cooperative development and
therefore, as is evident in the data presented in the following chapters, this affects the
levels and location of social capital.
2.2.2 Financial Cooperative Structural Environment
In most cases individual financial cooperatives emerge as separate small entities and as
they develop and strengthen they tend to start looking further outside of their immediate
circumstances (Robb et al. 2013).  As this begins to occur they tend to group into regional
federations8 or leagues9. There are many reasons they look outward, often it is to seek
technical assistance as their institution grows, or to seek formal recognition or registration
6 Personal observation under the guidance of Mr Vong Sarinda, CEO of CAC Federation and a PhD student
researching cooperativism in Cambodia
7 The Siuai people are from Bougainville, Papua New Guinea and parts of the Western Province in Solomon
Islands
8 Federations within the credit union environment tend to be made up of state or provincial leagues that
provide representation at a national level.
9 Leagues within the credit union environment tend to be made up of individual credit unions from a particular
state or province and provide representation at a state level.
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of the institution, sometimes it is to use the voice of the members of the institution in other
community related issues (Lewis 1996). There have also been cases whereby local
NGOs and government authorities have initiated the development of a peak body for the
financial cooperatives (ACCU 1981). As these financial cooperatives mature and
develop into more formal and financially sustainable institutions they are eventually able
to pay the peak body a membership fee or subscription fee (Lewis 1996) which in turn
enables the peak body to provide more sophisticated services back to their membership.
Peak bodies of these institutions tend to develop in two ways.  Firstly they tend to begin
life as a unified voice of the institutions, that is, they develop an advocacy focus for their
institutional membership.  More recently in financial cooperative movement history the
federations or leagues have also sought to develop additional sources of income as often
membership fees have been deemed to be inadequate to run a professional
representative peak body (WOCCU 2012).  Many of the movements around the world
now have additional business services that the individual institutions can access on a fee
for service basis. The peak bodies also often have a membership structure similar to the
financial cooperatives whereby their members are the financial cooperatives who are
also the users or customers of their services (WOCCU 2012).
In the case of even more mature financial cooperative movements they form what are
called Centrals which act as an intermediary bank to the individual institutions with all of
the associated banking services and back room functions that each smaller institution
could not necessarily afford to offer their membership independently (Adrien 1997). The
economies of scale of consolidating banking functions lowers the operating costs and
enables the individual financial cooperatives the ability to offer products and services that
they would not otherwise be able to such as credit cards, ATMs, chequing services etc.
The Centrals are also able to provide liquidity services that enable small financial
cooperatives to manage and receive a greater return on member’s deposits (Skully and
Ho 1993).
In the case of Cambodia there is no national federation or league that encompasses all
of the financial cooperatives. Cambodia is currently a patchwork of regional federations
and networks. Many of Cambodia’s financial cooperative federations and networks were
initiated by local and international NGOs, and have tended to operate in isolation and in
many cases in competition with each other.
Unlike Cambodia there is one federation in Timor Leste called Hana Malu Federation
(FHM) that serves the entire credit union movement with a number of self-help groups
sitting under the guidance of individual credit unions (Ferreira 2012).  The federation has
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commenced a small program of centralized banking to generate a small amount of
operating revenue for the federation.  The federation serves as a conduit to report and
supervise the credit union movement to the National Directorate of Cooperatives
(Ferreira 2012). The Timorese credit union movement is small in terms of overall
individual membership with approximately 6,000 members but large in terms of the
number of institutions with 34 credit unions across the country with little over one million
US dollars in assets (Drummond 2013).  This is mainly due to the industrial bonded
nature of the institutions and the role the government has played in the development of
the credit union movement whereby the majority of the credit unions are public service
bonded. There is limited potential for membership growth due to the prescriptive nature
of the industry bonded structure which by its own design limits the number of people that
can join the credit union.
The Solomon Islands Credit Union League (SICUL) is mandated as per the Solomon
Islands Credit Union Act of 1986 (SICUL 2011) to undertake the supervision of the credit
unions and be the reporting mechanism to the Registrar of Credit Unions in the Solomon
Islands Central Bank (SICB).  There are also over 300 Savings Clubs which SICUL are
not formally charged to supervise however they have taken on the role to also be the
central point of reference for these institutions and for disseminating information on how
to start a Savings Club, selling manuals and operational materials to interested groups
(SICUL 2011). One of the main sources of SICUL’s income is based on mandatory yearly
registration fees from each of the credit unions.  The league is in part funded by the SICB
(CBSI 2012) but due to the geographical disbursement and size of the credit unions and
savings clubs it has been financially and logistically difficult to provide services and
supervision to their membership.
National federations and leagues come together to form regional confederations that are
made up of a membership of national federations or leagues that represent a region of
the world.  In Asia there is the Asian Confederation of Credit Unions (ACCU) and in the
Pacific there is the Oceania Confederation of Credit Union Leagues (OCCUL).  The
purpose of these regional bodies is to provide a regional voice (ACCU 2013; OCCUL
2013) on global financial issues such as Basel III and Anti Money Laundering (AML).
National leagues can be a part of these regional bodies and also be represented
internationally by them or join individually to the World Council of Credit Unions
(WOCCU) which is the worldwide body for predominately credit unions but also for other
forms of financial cooperatives such as Building Societies and Mutual Banks in Australia,
Cooperative Banks, Rotating Savings and Loan Societies in Africa, Savings and Loan
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Societies in Papua New Guinea etc. (WOCCU 2013).  The membership of this
organisation sees the institutions or representative bodies subscribe to a set of principles
that provide a guiding philosophy for the institutions (Table 1).
National governments often play an important role during the maturation process of a
financial cooperative movement.  As the institutions mature the influence of the state
becomes more evident as the risk profile of the institutions increases (Brian  Branch et
al. 2008). The state’s role and influence in each financial cooperative movement tends
to be focused around regulation and supervision to protect their citizen’s financial well-
being (Birchall 2013b, 2013a). The state’s responsibility is to set the framework of
regulation and supervision of all financial institutions with particular attention to those that
are deposit taking.
Governments of developing nations pay differing attention to the regulation and
supervision of financial cooperatives (Brian  Branch et al. 2008).  The attention paid is
usually subject to the asset size of the movement along with the potential demographic
spread of the institutions. Financial resources are allocated according to need along with
the impact and risk.  In Cambodia, Solomon Islands and Timor Leste the state plays a
minor role in the overall regulation and supervision of financial cooperatives. Financial
cooperatives often tend to serve the poor, the voiceless and the disempowered within
society. Financial cooperatives are perhaps not always politically active nor powerful and
therefore pose a low risk in the view of the state. This is especially the case in Cambodia
where the government has paid little attention to the rise of financial cooperatives within
its borders.  This is partly due to the low risk that these present to the overall well-being
of the finance system of Cambodia. The asset size of the institutions is comparatively
small in relation to the formal banking system as well as the microfinance sector (National
Bank of Cambodia 2013). Currently there is a draft financial cooperative regulation,
Prakas (Proclamation) that has been developed and is awaiting the review of a
parliamentary committee (National Bank of Cambodia 2008). The Solomon Island
government has played a slightly more active role in financial cooperatives upon the
urging of INGOs such as CUFA (Drummond 2008) and multilaterals such as the IMF10
and DIFID (Government of Solomon Islands 2002a) whereby the government enacted
the Credit Union Act (1986) however a review of and revision of this act was undertaken
10 Personal conversations with IMF Consultant Mr Pierre Seguin
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in 2006 by WOCCU and CUFA with discussions held with the then minister for Finance,
Gordon Lilo (now Prime Minister).  The revised Act is currently sitting awaiting a
parliamentary review committee to be formed.
In 2013 the Timorese government drafted a Cooperative Act and conducted some
consultation with the community however the act was shelved.  Pierre Seguin from the
IMF has been working with a number of Pacific nations to assist in the development of
financial cooperative regulation.  Seguin met with the Vice Minister of Timor Leste Mr.
Abel Ximenes and the Timorese government have agreed to having the IMF draft their
act and that it would be presented to the government in June 201411.
Financial cooperatives when viewed from a macro perspective have low visibility within
government due to numerous reasons including: the disempowered people that these
institutions usually serve, the financial size of the institutions and often due to logistical,
financial and geographical challenges.  For governments of developing nations it is often
problematic to regulate and supervise these small diverse institutions especially were
resources are scarce. These issues are compounded where governments have low
capacity and low awareness of the financial cooperative sector (Turtianen and Ward
2007).
2.2.3 Organising and Operating Principles of Financial Cooperatives
Financial cooperatives are only one type of cooperative; there are agricultural, productive
(sometimes called multipurpose), consumer and manufacturing types of cooperatives.
Regardless of the type of cooperative there are similarities in the manner in which they
operate and relate to their membership. Many financial cooperatives belong to both the
International Cooperative Association (ICA) and the World Council of Credit Unions
(WOCCU).  Each of the organisations have a set of principles under which their
membership must operate. The credit union principles and philosophy is based on ‘liberal
and Christian ideals’ (Cutcher & Kerr 2006: 34).  A philosophy that can unite people and
create shared norms and a sense of shared values and a common identity. The
principles of each peak body are similar.
11 Personal conversations with the President of Hana Malu Federation, Mr Elizario Ferreira and IMF
Consultant Mr Pierre Seguin.
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Table 1 Cooperative Principles
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Source: Adapted from (World Council of Credit Unions 2011a) & (International Cooperative Alliance 2011)
The Operating Principles of Financial Cooperatives are categorized into three main
areas, that of Democratic Structure where the principles speak to 1. Open and Voluntary
Membership, 2. Democratic Control and 3. Non-discrimination. The second area is
Service to Members that covers 1. Distribution to members to ensure members are
provided with fair rates of interest and dividends on shares in the institution, 2. Building
Financial Stability, and 3. Service to Members that ensures that the financial cooperative
improves the economic and social well-being of all members.  The last area is Social
Goals which actively promote 1. On-Going Education, 2. Cooperation among
Cooperatives and 3. Social Responsibility.  In the following sub-sections I will expand
further on each of these main areas to demonstrate the linkages of the operating
principles to the social components of the financial cooperatives.  This will highlight the
institutionalized social processes that are at play in the everyday operation of a financial
cooperative.
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Democratic Structure
There is a strong focus on the democratic voice of the institution’s membership. As Lewis
has argued ‘In its purest expression the democracy principle is about participation and
means, literally, the active  involvement of members in key business and policy decisions’
(Lewis 2006: XV). Cooperatives are by their very nature an institution that is both owned
and serves the same people.  The strength and power of this principle is dependent upon
the scale and structure of the institution.  When the institutions are small and developing
‘The decision making process tends to emphasize maximum involvement by members
and the subordination of boards of directors and management teams to the will of the
members expressed collectively through general meetings’ (Birchall and Simmons
December 2004: 487 - 88).  The larger the institution grows the more difficult it becomes
to ensure that democratic principles are embodied within the decision making of the
organisation. As the financial cooperative grows and professionalizes (Mason 2010) the
membership become disconnected with the institution and its daily operation and a
resulting growth in Absentee Membership (Kelly 2012: 169) occurs whereby the member
moves from having a voice and agency within the institution to being a customer and
beneficiary (Mason 2010). The democratic nature of the financial cooperative becomes
formalized and controlled to a position whereby the exercising of agency over the
institution is limited to the election of a board of directors. Putnam has argued that
democratic participation within an associational environment ‘allow individuals to express
their interest and demands on government and to protect themselves from abuses of
power by their political leaders’ (Putnam 2000: 338). ‘Underlying democratic institutions
there is thus a hidden tendency that often leads men to contribute, despite their faults
and errors, to the general prosperity…’(de Tocqueville 2004: 268).
Service to Members
Members as owners of the institution need to balance the personal benefits arising from
their membership with the institutional health of the organisation.  That is, the purpose of
the financial cooperative is to build the wealth of the member but at the same time ensure
continuity and sustainability of the institution.  This means that while the member should
receive fair interest for their savings, they should be charged reasonable rates of interest
on their loans. They cannot be at such levels that jeopardize the financial wellbeing of
the institution as this would also harm the member as an institutional owner. The
research data often refects the member’s desire for lower interest charged on their loans
but as owners of the institution and recipients of institutional dividends the management
of the financial cooperatives need to weigh the two objectives carefully so as both are
balanced off against each other.  The need to build financial stability in the institution
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benefits the whole community and provides longevity and therefore ongoing capacity to
meet the community’s financial needs.  Service to members means that there is a
balance in ensuring the ‘economic and social well-being of all members’ (World Council
of Credit Unions 2007).
Social Goals
Member education is seen as an avenue to promote the ideals of the cooperative
movement but at the same time assists in the strengthening and development of
individual institutions and the general community.  The educational emphasis on thrift
and the wise use of credit is highlighted in the worldwide cooperative phrase that has
been in use for many years of, “Borrow wisely and repay promptly” and “Not for Profit,
Not for Charity, But for Service” (Lewis 1996: xix). Members are taught the principles of
mutual self-help and democratic principles in seeking ‘to bring about human and social
development’ (World Council of Credit Unions 2007: 2).  The utility of credit unions  as
an educational tool is best summed up by Father Marion Ganey when he was quoted as
saying, as he travelled around the Pacific helping to start credit unions, ‘Credit unions
teach people about money’ (Runcie 1969: Preamble).
Mutualism has been defined as ‘self-help through cooperation’ (Mathews 2008: 45)
‘Rational mutuality can provide purpose and meaning in people’s lives, while lack of
mutuality can adversely affect self-esteem’ (Jordan 1985: 1). However the meaning of
the term mutuality can shift over time ‘to bring stability and cohesion …[in] a changing
economic and social environment’(Cutcher & Kerr 2006: 42).
The philosophy of the cooperative movement is one of cooperation in place of
competition. ‘Cooperation among cooperatives’ (World Council of Credit Unions 2007: 2)
is the manifestation of this belief system whereby globally cooperatives work closely
together ‘at a local, national and international level in order to best serve the interests of
their members and their communities’(World Council of Credit Unions 2007: 2).
Jarley (2005) has argued that unions can have more meaning and value by capitalising
on the ‘naturally occurring social networks that tie members together’(Jarley 2005: 1).
He argues against a ‘service model’, or what I have called professionalization (Mason
2010) to one that focuses on social capital formation and the role of mutual aid.  Where
the institution and its ownership and leadership is within a ‘Rooted membership’ (Kelly
2012: 169).
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2.2.4 Organisational Models and Types of Financial Cooperatives
Globally there are many different types and forms of financial cooperatives, each adapted
dependent upon the influences within the environment it is found.  Using an aerial view
there are two organisational models of financial cooperatives.  The first being a
grassroots type of financial cooperative where the decision making and the control of the
institution is positioned in the hands of the member with the benefits flowing directly to
the member.  The second model is that of the Desjardins type of structured organisation
whereby there are Caisses Populaires and Caisses d’Economie (credit unions) which
‘are assembled under a single federation’ (Desjardins Group 2013). This form of financial
cooperative gives a central body (the federation) the control over the institution.  Under
this model the institutional members need to sign up to conditions around the way their
financial institution is run and marketed to the community.  It could be described as
cooperative franchising whereby the federation, which is governed by its members,
dictates the strategic direction and management of the institution. In this model the
individual member’s voice is located within the peak body through their representative
from their cooperative rather than at the local institutional level. While they directly elect
their representatives onto the board of their institution the major decision making related
to their institution is located at a federation level.  The federation board is in turn elected
by the individual institutions and so the member’s democratic voice is far removed from
the actual individual institutional decision making.
When using the prism of either a grassroots managed organisation or a top down
management structure the financial cooperatives of Timor Leste and Solomon Islands fit
neatly into the bottom up model approach, as do many of the Cambodian financial
cooperatives within this research.  The exception is those surveyed from Cambodian
Community Savings Federation (CCSF) which increasingly has moved from being
community controlled institutions to one of being directed by the federation.
2.2.5 Emergence of Financial Cooperatives (Endogenous, Exogenous)
Financial cooperatives emerge in various ways and through numerous influences.  Some
institutions are developed through local leadership and others through the influence of
local or international NGOs or through state initiatives.  In Asia many of the cooperative
movements have been developed on the basis of charismatic figures that seek to spread
the message about the social and economic benefits of cooperative approaches to
financial services.  In the Pacific these charismatic figures have mostly been religious
actors such as Father Ganey (Biumaiono 2013; McClure 2011).  Usually these individuals
tend to go village to village and generate significant interest where in the following years
a regional or national financial cooperative movement emerges.
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The Cambodian financial cooperatives within this research emerged from the work of
predominately three groups or individuals.  The CCSF group of financial cooperatives
emerged from an international project run by CARE Australia and CUFA, whereas both
the CAC and the CFIN group were initiated by a Cambodian, Mr. Sarinda Vong who had
a depth of experience with financial cooperatives and excellent community development
skills.  He was able to build a local NGO structure around groups of financial cooperatives
to provide support and technical assistance.  The Flifly financial cooperatives were
developed by a local NGO.
The financial cooperatives in the Solomon Islands emerged through a combination of
influences.  Credit unions started to emerge in the Pacific in the 1960’s through the work
of the Jesuits and the Catholic Church (McClure 2011).  During the 1980s’ the Solomon
Island government in partnership with DFID undertook a program to develop credit unions
on the main islands.  In 1986 the Credit Union Act was passed recognizing the reach of
these institutions.  During the 1990s CUFA built on this work and implemented a smaller
scale cooperative model of Savings Clubs that could service the needs of smaller groups
of people that didn’t have the population and human capacity necessary operate a formal
financial institution (CUFA 2002).
The credit union concept was first introduced to Timor Leste by the Reverend Albert
Karim from Germany in 1990 when the Timor Leste was part of Indonesia.  In the first
year five credit unions where established, two in Dili and one each in Bobonaro, Sare
and Atsabe.  In the early stages the credit unions were supported by Yasasan Ema Mata
Dalan Ba Progressu (ETADEP).  The cooperative movement during Indonesian times
developed multi-sectoral cooperatives called Koperasi Unit Desa (Cooperatives in the
Village Unit) which were run by the Village Chief, only later did government bonded credit
unions emerge after independence.  The first incarnation of the Hana Malu Federation
was established on the 24 April 1996 and was re-established again in 2009 with the
assistance of CUFA.
The levels of success in financial cooperative development are influenced by external
factors. There have been numerous reports and studies (Adusei and Appiah 2011;
Besley et al. 1993; Glenk et al. 2009; Mathews 2003) as to the reasons for failure of
cooperatives. Huppi and Feder (1990) have argued government supported cooperatives
have often failed due to the desire for them to develop quickly rather than giving them
time to mature at their own pace.  ‘many failures have frequently been the result not of
intrinsic faults with the concept of group ownership, nor members’ own mistakes, but of
overzealous or misdirected efforts by governments or other agencies…’(Harper and Roy
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2000: 4).  Governments, and for that matter donors, expect sustainability in short periods
of time which is not possible if the members have not had sufficient time to develop
relationships and norms within their institution. There are those that argue that
cooperatives will only be successful if they emerge through their own endeavours without
any external assistance (Shah 1996). If trust is a key element of successful financial
cooperatives then, as Uslaner (2003b) has asked, how can the state manufacture this
trust?  Uslaner (2003b) argues that the inherent democracy within the process of
government doesn’t produce more trust unlike Levi (1998) who has argued that it is the
economic equality and the surrounding government policies that creates trust.
Conversely Veenstra (2002) has argued that the influence of trust and participation within
the civil space impacts the performance of governments and economic growth.
2.2.6 Financial Cooperatives and Microfinance
There are tensions between the financial cooperative movement and the credit driven,
neoliberal, commercial forms of microfinance. The tensions are located within the nature
of the supply driven approaches of credit focused microfinance institutions and the
demand driven cooperative sector as well as the disempowerment of the community
within a supply driven microfinance context as opposed to the community centered
approach of the financial cooperatives.
The concept of commercial/supply driven microfinance is a much more recent
development, emerging in the 1970s from what was subsidized credit.  Much of the
subsidized credit market was framed around rural finance projects that were mostly
provided to fund agricultural production which were focused on increasing agricultural
production to improve food security. (Clarke & Parris 2011). Today more often the aim
of microfinance is poverty alleviation with the goal of improving livelihoods and providing
access to improve education and health opportunities (Conroy 2003). Generally early
microfinance programs which were aimed at alleviating poverty were focused on
microcredit as a way of improving the poor’s’ access to credit from the formal market.
Clarke & Parris (2011) argue that the value and importance of saving as a tool against
future shocks was recognised in the later stages of the development of the microfinance
sector.  It was only in the 1990s that many of the microcredit focused organisations
understood that for their programs to become sustainable they needed to broaden their
financial service provision to include not only savings products but also micro insurance,
and remittance products and services (Conroy 2003; Cornford 2001).
Financial cooperatives tend to emerge from an identified need of community when they
have been excluded from formal financial services (Brodrecht 2012; Evans et al. 2006;
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Myers et al. 2012).  Financial cooperatives mostly begin their life as a safe place to save
and borrow (Evans and Ford 2003; Evans and Klaehn 2004).  The sophistication of the
products and services varies as the emerging institutions are managed and staffed by
the members as volunteers. Financial cooperatives that are truly community owned take
time to develop and mature, often over many years (Oluyombo 2012).  Financial
cooperatives are managed and governed by the community of members and so the
institution develops in pace with the skill development and education of the members
(Huppi and Feder 1990).
Table 2 Comparison of Financial Cooperatives and Microfinance
Source: (Mason 2011a) adapted from (World Council of Credit Unions 2007) and (Clarke & Parris 2011)
Table 2 contrasts the tensions that lie within the differences between financial
cooperatives and commercial/supply driven microfinance12.
12 In this instance commercially driven can also refer to microfinance institutions that are initiated and/or
managed by both local and international NGOs
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2.2.7 Financial Cooperatives, Poverty Alleviation and Social Capital
The role of financial cooperatives in the alleviation of poverty through the development
of social capital is a significant and important area of research that deserves particular
attention and could be the area of further research following on from this thesis.  While I
acknowledge its importance and the need to highlight the connections it is not the
purpose of this thesis to explore these connections in depth but to critically outline the
links that financial cooperatives have to the development of social capital.
Financial cooperatives assist in the development of community, through the activity of
operating and governing the institutions as well as through the provision of products and
services to their members and by extension to their community.  They build a sense of
common good, they facilitate social interaction and build social relationships and enable
the community to engage in self-help along with developing a sense of identity through
collective action (Albee and Gamage 1996; Brown 2002; Evans et al. 2006; Mathews
2003). ‘People, regardless of their economic & social circumstance, have the capacity
to change and improve their lot, given proper motivation and means to do it. Self-help
and mutual help are key to successful credit unions’ (Romulo Villamin, NATTCO in
Matthews 2006: 1).
Chambers understands poverty alleviation to be premised on strategies which must be
connected ‘with the realities of people who are marginal, [and] vulnerable…’(Chambers
2010: 16).  The inclusion of civil society is as critical to social development as the state
and the market (Neamtan 2002: 7). ‘A country’s economic development is embedded in
its social organisation…’ (Narayan 2002: 58). Social capital and the associated social
networks within economic development is seen as essential for growth or as Putnam has
called it ‘network capitalism’ (Putnam 1993a: 5). ‘informal and formal relationships on
both the organisational and individual levels play a role in legitimation, creating
awareness and mobilizing for change’ (Brown 2002). Cooperatives’ role in assisting in
the alleviation of poverty is however contested (Vicari et al. 2008: 2). Simmons and
Birchall (2008) have argued that the results are varied from country to country and are
impacted by structural influences such as the ownership and control as well as macro-
economic factors of state governance.
2.3 Social Capital
The term social capital was first used by Hanifan in his article The Rural School
Community Centre published in September 1916. He presented it as the property of
communities based on goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse (Hanifan
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1916).  Hanifan described social capital as a resource that could be utilised to improve
community wellbeing (Hanifan 1916: 130-31).
‘In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual
acceptation of the term capital, except in a figurative sense.  I do not refer
to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in
life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the
daily lives of people; namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social
unit...The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself...If he comes into
contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an
accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social
needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial
improvement of living conditions in the whole community’
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Nearly 100 years later the ideas of Hanifan are still relevant to the way in which financial
cooperatives develop. ‘Social capital is…investment in social relations with expected
returns’ (Lin 1999a: 30). Social capital is also defined as the ‘social networks, the
reciprocities that arise from them, and the value of these for achieving mutual goals’
(Baron et al. 2000).  ‘Social Capital, in short, refers to social connections and the
attendant norms and trust’ (Putnam 1995).
Fine (2010) argues, this approach to social capital has been misappropriated to meet the
needs of a neo-liberal agenda. Social capital is now used as a common tool to
understand and to articulate the organisational and economic development of civil
society. Social capital is now seen as an instrument to understand “the social” within
business, economics, organisational behaviour, political science, and sociology, and is
often defined as the advantage created by a person’s location in the structure of
relationships. It explains how some people gain more success in a particular setting
through their superior connections to other people. Theoretically, social capital has been
conceptualised at multiple levels (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002c). Social capital can
be viewed at either a national level (Uslaner 2003b), organisational level (Rothstein and
Stolle 2003) and/or at the individual level (Bourdieu 2002). Considerable research has
been conducted in the area of social capital; however, researchers are just beginning to
integrate social capital across the different dimensions of the various types of analyses
(Michael Woolcock and Narayan 2007). My thesis seeks to contribute to this field of
understanding the multivariate approach to social capital.
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There is no consensus on how to measure social capital, which is seen as one of its
weaknesses (Fine 2010). Measuring social capital has proven somewhat complicated.
The term social capital is argued to have similar (although less measurable) benefits to
that of the classical theory of capital (Parsons 1947). However, the analogy with capital
is misleading to the extent that, unlike traditional forms of capital, social capital is not
depleted by use, but in fact depleted by non-use (”use it or lose it”) (Halpern 2008). In
this respect, it is similar to the now well-established economic concept of human capital
(Coleman 1988). New insight into social capital is provided by the work of sociologists
Bankston and Zhou (2002) who point out that the concept of social capital is based on
an imprecise metaphor. They observe that social capital does not consist of resources
held by individuals or groups, but of processes of social interaction leading to constructive
outcomes (Zhou and Bankston 1994). Social capital has also been largely defined as
the resources available to one through the networks that they hold (Bourdieu 2002; Esser
2008).
The contested nature of social capital has been debated and questioned (Fine 2003;
Gargiulo and Benassi 2000; Macinko and Starfield 2001) and yet there is a lack of any
consensus on its form, position or benefits. The purpose of this thesis is not to determine
the merits of the arguments around the existence of social capital but to acknowledge its
existence, examine the debates and move to looking at social capital in context to
financial cooperatives.
2.3.1 The Contested Definition
Social capital is now permeating through all aspects of life from academic circles,
community organisations, policy making, at a local, regional, national and global level.
Its’ impact can perhaps be attributed to the shift in western political theory away from the
state and the citizen to the space in-between, that of the civic space (Newell 2008).
Social capital then follows both the contemporary liberal democratic theory and that of
the ‘third way’ (Giddens 2013) as a form of communitarianism. ‘In both cases, civic space
or community is the starting point of analysis, rather than either the rights-bearing citizen,
liberalism or the equality-bearing state of socialism or social democracy’ (Arneil 2006: 1).
Due to this separation from the state and the citizen it is therefore above the simple left
and right divide.  It, according to Arneil (2006), challenges both ideologies of the modern
era, that of liberalism and of socialism.
Fine (2003) wishes to understand social capital away from postmodern interpretations
loaded with meaning, subjectivity and relativism.  Fine views social capital within a
framework of how it is constructed and experienced.  He also distances his position from
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neo-liberal writings (Becker 1976; Coleman 1988) on the subject to move away from
looking at social capital through a market lens, that is, social capital does not necessarily
need an economic foundation to view its properties. The all invasive presence of the
market within the state and the commercialization of culture within society that treats
social capital as being quantifiable and marketable as a commodity is a highly contested
space (Fevre 2000; Halpern 2008; Solow 2000).  The argument against an economic
imperialist approach whereby social capital is a non-market phenomena (Fine 2003) is
then often treated as a commodity that has a market and a value through a rational choice
approach (Becker 1976; Becker and Murphy 2000; Coleman 1990b).  Treating social
capital as a commodity sought after through self-interest is premised on the widely
accepted understandings of human capital and the resulting ideas of its presence within
the market (Coleman 1988).  At its core is the rational individual (Coleman and Farraro
1992) in terms of agency but this approach also enables individuals to organise
collectively (Tyler 2011). It has moved the debate from an economic imperialist argument
that sees individual rational choice driving the market to a position whereby we
understand that there are market imperfections that enable individuals to join together to
create institutions, culture and norms to generate trust within their network (Eriksson
2011).  This approach allows an evolved response to non-economic performance to cater
for perceived market imperfections whereby they are no longer unconsidered within the
economic disciplines. The World Bank has used social capital from a functionalist
approach as a tool that enables markets to work better (Bebbington et al. 2006) and to
activate communities within the context of self-help.  Cynically it allows the World Bank
to influence the development projects through the community’s act of participation.
Bourdieu would see this as how oppression and power could manifest itself in influencing
the economy and the culture (Castiglione et al. 2008: 3).
Social capital’s fungible nature enables it to be utilized in multiple ways.  ‘Social capital,
like globalization, can be turned to examine almost any issue, to deploy almost any
methodology, method and theory, to be empirical, conceptual or technical, to range over
time, place and context, to contribute to any discipline and to interdisciplinary study, and
to revamp old ideas, publications, funding proposals, and projects as if they were new’
(Fine 2003: 40). Herein lies the danger of reductionism as there is a problem in the
various analysis being put forward within a social capital framework, insofar as viewing
these as having commonalities and in doing so their difference is lost (Baron et al. 2000).
Gender, ethnicity and culture are treated as a tool to generate social capital rather than
the social capital itself (Arneil 2006; Lin 2008).  Fine (2010) argues social capital is
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ahistorical and asocial and that we must be sensitive to the specificities and context within
which it is used. (Fine 2010).
Putnam (2000) and Coleman (1988) theoretical underpinning of the manifestation of
capital as a concept is also problematic as they see social capital, as with other forms of
capital, accruing through hard work and commitment and having the promise of a
dividend in the future, with the ability for it to appear that it is available to anyone, with
the right choices and with putting in their own time.  For Coleman (1988) and Putnam
(2000) social capital is uncomplicated and unproblematic however through it’s very
construction it becomes problematic if culture, gender or ethnicity is unconsidered.  It is
by its nature positive in all facets, the outcomes are positive and its functional nature can
create greater means according to Putnam (2000).  Putnam (2000) and Coleman (1988)
position social capital differently to other forms of capital in terms of its benefits.  While
other forms of capital benefit the individual, the benefits of social capital can return to
others rather than necessarily the individual.  Others may reap the benefits rather than
the individual who has put in time and energy (Coleman 1988; Putnam 2000).
Bourdieu (2002) positions capital in three forms; Economic, Cultural and Social whereby
the term capital is the differentiation of power associated with these forms of capital.  It
is the role that history and power play in the makeup of civil society and therefore is not
free flowing nor does it have the functional attributes of a means of exchange in a laisser-
faire manner, it is loaded with historical power relations (Siisiainen 2000; Swartz 1997).
Within this conceptual framework social capital cannot be seen to be a benign force, and
it cannot be argued that it operates to everyone’s benefit or interest.
The difference between Bourdieu and many of the American School of social capital is
the preference for networks and resources. The American School of social capital
focuses on the functionalist approach whereby social capital depends upon the
transformational qualities of connectedness which generates trust and the resulting
“lubrication” that improve societies and the way in which they function.
Jean Cohen and Arato (1992) argue, based on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony ‘civil
society is not a space within which individuals cooperate in various associations and
come together but a locus of contestation and division where the hegemony of one
culture fights to dominate others’ (Arneil 2006: 9).  Cohen (1999) argues that using
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony sees civil society not as natural but as a state of social
contestation ‘its associations and networks are a terrain to be struggled over and an
arena wherein collective identities, ethic values and alliances are forged. Indeed,
competing conceptions of civil society are deployed in a continual struggle either to
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maintain cultural hegemony by dominant groups or to attain counter-hegemony on the
part of subordinate collective actors’ (Jean Cohen 1999: 214). When we use concepts
such as “sites of contestation” it becomes more tangible in terms of the positioning of
minorities and the positioning of justice. Bourdieu’s use of power within networks and
resources in place of trust and shared norms make his positioning of social capital easier
to frame within a society which is diverse and multicultural (Arneil 2006; Bourdieu 2002;
Siisiainen 2000).
Arneil (2006) goes beyond Bourdieu’s analysis of class to include a gendered and cultural
analysis of social capital.  What is absent from Bourdieu’s argument is the dimension of
resistance and agency by minority groups which is curious given his focus on power
relations.  So in addition to Bourdieu’s analysis, Arneil (2006) argues that not only do you
need to look at social capital in terms of accumulated power relations within the
environment of the various groups of people but we must also look at the resistance and
agency of the marginalised groups and the growth of this resistance historically to the
boundaries and norms.
2.3.2 The Theorists: Coleman, Putnam and Bourdieu et al
Hanifan (1916), a young progressive educator and social reformer, a Presbyterian,
Rotarian and Republican believed ‘that the grave social, economic, and political problems
of the communities in which he worked [nearly a century ago] could be solved only by
strengthening the networks of solidarity among their citizens’ (Putnam 2002: 4).  He
understood that some of the older customs of reciprocity and community spirit had fallen
away.  The disintegration of civic engagement had been replaced by family isolation.
Since Hanifan (1916) social capital has been utilised in a range of disciplines including
sociology (Bankston and Zhou 2002; Loizos 2000), political sciences (Maloney 2008;
Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Uslaner 2003a) , economics (Cersosimo 2008; Krishna 2008;
Michael  Woolcock and Radin 2008), public health (Jain et al. 2012; Macinko and Starfield
2001), education (Coleman 1990a; Szreter 2000), urban planning (Rosero-Bixby 2006;
Thomas 2002), criminology (Buonanno et al. 2009), organisational development (Leana
and van Buren 1999; R. C. Mayer et al. 1995; Thornton and Jaeger 2006), and
international development (Babajanian 2008; Pantoja 2002; Reid and Salmen 2002).
The outcomes from these studies are numerous and speak to the way in which social
capital is entrenched within our everyday life. Scholars have positioned social capital in
a multiplicity of ways, as having both positive (Putnam 1992, 1993a) and negative
(Bourdieu 1985) features and benefits, being located in the institution (Rothstein and
Stolle 2008), the community (Hooghe 2003), individual (Bourdieu 1985) or the
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relationship between (Coleman 1990b).  There are nearly as many positions and variance
in the understanding of social capital as there are scholars in this field of inquiry.  It would
be extremely easy to be caught focusing on the debates rather than the primary research
question.  There is however significant value in understanding the theoretical positioning
of some of the social capital luminaries in order to provide some context to the research
that I have undertaken in this thesis.
Social capital is a highly contested concept however using Claridge’s (2004) timeline of
the development of social capital theory (Figure 1) the reader can understand how the
debate has developed and how there is an alignment of theorists in respect to the two
different schools of social capital thought has advanced.
Figure 1 Contemporary Authors on Social Capital
Source: (Claridge 2004: 21)
Each of the arrows in Figure 1 demonstrate the theoretical splintering based on other
theorists work. Moving forward to 2014 theorists are still fragmenting further as the field
of social capital inquiry develops, however for the purposes of clarity and to ensure the
robust nature of the resulting Social Capital Schematic I have endeavoured to utilize only
highly cited scholars of each component and theoretical branch of social capital.  I have
cited a number of theorists published more recently including a number of Australian
social capital scholars (Cox 2002; Onyx and Bullen 2000; Onyx 2005), their work is
36
founded on that of either the European School or American School of social capital. The
American School of social capital, that of Putnam (1992, 1993a, 2000) and Coleman et
al, (1988, 1990b) see it as existing outside of the state and with perceived positive
qualities such its aggregate nature, connectedness, solidarity and generalized
reciprocity.  The European School of social capital, that of Gramsci (1995) and Bourdieu
(Bourdieu 2002) offer a more negative view of the qualities of social capital as well as
positioning it structurally. Within the European School, questions are raised as to the
often exclusionary nature of social capital and the assimilationist features and whether
they embrace ‘a principle of transcendent unity as a centerpiece of community will…’
(Arneil 2006: 240).
The positioning of social capital by theorists can also be divided three ways as highlighted
in Figure 2, those which posit that it resides in the individual and class, which is a more
structural approach such as that taken by Bourdieu (1995). Then there are theorists such
as Coleman (1988) and Foley (1996) that position it within the family and community and
then others such as Putnam (1992, 1993b, 1995, 2002) Woolcock (2002), Narayan
(2001), Fukuyama (2000b, 2001, 2002) that position it within the community but also
within the cultural context and agency of the actors.
Figure 2 Contemporary Authors Level of Study of Social Capital
Source: (Claridge 2004: 19)
Robert Putnam
The most cited social capital theorist is Robert Putnam whom has loomed large in this
area.  Putnam was one of the first scholars utilizing social capital to step outside of the
normative theory of civic space and arm himself with quantitative data which reinterpreted
the civic space based on empirical science (Putnam 1992, 1993a, 2000, 2001, 2002).
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Putnam believed that central to the quality of demographic politics is the performance of
interest groups and associations.  He sees a strong civil society as a good check on the
state.  Civil society organisations are not the only institutions and mechanisms available
but are an essential part of developing sound and sustainable democratic institutions.
The quality of associational life is seen as an indicator of the accumulation of social
capital that a community possesses (Putnam 1993a, 1995).
While Putnam acknowledges forms of negative social capital he sees it as a requirement
for a well-functioning, democratic government and for economic development.  This view
of Putnam’s has been developed through his understanding of Alexis de Tocqueville’s
(2004) sense of civil society and democracy. De Tocqueville (2004) argued that
Americans had a propensity to create and join voluntary associations that were neither
part of the market nor part of the state.  Being neither part of the state or the market
enables these communities of interest to capitalise on, and invest in, aspects of their
community life through coming together to build trust, social norms and networks which
allows community members the ability to achieve shared objectives (Putnam 1995).
Putnam’s (2000) underlying assumption is of a civil society that is good and that which is
a vehicle for people to work together to achieve shared goals and interests through trust
and reciprocity.  This is an idealised notion of Tocquevillian civil society although as Foley
and Edwards (1996) have argued, de Tocqueville’s position on civil society is far more
complex and contested than perhaps Putnam’s interpretation.  Foley and Edwards (1996)
have argued that de Tocqueville saw the associationism emerging out of an egalitarian
society framed within particular social and political conditions unique to America at the
time.  De Tocqueville saw egalitarianism as Janus faced for ‘if men are to remain civilized,
or to become so, they must develop and perfect the art of associating to the same degree
that equality of conditions increases among them’ (de Tocqueville 2004: 599). De
Tocqueville (2004) saw conformism and mediocrity which associations had emerged to
address.
Putnam addresses the tensions of collective action (Putnam 1995) that flows from
associationism.  The individualistic aims of the one according to Putnam can be
overcome by understanding that unlike economic and human capital, social capital does
not belong to the individual or to institutions but resides in the relations between the
actors.  This type of capital can only be drawn down upon by collective action and/or
cooperation rather than through the individual. Putnam provides us with Bonding and
Bridging social capital (Putnam 2000) to explain the differential abilities of groups to
access and exchange social capital. Bonding social capital is that which is accumulated
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and generated within a tightly defined group whereas Bridging social capital is that which
is where closed groups link with other groups.  Putnam’s social capital has been criticized
for being oversimplified and under-theorised particularly through the lack of
acknowledgement of the conflictual nature of civil society (Arneil 2006; Foley and
Edwards 1996: 40-41).  Putnam elevates social capital based on democratic values and
attitudes.
Organisations such as the World Bank and other development practitioners grasped
Putnam’s use of social capital and the way he uses trust based voluntary associations
as a key constituent of civil society (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer 2001, 2002c; Grootaert
et al. 2004).  It is within these civic institutions for Putnam that he normalises social capital
within the social networks to engender cooperative action within society both within the
institutions and the actors (Putnam 2000).  This amalgamation of social capital into civil
society has enabled the international development community (to some extent) to see
the social capital within these institutions and communities as a panacea to development
requirements in emerging nations.
James Coleman
James Coleman (1988) put social capital back into scholarly writing in the late 1980s,
using it to understand the social setting of education as Hanifan (1916) has done at the
start of the century.  Coleman looks at the wider environment both civic and non-civic
areas and provides a theoretical basis for the way social capital is distributed. There are
three components of social relations that are useful within the exchange which is
trustworthiness, obligations and expectations (Coleman 1988). Using this model social
capital both enables and constrains action.  Coleman (1988) argues there are two types
of structure that enables social capital to accumulate.  The first structure being closed
social networks which is used to effect action, that is, to provide a framework to enable
sanctions and provide norms and values by which people’s actions occur.  Within this
there is a structure of trust that can be used to imply obligations and create expectations.
The second being social organisations such as voluntary organisations that are focused
on a purpose.
Coleman (1988) views social capital as behaving as other capital in as much as it is
productive and enables outcomes that without it would not be possible.  He ascribes other
attributes to social capital, he sees it as being specific to particular activities and is not
always useful in every context and in fact can be harmful in certain situations. Coleman
(1988) sees social capital deviating from other types of capital whereby it is not separate
from, but inherent in, the structure of the relationship between the actors. Coleman
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(1988) is able to demonstrate that social capital is not the preserve of the elite and
powerful and that there is an accumulation of social capital within poor and marginalised
communities and therefore social capital can benefit the group rather than just the
individual which is accompanied by reciprocity, associated trust and shared values.
Coleman (1988) endeavours to undertake an inter-disciplinary approach using
economics and sociology within his theoretical writing as he places social capital within
rational choice theory framework. ‘Rational choice (or rational action) theory shares with
classical economics a belief that all behaviour results from individuals pursuing their own
interests; social interaction is therefore viewed as an exchange’ (Field 2006: 21).
Coleman (Coleman 1988; Coleman and Farraro 1992; Marsden 2005) has rational
choice theory at the core of his theory along with the individual and their choices that
benefit them. Coleman has developed a concept of social capital that explains how
people also cooperate as he argues that social capital could offset social and economic
disadvantage.  Coleman ‘defined social capital as a useful resource available to an actor
through his or her relationships’ (Field 2006: 23).’  Coleman sees human and economic
capital within individual ownership whereas social capital is possessed by those who
created it (within a structure) and therefore is a public good as opposed to a private good
such as human and economic capital.
Coleman reconciles his theoretical rationalist choice understanding through the
justification of people working together to achieve a common goal.  Coleman incorporates
the understanding of an individual benefit that would otherwise not be realised outside of
group action (Coleman and Farraro 1992).  Therefore collective action can be seen as a
mechanism to achieve individual goals.  Notwithstanding, rational choice theory
predominately focuses on the individual and their self-interest so cooperation and
solidarity is in broad opposition to its theoretical underpinnings.  Coleman views social
capital in what de Certeau might describe as a poetry of tactics and strategies (de
Certeau et al. 1998) as he sees the use of resources and actions on an “as needs basis”
and does not overlay any judgment on the deployment of those resources.  That is, they
are neither good nor bad, and are just a context from which both sources and effects
materialize but without which would not be possible. (Portes 1998).
Pierre Bourdieu
Pierre Bourdieu’s social capital is used to understand social hierarchy. His social capital
theoretical underpinnings were influenced by Marxist sociology and although he tried to
develop his theories away from this influence, he believed that all capital has economic
capital features (Field 2006: 15).  Bourdieu (Swartz 1997) also argued that social capital
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embodies the relationship of culture to the economic and the differential of power within
those relationships.  Within his deeply Marxist influenced theoretical base he sought to
understand the inequalities that are produced and reproduced through all types of capital
(Bourdieu 1985). Bourdieu (1985) endeavoured to delineate between types of capital
and argued that while representing capital in all its forms it cannot be treated within the
same economic paradigm. Transmission of different forms of capital produced differing
results and because of the hidden nature of some forms of capital they are less able to
be controlled by external forces.
Bourdieu wrote of the ‘brutal fact of universal reducibility to economics’ (Bourdieu 1986:
253) and in doing so, tried to blend the structural elements of inequality with an
understanding of the role of human agency.  This does not appreciate the power of social
capital, only the way in which people use it to their own ends.  There is no place in his
theory for groups and collective action to accumulate social capital to be utilised for the
greater collective good as he saw social capital as a possession of the privileged and
elite (Bourdieu 2002, 2003; Siisiainen 2000; Swartz 1997). Bourdieu positions social
capital as an attribute of an individual in a social context. One can acquire social capital
through purposeful actions, and can transform social capital into conventional economic
gains. The ability to do so depends on the nature of the social obligations, connections
and networks available to the individual (Bourdieu 2002; Lin 1999a).
Bourdieu (1985) argues the group needs to maintain investment in the network and the
solidarity that is formed, because there is a material or symbolic benefit through
membership.  For this benefit to be realised over the long term Bourdieu added the
relationships must have ‘durable obligations subjectively felt’ (Bourdieu 1980: 2; 1986:
249).
There are difficulties with Bourdieu’s use of social capital being the domain of the elites
and the way in which they use it to secure and maintain their position within society. He
also focuses heavily on the social capital within the context of kinship.  It appears that
while Bourdieu did value some agency in his writing he struggled to free himself of
viewing the relationships outside of the social hierarchies.
2.3.3 Social Capital Components
Positioning of Social Capital
There is an ongoing debate on the positioning of social capital (Comim 2008; Halpern
2008; Hooghe and Stolle 2003), whether social capital is generated and expended by the
individual or within and by the institution or whether it is within the personal relationships
and networks or within the institutional networks and relationships.  Positioning social
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capital assists in informing the way in which it is measured, what is measured and if in
fact it can be measured.
The functional approach to social capital includes scholars such as Coleman (Marsden
2005) and Bourdieu (Swartz 1997).  Coleman positions actors with resources over which
they have some if not total control and importantly they also have interests in.  Coleman
looks at the functional aspects of this interaction and argues that ‘Social interdependence
and systemic functioning arise from the fact that actors have interests in events that are
fully or partially under the control of other actors’ (Coleman 1990b: 300). Coleman
contends that social relations emerge ‘when individuals attempt to make best use of their
individual resources’ (Coleman 1990b: 300) and argues that these cannot only be viewed
as elements of social structures but as resources of the individual. This at first glance
may be considered a rational choice approach to agency, Coleman has stated ‘…
individuals, each of whom acts to achieve goals that are independently arrived at, and
that the functioning of the social system consists of the combination of these actions of
independent individuals’ (Coleman 1990b: 300).
Social capital according to Coleman is specific to certain actions and may in fact be
detrimental to other actions. Coleman positions social capital within the relations between
people, ‘Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations
between persons and among persons’ (Coleman 1990b: 302). Coleman sees social
capital not within the individual, or in a Marxist or Weberian sense, located in the
resources of production but within the structure of the relationship (Szreter 2000).
Loury built on the concept of social status to offer a theory that understood social capital
as a way of offering intergenerational mobility that could be passed on from a family onto
individuals (Loury 1981). Putnam positions social capital as a community attribute
through the distinctions of bridging and bonding mechanism.  Bonding social capital
creates in-group ties or as Putnam has written ‘sociological superglue’ (Putnam 2000:
23) whereas bridging is the ‘sociological WD-40’ (Putnam 2000: 23) referring to its wider
reach and possibilities.
Sobel (2002) draws on the individual and their purposeful actions to create social capital
in context to the society within which they live (Sobel 2002).  Portes (2000) argues that
there are tensions between these two elements due to the potential of the use of social
capital by one to weaken and lessen the social capital of another.  Portes et al argues,
this can create exclusivity and in some cases rent-seeking behavior (Portes and Landolt
2000).  Conversely as noted by many scholars (François 2002; Fukuyama 2001; Harrigan
and El-Said 2009; Pieterse 2006) social capital is seen as important for economic growth
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and to the development and stability of democracy (de Tocqueville 2004; Hooghe 2003).
Fukuyama (2002) sees social capital residing in small kinship networks which he argues
are valuable social assets for a community regardless that they are closed off. It is within
these small kinship networks that generate economic benefits through their market
interaction and their increased levels of trust because of the very nature of the enclosed
environment within which they operate. It is those interconnected networks from which
those kinship networks work for the communities benefit.
To grasp the positioning of social capital within the canon of capital theory it is perhaps
best viewed through the lens of the journey from the Classical Theory of Capital to the
Neo-Capitalist Theories of Capital (Table 3). Classical Theory of Capital positions
theorists such as Marx as it’s most prominent, within a structural theory based on class.
When we start to look at the Neo-Capitalist Theories there is a clear fragmentation and
growth of types of capital which are positioned, not necessarily within a structure, but
within the individual, within the group, within resources, or within relationships. There is
certainly no agreement with theorists of social capital in relation to its positioning.  Putnam
(1992, 1993a, 1995, 2000) argues that it is within the groups through which the action of
collective behavior that social capital is generated whereas Loury (1981, 1984) sees
social capital positioned within the individual and the associated relationships.
Table 3 Theories of Capital
Source: Adapted from: (Lin 1999a; Macinko and Starfield 2001)
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Forms
Some theorists (Berman 1997; Krishna 2000) seek to divide social capital into two forms,
that of institutional capital and that of relational capital (Table 4).  The institutional capital
is exhibited through institutional structure, that of transactions and markets and
procedures whereas the relational capital tends to reveal itself through values, ideology
and relationships.
Table 4 Forms of Social Capital
Source: (Berman (1997) in Krishna 2000: 79)
The two types of capital are interdependent, that is, there is a need to ensure stocks of
each type of capital are both strong in order to generate high levels of social capital.
Uphoff (2000) sees capital of all types as beneficial and seeks to place collective action
and the resulting social capital into two categories, that of cognitive and the other as
structural social capital.  Uphoff sees the structural social capital as that of roles and rules
and procedures whereas the cognitive social capital manifest themselves into ‘norms,
values, attitudes, and beliefs’ (Uphoff 2000: 215).  Uphoff (2000) argues that social capital
needs to be understood in terms of its elements, connections and consequences.
Robinson et al (2002) posits that social capital should be defined in relation to the
resources that it encompasses comparative to the features and properties of that of other
forms of capital. Its properties include that of durability, transformational capabilities and
substitutional qualities along with properties of decay and growth.  Similar to economic
capital (Nitzan 1998) it has a relationship to power through accumulation.
Trust
Granovetter (2005) seeks to include the personal relationships and the networks of those
relations, ‘the embeddedness of economic transactions in social relations’ (Coleman
1990b: 302).  This according to Granovetter (2005) is the location where trust is
generated and where norms are developed, established and enforced. Fukuyama (1995)
argues that the wellbeing of an economy is prefaced by the level of trust contained within
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regardless of cultural characteristics. The location of trust is deemed to be that ascribed
to both individuals and institutions.
Coleman (1990b) positions closure the of social networks as important for the creation
of norms as well as the creation and maintenance of trust within the social network.
‘These closed systems can, of course, lead to inflationary and deflationary spirals in the
placement of trust; despite this instability that can result from extreme closure, some
degree of closure is a valuable asset to individuals who must decide whether or not to
place trust’ (Coleman 1990b: 318).
Culture
‘Culture, for a society, a group, or a person, is a continual process of
sustaining an identity through the coherence gained by a consistent
aesthetic point of view, a moral conception of self, and a style of life which
exhibits those conceptions in the objects that adorn one’s home and
oneself and in the taste which expresses those points of view.  Culture is
thus the realm of sensibility, of emotion and moral temper, and of the
intelligence, which seeks to order these feelings’ (Bell 1978: 36).
It is unity that is the byproduct of this interaction and structure.  It is the values that
emanate from this sense of belonging and provides a sense of order.  As Weber (2009)
argued culture is intertwined with the economy due to its commodification through the
process of exchange (Coleman 1990b).  The role of culture in the case of motivation
needs to be joined to that of knowledge, desire and action rather than disembodied from
it, that is, it should be considered as ‘shared cognitive schemas through which human
realities are constructed and interpreted…’(Strauss 1992: i). This framework allows the
researcher to examine why people do what they do, with who they do it, and how they
do it.  Culture is the delivery channel of the collective or social action and the way in
which the action is realized.  As Andrade (1992) has argued motivation is the link between
culture and action and requires the observer to understand that there are multi causal
mechanisms at play between the cognitive and action.
Culture and its impact on the market needs to be considered in context to the actors.
Weber‘s work on the virtues of the protestant work ethic, not of material gain, along with
the rewards gained after life (François 2002).  This regulated behavior of individuals
assisted in forms of cooperation and collaboration and in developing better conditions for
the whole community.  Similarly, different belief systems informed cooperation of the
communities that were of a Confucian nature (L. Harrison 1992).
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The diversity of culture also has an effect on the cohesiveness of the collective action in
relation to their motivation and the interaction of other variables of production and
development. One of the external influences on culture (Klitgaard 1992) could be seen
from a financial cooperative perspective as the feedback loop from the outcomes and
consequences of collective action.
Norms
Another form of social capital according to Coleman (1990b) is that of norms.  He argues
that these are on the one hand, powerful, but at the same time can be fragile.  Examples
of these norms may be those that make it safe in a city, or to support high achievement
in study. ‘A prescriptive norm that constitutes an especially important form of social
capital within a collectivity is the norm that one should forgo self-interests to act in the
interests of the collectivity’ (Coleman 1990b: 311).  This type of norm is ‘reinforced by
social support, status, honor and other rewards’ (Coleman 1990b: 311).  According to
Coleman it is the type of social capital which young nations are built upon and the type
from which families are strengthened and which assists in the development of ‘nascent
social movements from a small group of dedicated, inward-looking, and mutually
rewarding persons, and in general leads persons to work for the public good’ (Coleman
1990b: 311).  Coleman argues that often these norms are internalized and at other times
they are supported by external recognition for the selfless nature of the acts.
Fukuyama defines social capital as ‘shared norms or values that promote social
cooperation, instantiated in actual social relationships’ (Fukuyama 2002: 27).  He states
that it is understandable that social capital is not formulaic and is generated from
accepted norms and values and ‘frequently originates in phenomena like religion, shared
historical experience, and other deeply embedded cultural traditions’ (Fukuyama 2002:
32) and requires the continual and ongoing inculcation of the shared norms through habit,
shared experience and leadership.
This element of social capital facilitates action, it, like other aspects of social capital,
norms can also constrain action.  For example the norms contained within the village
system in Cambodia prevent the volunteers from embezzling funds from the Village
Savings Banks.  The social norms within the organisations inculcate the staff and
management with ways of behavior that constrain negative conduct. Similarly the
Solomon Islands social networks have cultural norms of behavior that see negative
externalities arise, i.e. we that see loans not given on merit and capacity to repay but on
kinship or clan association (Mason 2011c).
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According to Coleman (1990b) an underinvestment in public goods causes the norms to
suffer.  Norms are established to reduce the externalities which benefit those who
establish them which can be affected by individuals within the group.  That is, while one
actor does not necessarily have control over the norms the norms can be affected by an
actor’s actions.  It is within the integrity of the structures capacity to maintain and sustain
the norms where the risk lies.
While many theorists and institutions such as the World Bank (2002c) are inserting
questions into their household survey instruments incorporating social capital measures
focused on social networks and norms, the measure can be problematic as Carpenter
(2002) demonstrates that ‘hypothetical and “warm glow” biases among others, can cast
doubt on self-reported measures’ (Isham et al. 2002: 6).  While there are many doubts
and questions that still need to be answered in the use of social capital as an economic
development tool, they ‘are convinced ...that the concept enhances the analysis of the
determinants of well-being in developing countries’ (Isham et al. 2002: 6).
From a development perspective the research indicates (Michael Woolcock and Narayan
2000) that countries that have the capacity to form social networks and have systems of
norms and values tend to be much more successful in the implementation of
development projects and according to Kozel and Parker (2003), are therefore more
successful in alleviating poverty.
While as Streeten points out the ‘ability to associate depends on the degree to which
communities share norms, and out of such shared norms grows trust’ (Streeten 2002:
43).  There is a separation of the action or participation with the outcome.  That is, the
action is the association which generates trust, networks and norms and the outcome is
the social capital it generates.  ‘social capital amalgamates incommensurable objects –
beliefs, behavioural rules and such forms as capital assets as interpersonal networks –
without telling us how to amalgamate them’ (Streeten 2002: 43).  Trust promotes
cooperation and norms arise from trust and reinforces trust.  Therefore ‘social trust in
modern social settings can arise from two related sources – norms of reciprocity and
networks of civic engagement’ (Putnam 2000).  Following this trajectory ‘generalised
reciprocity norms help to improve the durability of social capital, making it less vulnerable
to erosion through exit of any single individual from the network’ (Jarley 2005: 4).  ‘People
who lived, worked, and socialised together formed very strong bonds, bonds that
produced shared visions of problems and solutions, facilitated the development of trust,
and instilled generalised reciprocity norms’ (Jarley 2005: 5).  This is, as Jarley (2005) has
argued, where voluntary collective action becomes a natural process that occurs with
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groups so tightly tied together and creates opportunities to reinforce relationships and
the norms of the group. Coleman however posits that social capital like other forms of
capital can depreciate over time if not renewed and maintained. ‘Social relationships die
out if not maintained; expectations and obligations wither over time; and norms depend
on regular communication’ (Coleman 1990b: 321).
Networks
Networks are the gateway to participation and are the mechanism through which social
capital can be realized.  They are the tool which is used to produce the benefits of trust,
collective action and reciprocity.  Networks can be a proxy delivery channel to address
failed markets.  They are formed by communities of interest, by governments and by
NGOs, to achieve the interests of the creators.
Networks are however a theoretically contested space.  The difference between Bourdieu
(Siisiainen 2000) and many of the American School of social capital is the preference for
networks and their inherent resources, what could be viewed as a Marxist perspective of
social capital.  The American School of social capital focuses on the functionalist
approach whereby the networks importance depends upon the transformational qualities
of connectedness which generates trust and the resulting “lubrication” (Putnam 2000)
and improves civil society and the way in which it functions.
For Fine (Fine and Green 2000; 2003, 2010) social capital is the connections and the
formal and informal networks between people outside of the market.  The space outside
the market is very crowded when we consider the multiplicity of networks and
associations such as family through to geographical communities and communities of
interest as well as political participation and voluntary organisations.  Fine (2003) layers
onto these the stratifications that occur through gender, class, race and religion etc.  The
array of social networks that are not only available but through which we participate by
just living our lives is wide and far reaching.  Many of these networks, both the informal
and formal, can be exclusionary in their structure and intent according to Fine (2003).
As Barr (2000, 2002) has argued, where there are missing or dysfunctional markets, lack
of governance and a deficit of information, social relations become much more important
as these social networks facilitate the flow of information. Of course just being part of a
network does not necessarily generate social capital that is useful. Becker (1976)
Becker and Murphy (2000), Coleman (1988) Putnam (2000) argue that it is only those
networks that provide the opportunities for generating social capital which matter.  ‘The
building of social capital may depend on everyone having equitable and culturally
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appropriate opportunities for establishing the networks that will allow for linking and for
cross-group cohesion’ (Cox 2002: 358).
As previously noted, Fukuyama (2002) sees social capital residing in small kinship
networks which he argues are valuable social assets for a community regardless that
they may be closed off.  He does not deny that this familism is also a disadvantage in its
rejection of outsiders which demonstrates a lack of trust within a society.  He argues that
‘familism can actually be seen as a rational response to a society in which the state is
arbitrary and rapacious’ (Fukuyama 2002: 28).  He sees the family and its networks,
whether they be businesses or other family institutions, as a defensive safeguard against
the state.  Fukuyama has argued that ‘familism can be seen as an imperfect substitute
for the rule of law’ (Fukuyama 2002: 29).
It is not difficult to see why organisations such as the World Bank (Grootaert and van
Bastelaer 2002c) and other development organisations have grasped at Putnam’s use of
social capital.  The way that he uses trust based voluntary associations as a key
constituent of civil society Putnam (1992, 1993a, 1995, 2000) normalises social capital
within the social networks to engender cooperative action within society both at the level
of the institution and within the actors. The properties of social capital is attractive to the
development community for its apparent all-encompassing and all-embracing features
that position it as a necessary requirement to a well-functioning civil society within
developing nations. It is particularly evident within DFAT (formally AusAID) whereby they
have a strong desire to see civil society institutions strengthened so as they can hold
governments to account (AusAID 2006, 2013). The economic growth in Asia has been
attributed to the dense social networks and ‘are sometimes said to represent a new brand
of network capitalism’ (Putnam 1993b: 38). Putnam suggests that in the Italian
communities that he studied saw their economic well-being generated through their civic
richness (Putnam 2000).  It is here that you can see how attractive social capital is to
community economic development practitioners and its translation into being integral to
the development of communities and nations.
Putnam’s (1992, 1993a, 1995, 2000, 2002) social capital framework is however
problematic within the economic sphere as there are issues in terms of the exclusivity of
networks.  If as Putnam has argued the health of a community is relational to the
associational activity then the issue of access to participate is crucial.  Many associations
have points of entry that might not be available to all those that wish to join.  DeFilippis
(2001) argues that for social capital to work within a market economy it must
acknowledge the competitive nature of market relations.  It is this very competitive nature
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of market economies that sees the networks and associations close off to all “outsiders”
as they cannot possibly be extended to everyone that wish to participate. While this
might be true in with many networks and associations it is not necessarily the case in all
situations.  In the case of financial cooperatives the benefits do not necessarily have to
be limited to a select few.  A financial cooperative that covers an entire population will
give the members proportionally the same benefits as if it had smaller membership.  That
is not to argue that there would not be an unequal access to products and services within
the organisation.  It is clear from my research that credit committees that are poorly
operated often make decisions on loan access based on networks and relationships
within the membership. As Weber wrote in 1925 of social networks in economics ‘If the
participants expect the admission of others will lead to an improvement of their
situation...their interest will be in keeping the relationship open.  If, on the other hand,
their expectations are of improving their position by monopolistic tactics, their interest is
in a closed relationship’ (Weber 2009: 139-40).
Networks and their economic function sometimes incorporate rent seeking behavior from
those in the group.  In the research countries there are specific cultural and historic
patronage systems that operate.  The rentier or rent seeking (Ear 2013; Spector 2012)
economies and the networks of patronage that in some cases can be deemed as corrupt,
are sometimes about political power and at other times it is about networks and systems
of respect and position.
Smith (A. Smith 2003) in his 1776 book The Wealth of Nations argues that networks
were similar to monopolization and could potentially create groups whose interests are
in direct opposition to the majority. ‘too much trust between economic actors was a recipe
for economy-stifling cartels and monopolization’ according to DeFilippis (2001: 794) this
has been borne out in Asia.  DeFilippis is doing what he has accused Putnam of doing,
and that is conflating social capital with the cultural, political, power and the economic
components of society.  DeFilippis uses Weber to argue that ‘trust-based networks further
distort and hamper growth within the economy by inviting free-riders from within
relationships not to work as hard as they might have to, if they were not connected’
(DeFilippis 2001: 794).  Within a financial cooperative framework it is evident that this
statement is a falsehood and is in fact quite the reverse.  Most emerging financial
cooperatives in Asia and the Pacific survive on the volunteer nature of the organisation
and most members participate and assist according to their abilities (Mason 2011b,
2011c).
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Exclusion from the formal banking system and a market driven approach does not
necessarily equate to financial cooperative inclusion.  The commercial banks do not wish
to have the poor as customers due to the high transaction costs associated with their
small deposits and also due to the capital cost of providing access in remote and rural
regions.  This has seen communities come together to develop their own financial
service.  Market driven exclusion has created a network that tends to be geographically
based and therefore one type of exclusion has emerged and replaced the other type of
exclusion. For Foley and Edward (1996) this may not necessarily be undesirable.  They
argue fragmented societies may actually possess ‘superior resources of social capital’
(Foley and Edwards 1996: 550-1).  Networks which can act to include and exclude
(Siisiainen 2000) may possess social capital of a higher value due to the exclusivity of
that participation.  Whittington (1998) opens up the possibility that social capital is anti-
democratic through its sometimes exclusionary nature and that it may in fact breed
mistrust of those outside of the group with feelings of reciprocity and trust only directed
to those within the group.  Therefore the social capital accumulated within one network
may not necessarily be exchanged or valued outside of that distinct network.  This
proposition is problematic as it does not consider the external or public effects in contrast
to the internal and private effects of social capital.  By external effects an example may
be the crime rates in relation to community participation rates in neighbourhood activities.
It is here that we see the intersection of what Hanifan (1916) described by his term “public
good”.  The “investment” by “private” individuals reaps an “external public good”.  Putnam
makes the case that ‘social networks create value, both individual and collective, and ...
we can “invest” in networks’ (Putnam 2002: 8). Communities benefit from a connected
community where individuals have created a public good through the solidarity of social
networks.
Solidarity
Emile Durkheim, the ‘central founding figure in nineteenth–century sociological’ (Field
2006: 11) viewed society through individual connections that wove society together.
There are perhaps some components of Durkheim’s understanding of social bonds that
can be viewed in context to the developing world today.  Durkheim saw pre-modern
societies with a ‘mechanical solidarity’ (Durkheim 1933: 266 in Field 2006: 11) whereby
there was an observance to authority within social status and routine.  However Durkheim
saw “organic solidarity’ within ‘mobile’, highly differentiated social systems of modernity’
(Field 2006: 11).  Durkheim recognised that the ties are deeper and more complex than
within the timeframe that the interaction is played out.
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Trust varies from country to country and forms a picture of the solidarity of that country
and a direct relationship with the responsibility to perform good deeds from volunteering
through to giving to charity.  Trust according to Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) is impacted
by government policy and the level of equality within a society which creates the social
solidarity that generates generalised trust.  When governments create policies around
universal social programs there is greater citizen solidarity and therefore social trust.  The
implied messages contained within the enactment of these policies are the optimism for
the future.  That is, that trusting strangers is less of a risk when there are feelings of
positivity about the future.  If individuals feel that they are not being given the
opportunities by society then they will be less optimistic about sharing in their society’s
benefits and subsequently less citizen solidarity.  If conversely if there is a sense that the
society in which they live is equitable in terms of the economic distribution and the
opportunities then the individual will feel they have an opportunity to share in societies
prospects which will lead to greater generalised trust.  The positive externalities of
increased generalized trust according to Fukuyama (1995, 2001) is the reciprocity,
honesty and dependability that people are taught and the transposing of those onto
relationships with others.  The negative externalities include the development of in-group
solidarity where they are tightly bonded (Fukuyama 2002: 30).  ‘Tight group
consciousness and solidarity can be and often are accompanied by hostility to or
exclusion of other groups.  Even in associations that are not aiming at exclusion, the fact
that they are ethnically or economically homogeneous can reinforce social stratification
and inequality’ (Streeten 2002: 45).  Additionally rational choice theorists (Eriksson 2011;
Olson 1971) would argue that individuals focus on self-interest which make cooperation
and the resulting solidarity difficult to achieve.
Collective Action
Concepts around collective action are not new, Aristotle wrote, ‘Men journey together
with a view to particular advantage, and by way of providing some particular thing needed
for the purposes of life, and similarly the political association seems to have come
together originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the general advantages
it brings’ (Ethics viii. 9.1160a in Olson 1971: 6). Festinger (1960) contends that the value
for individuals in membership is not in the sense of belonging but rather the acquisition
potential within the act of membership.
Collective action can be defined as where two or more individuals come together to
achieve a common purpose and where working together will benefit the individual much
more than taking individual action.  Collective action needs to benefit the whole group.
Olson (1971) in The Logic of Collective Action argued that where costs to individuals to
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facilitate collective action was higher than the gains there was little incentive to take
action.  The Svendsens argue that this is not the case and that there are plenty of
examples where ‘entrepreneurs in the form of group leaders do exist’ (Svendsen and
Svendsen 2004: 5).  They question why this exists and posit that it is due to incentives
other than economic.  Rather than focus on the social features of the economic
transactions the Svendsens seek to provide a strengthened theoretical framework
utilising social capital.  They argue, contrary to theorists such as Fine (2000; 2010), that
social capital can be used at a micro, meso and macro level and utilised in transnational
comparisons.  The use of the concept of social capital links closely to the word capital
and therefore enables the social, cultural and economic spheres to provide a ‘holistic
understanding of collective goods provision processes’ (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004:
5). Collective action according to Sandler ‘arises when the efforts of two or more
individuals are needed to accomplish an outcome’ (Sandler 1992: 1).  Sandler argues
that the need for collective action within society is evident.  Sandler points to defense and
safety as historically collective actions.  Italian political philosopher Mosca (1939) also
wrote of men having a natural predisposition to joining together to fight other groups  of
men. Cox states that collective action is ‘intrinsic to social functioning’ (Cox 2002: 337).
It is within these types of actions, according to Sandler, we see interdependency of
individuals within groups that do not necessarily focus on the social features of economic
transactions (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004).
Coleman reconciled his theoretical rationalist choice understanding of collective action
through the justification of people working together to achieve a common goal with the
understanding of an individual benefit that would otherwise not be realised outside of the
group action.  Therefore collective action could be seen as a mechanism to achieve
individual goals.  Notwithstanding rational choice theory predominately focuses on the
individual and their self-interest so cooperation and solidarity is in broad opposition to its
theoretical underpinnings.
The tensions of collection action can be addressed according to Putnam (1995).  The
individualistic aims of the one can be overcome by understanding that unlike economic
and human capital, social capital does not belong to the individual or to institutions but
resides in the relations between the actors.  This type of capital can only be drawn down
upon by collective action rather than through the individual. Laski, states, ‘associations
exist to fulfil purposes which a group of men have in common’ (Laski 1938: 67).  Olson
(1971) argues that the associations or organisations are expected to further the interests
of its members whether they are labour unions, farming associations or financial
cooperatives.  He recognizes that the state can often have ‘interests and ambitions apart
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from those of its citizens’ (Olson 1971: 7).  The cooperative movement in Timor Leste is
often used by the government to address political agendas (Mason 2011c) and so it could
be argued that the use of neoliberal models of cooperatives instituted by the state serve
the purposes firstly of the state and then that of the community.
The commonality of many theorists on this subject is that they argue that the cooperation
and association is maintained due to the general advantages that can be gained.
MacIver (1932) contended that the very reason the organisation exists is premised on a
value or benefit that the members have in common. Bentley (the founder of the “group
theory”) posited that ‘there is no group without its interest’ (Bentley 2008: 211).  Olson
notes that while it is important to note that all groups have a common interest it may not
be forgotten that individuals of the group have interests can vary from others in the group
(Olson 1971). While all members of a financial cooperative may have an interest in
receiving a suitably priced loan and receiving adequate interest on their savings, they
also have an individual interest that their deposits are protected and risk is minimized
from other members of the financial cooperative who do not his or her loan back to the
institution.
Jarley has argued that voluntary collective action is natural process that occurs with
groups so tightly tied together.  Collective action is the opportunity to reinforce
relationships and common values. ‘Membership itself [is] an act of generalising
reciprocity’ (Jarley 2005: 5).  What is clear from Jarley’s (2005) work is the importance of
the “opportunity” to undertake activities of reciprocity and to have a forum to develop
bonds and shared values that can be maintained and strengthened. ‘Social
interaction…helps to resolve dilemmas of collective action, encouraging people to act in
a trustworthy way when they might not otherwise do so’ (Putnam 2002: 7).
The social capital components that have been discussed in the previous paragraphs, that
of Collective Action, Solidarity, Networks, Norms, Culture and Trust provide the
foundation understanding of the development of the Social Capital Theoretical Structure
(Figure 3). Chapter Two provides the building blocks of knowledge which are then
constructed into a theoretical framework and schematic that is suitable for viewing social
capital within financial cooperatives.
2.3.4 Social Capital and Financial Cooperatives
Financial cooperatives are problematic from a neo-liberal perspective as there is a
struggle for communities and other stakeholders to understand the balance between the
social and the economic through a collective and cooperative model where the social can
be valued over the economic (Y. Levi and Davis 2008).  The cooperative model seeks to
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include other types of profit, that of social profit (Neamtan 2002) to put this in neo-liberal
terms.  The financial cooperative is a dichotomy which sees overlap and tensions within
its purposes between that of the social and the economic.  Tensions within the
cooperative methodology: between that of the voluntary and the commercial, within the
ownership, that of the public and the private (Y. Levi and Davis 2008).  This duality is
evident in the relationship that the financial cooperative has with its members, who are
at once both owners and customers, who come together for the collective good but are
driven by individual choice.  The organisational structure can at the same time provide
both a collective and individual benefit (Robb et al. 2013). Theorists (Maak 2007;
Narayan and Cassidy 2001) of social capital have attempted to address the
organisational ambiguity between the social and the economic through not only the
concept but concrete tools and methodology by which to measure the social.
Streeten (2002) contends that economists have not had a significant interest in social
capital and view it as simply an equivalent of an intellectual anomaly that will soon pass.
There is general disagreement as to what social capital is, where it is located, how to
measure it and the resulting benefits.  Streeten notes the many objections to the use of
the word “capital” and in particular the rejection by Arrow (2000) who has argued ‘that
social networks are built up for reasons other than their economic value to participants.
Both building new and enjoying existing social relations have intrinsic value’ (Arrow 2000:
4). François argues that ‘trustworthiness as a way of making economic sense of the
increasingly popular term “social capital”’(François 2002: 1). François states that
trustworthiness has been analyzed through a sub-branch of evolutionary economics
which deals with the evolution of preferences.  François states that this has been
problematic due to its underlying basis of biological fitness.  It treats all outcomes of
preferences as “payoffs” or pecuniary returns.  This becomes problematic when applied
to everyday life activities such as raising children, where parents do not take into account
“payoffs” such as when deciding what religion their child should be.  There needs to be
a richer sense of “payoffs” if we are to use this to look at trustworthiness according to
François (2002).  Conceptually social capital is an attempt to fill this void, the analysis of
François seeks to demonstrate the inherent trust that is formed within the capitalist
production which bring about by products of mutually beneficial interaction..’ (François
2002: 2).
Fine contends that there is a need to confront the rational choice origins of our
understanding of the social and the economic in the broader understanding of capital
(Fine 2003).  He argues that social capital has been accepted and used carelessly as a
“discursive tool”. (Fine 2003: 42). Fine cites examples of the World Bank using social
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capital as a variable ‘plugging measures of it into statistical regressions in order to tease
out the social capital effect’ (Fine 2003: 43).
‘There is ...no determinate relation between expenditure or the devotion of resources and
the resulting social capital, or between that capital and output’ (Streeten 2002: 40). For
many other economists ‘social capital by its very nature is part of the growth-and-
productivity-centered approach to development’ (Streeten 2002: 40). This means that
the poor, in order to have a political or economic stake in their community, need to
organise in such a way to produce the required outcomes.  This is not organisation for
traditional purposes but to access economic and political power that is usually denied or
at best is available to them in a constrained environment. François (2002) has also
looked at the question of development and why there are differences in the growth and
productivity of different countries.  ‘Short of conspiratorial postcolonial or Marxist
explanations, neoclassical economists are stumped by the modern world’s large and
persistent cross-country productivity differences.’(François 2002: 3) And while from an
economists view, the attractiveness of implementing improvements to productivity is
great, it can actually lead to poor outcomes in terms of not only the productivity but also
to social capital and therefore to trustworthiness. François does acknowledge ‘the large
differences in the institutions of law, contract and enforcement, cultural differences in
business practices’(François 2002: 4) but has failed to recognise the broader influences
of culture on attitudes and norms. He does however flag that it is within family and kinship
in the less developed countries that production occurs which in itself limits opportunism.
Conversely he argues that in more advanced industrial economies this form of production
does not work because of the complexity of the system.
Social capital has however provided a bulwark for those that have understood the failure
of the markets to provide the necessary solutions to issues of poverty and development.
Social capital in some ways has fitted neatly into what has been called by Giddens
(2013), the Third Way ‘the very phrase “social capital” hints at the pleasingly communal
but stirs in an invigorating dash of hard economics’ (Streeten 2002: 40). Social capital
provides a meeting place for the various disciplines of economics, sociology, political
scientists, historians and anthropologists. Social capital provides cover from the neo-
liberal agenda and presents an acceptable face for collective action, solidarity and
communal elements of the financial cooperative structure.
2.3.5 Durability of Social Capital within Financial Cooperatives
Social capital has been examined in numerous ways such as horizontal verses vertical
(Bjornskov and Svendsen 2003; Lee and Bartkowski March 2004) , bonding and bridging
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(Brandtzaeg et al. 2010; Brisson 2009; Coffe and Geys 2007; Ferlander 2007; Hodgkin
2009; Lockhart 2005; McKenzie 2009; Narayan 2002; Putnam 2000; Svenden 2006) and
networks (Bjornskov and Svendsen 2003; Huppi and Feder 1990; Jarley 2005; Klesner
June 2007; Ville 2005). Streeten (2002) evaluates social capital in terms of its properties
of durability.
Understanding the durability of social capital assists in understanding the longevity and
strength of financial cooperatives, especially in the face of the everyday challenges that
communities face in developing countries.  Challenges that accompany poverty such as
access to food, health care and education.  Often there are more pressing individual
needs than access to financial services but in the three countries within this research the
willingness of the community to participate and work together often overshadowed their
individual needs.  The durability of social capital helps in unpacking the unseen or hidden
benefits, outcomes and impacts that arise from the social interaction within financial
cooperatives. Streeten (2002) structures the durability of social capital in a particular
format to understand its features and the way in which it manifests itself through social
interaction. Social investment or investment in social capital, is a Non-Durable
Consumptive Good (Streeten 2002).  This element may be similar to making new friends,
creating trust, joining new networks. Streeten (2002) equates this activity with pleasure.
He argues that if it is pleasurable then no cost is involved unless of course time is scarce.
Here he argues that this investment of time is similar with other forms of investment and
that time committed now should produce future benefits.  But if the interaction is
pleasurable and is enjoyed in its own right then ‘there is an excess of intrinsic enjoyment
over costs’ (Streeten 2002: 41).  A Durable Consumption Good (Streeten 2002) are
activities within social relations and interactions that are enjoyed for their intrinsic value.
They can however bring status, friendship, identity or a sense of belonging however the
reason individuals will volunteer or will join associations is not the direct material benefit.
A Non–Durable Production Good (Streeten 2002) is one that is used up in the process of
producing a durable good.  It is expended in the hope of an economic return.  If there is
an investment of time in an organisation there is a hope for an economic return.  An
example might be the desire to join a financial cooperative and volunteer in order to be
more favourably considered for a loan. The villager who volunteers gives their time in
the hope that they we be repaid with going to the head of the line for a loan.
The end product of creating social capital like a Durable Capital Good (Streeten 2002) is
similar to a machine tool, the means of production, to put it in Marxist terminology, yields
pecuniary benefits that can be intended or incidental and unanticipated. The last is a
Durable Investment Good (Streeten 2002) for non-marketed activities.  An example
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maybe a computer a financial cooperative may buy to improve efficiency. The social
capital generated from that efficiency benefits the whole community and conversely the
trust that is built to strengthen the whole community. It contributes to the raising of
productivity. Streeten (2002) contends that each of these five elements are
interdependent but they work together to produce desired and unanticipated benefits and
outcomes.
2.3.6 Negative Effects: Antisocial Capital
There is a growing group of scholars that do not necessarily see social capital as only a
positive indicator of a society (DeFilippis 2001; Fine and Green 2000; Fine 2003, 2007,
2010; Labonte 1999). Social capital can have both positive and negative consequences
(Hunter 2004: 13; Macinko and Starfield 2001: 397; Portes 1998). As with other forms of
capital, it can be put to bad uses. If we only defined social capital by its positive uses
this would not be helpful as ‘It would mean that, whenever we have good results, social
capital is tautologically assumed to be present.  It is preferable to define it by its
characteristics rather than its desirable (or undesirable) effects.’ (Streeten 2002: 44). The
very networks and social interaction that can produce positive results for a community
can also bring upon it negative actions and consequences such as corruption, bribery,
nepotism, patronage, (rent seeking) cronyism and crime (Cheema 2005; Spector 2012).
Contained within these concepts and through the use of negative social capital other
issues for society and communities arise such as inequity and disregard for human rights
(Ear 2013).  While Putnam may list positive associations and networks (Putnam 1993a)
there are others that do not produce positive results such as terrorist organisations, cults
and crime syndicates. The purpose of these negative networks varies from personal
financial gain to the suppression of others to the spreading of harmful ideology. Different
forms of social capital can have more or less value to society or a community.  The
mobilisation of people for political participation could be deemed as far more valuable
than a social network that gets together for the expressed purpose of playing a social
game.  That at first glance may be true but we need to be mindful that the hidden value
of a social network which may in fact be far more beneficial to the individual as a social
safety net than their participation in a political process.
Olson argues that interest groups as a part of civil society effect economic growth and
makes the argument that these interest groups can destroy efficiency (Olson 1982).
Contrary to Putnam’s (Putnam 1992) claims of social capitals positive effects, these
groups can create conflict and destroy social cohesion. There is evidence in this
research that financial cooperatives which are not inclusive can create a situation of
mistrust and exclusion as seen within the sample group that were nonmembers: When
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asked why the community member was not a member of the financial cooperative they
responded:
“I don’t trust this financial cooperative, I worry when I try to withdraw my
money, they won’t be able to give it to me.”
Source: OPICBBASATNMN092
Given that the people in this village had known each other for many years the exclusion
from the institution had manifested itself into one of mistrust, ‘even benign long-term
relationships can be obstacles to economic betterment.  They can form a sort of anti-
social capital’(Streeten 2002: 45).
2.3.7 Leadership in Relation to Access and Mobilisation of Social Capital
Access to, and mobilization of social capital within a financial cooperative is heavily
dependent on a number of factors, these include the quality of leadership and the
inclusive or exclusionary nature of the community within which the financial cooperative
is situated.
The research within this thesis highlights the necessity for good quality leadership in the
development of financial cooperatives.  Maak states leadership ‘is a relational and
inherently moral phenomenon that cannot be captured in traditional dyadic leader-
follower relationships’ (Maak 2007: 329). While the research has focused on the local
leadership of the financial cooperative there are other actors that play a leadership role
that also impact on the financial cooperative such as that of the local community leaders,
village, commune and district chiefs along with the leadership at a state and national
level.
The cultural context of the community also plays a significant role in the success or failure
of mobilizing social capital within the community for the benefit of the financial
cooperative. Leadership is a universal occurrence however the manner in which it
manifests itself is considered to be culturally contingent (Ambang 2008).  Intersecting
with the cultural layers are the complexities of inequality and power relations that
sometimes inhibit participation at a leadership level of women and minority groups
(Mayoux 2001). Leadership organized along ethnic or religious lines is problematic in
the sense of exclusionary tactics that can occur through the development of social norms
and accepted ways of behavior and trust which are all essential elements in the
generation of social capital. The literature on social capital has also highlighted the
impact of tradition whereby it can have both good and bad impacts, it can benefit the
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development of the institution especially in the mobilization of the community but it also
has a negative effect as it ‘can stifle individual growth and creativity’ (Mayoux 2001: 439).
2.4 Conclusion
Financial cooperatives have a long global history with a form that varies dependent upon
the soil in which they have been planted.  They do however have a common DNA that
sees them exist under adverse conditions and in extreme environments.  Their core
elements are the social connections that initially bring them into existence and then drive
their operations.  The economic outputs and impacts are only possible due to the very
social nature of their development.
Within this chapter I have focused on understanding the neo-liberal approach to social
capital and the way in which it has often been misappropriated by large multilaterals to
achieve their agendas.  It is however a worthwhile mechanism as it is more inclusive of
a broader range of actors especially when it gives voice or agency to those that would
otherwise not be able to participate.
The inordinate breadth of literature on social capital far exceeds the capacity to cover all
arguments and positions within this chapter.  I have provided a small snapshot of the
main themes of trust, norms, networks, solidarity, positioning and forms of social capital,
culture and collective action, that are pertinent to the research data presented in the
following chapters. I will return to these themes in relation to each country’s dataset in
Chapters Four, Five and Six and then provide an analysis of these in Chapter Seven.
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework and Research Design
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I provided a literature review of the two main components of this
research, that of the financial cooperatives and social capital. In this chapter I seek to
outline a theoretical approach that considers these components through the analysis of
the data collected. The theoretical concepts that informed my approach are broad, not
through design but through necessity.  The theoretical framework I have had to develop
in this chapter was due to a lack of an existing lens through which I could examine social
capital within financial cooperatives.  The theoretical framework accommodates an
analysis of the Community, the Individual and the Institution. The data collection tool was
developed and tested by researchers at the World Bank (Grootaert and van Bastelaer
2002c) and utilizes an integrated research process (Desai 2009) of participatory,
qualitative and quantitative methods.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework from which I have analyzed the research data has its genesis
in the breadth of literature on social capital and the way in which it is situated,
accumulated, expended, as well as the manner in which it interacts with its environment
and the demonstrated outcomes that occur and the way it can be viewed.  There is none
more apt phrase when it comes to the development of my model of viewing social capital
than ‘If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants’13.
The comprehensive literature review offered the ability to position theorists at particular
positions within the debate and within the context of how social capital works.  That is,
after considering each of the theorist’s positions I was able to map their arguments in
relation to the elements of the ongoing social capital discourse.
I have utilized a constructivist epistemological approach for this research as ‘it recognizes
the important role the observer and society in constructing the patterns we
study…’(Moses and Kunutsen 2012: 9) that is, to reject that there is a singular truth but
multiple truths dependent upon the mind that is observing them. ‘The world we observe
13 Isaac Newton used a similar phrase when writing to Robert Hooke that has been attributed to Bernard
Charles who said ‘that we [the Moderns] are like dwarves perched on the shoulders of giants [the Ancients]’
Anonymous, ’Isaac Newton’, <http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Isaac_Newton>, accessed 10 December 2013
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is, in a sense, a world of our making’ (Moses and Kunutsen 2012: 169), that knowledge
is ‘contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between
human beings and their world, and …within an essentially social context’ (Crotty 1998:
42).  This epistemological approach sat comfortably with social capital and its inherent
structural and cognitive components.  The respondent’s subjective view of norms, trust,
collective action and solidarity, their subjective use of networks and the consequences
and meaning of their interaction ensured that constructivist epistemology was fitting for
this research.
The Social Capital Theoretical Structure (Figure 3) is a type of graphical representation
of the epistemology of where different theorists sit within the broad spectrum of social
capital literature and where the overlaps are in terms of intersections between the
theorists.  I have used these theorists as a starting point to develop a solid foundation to
examine the research data.  Upon this basis I have developed a model called the Social
Capital Development Framework (Figure 5).  The selection of theorists chosen are an
appropriate representation of the academic knowledge necessary to develop the
research framework.
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Figure 3 Social Capital Theoretical Structure
Source: Authors own work
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There is no pattern or rhythm to the diagram (Figure 3), it is as messy as people’s lives,
nothing fits perfectly and as with much academic work, we must live with the ambiguities
and tensions that emerge from what we find.  There are many more intersections than
are represented on the Social Capital Theoretical Structure, much more work could be
undertaken to expand and provide more detail and nuance to this social capital roadmap.
It is however based on major themes and on the work of scholars that are well published
in their areas of expertise within the domain of social capital.  I have based the theoretical
structure on a number of scholars who lead in their field in terms of social capital:
Fukuyama (2000a) on norms and trust, Uphoff (2000), Lin (2001) and Krishna (1999;
2000) on forms of social capital, Dale (Dale 2005) on networks, Lin (1999a) on leadership
and so forth.  Using these theorists and the main social capital components I have
charted a way through the dense and complex nature of social capital to allow an analysis
of the research data from each of the countries surveyed.  The Social Capital Theoretical
Structure (Figure 3) and the resulting Social Capital Development Framework (Figure 5)
map against the SOCAT that has been used to collect the data.
Environment and Structure
The Social Capital Theoretical Structure is based on a meta narrative of Chambers
(2010) Adaptive Pluralism Paradigm (Figure 4).  Adaptive Pluralism as a participatory
type framework is a model that has the actors at the center and is by its nature
performative which encompasses personal agency, relationships and interaction. People
are ‘the creators and disseminators of concepts, as the holders of values and principles,
as actor who use methods and populate processes, as those who occupy roles and
behave, as agents who interact to form relationships, and throughout as those whose
mindsets, orientations and predispositions are in living reality conditioned by and
condition the other elements’ (Chambers 2010: 42). Adaptive Pluralism is ‘well suited to
understanding and expressing the local, complex, diverse, dynamic, uncontrollable and
unpredictable realities experienced by many poor people’ (Chambers 2010: 3).
Chambers contrasts difference using a “things-people” binary to construct his two
paradigms, that of Adaptive Pluralism which I have utilized within this research and Neo-
Newtonian Practice (Chambers 2010) which is a model of predictability, standardization,
routines and order.
Chambers (2010) has argued that development problems have been exacerbated by the
linear logic that development practitioners apply to development practice and the
centering of money at the core of all development problems.  Often the immeasurable
elements, such as trust, relationships, and commitment are not valued and are
overshadowed by targets and log frames and results based management.  Where people
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and community are at the core of the development activities a linear logic is often a
difficult tool to use to understand impact and societal change.  In environments of the
poor which has been demonstrated to be chaotic and unpredictable (O. Bennett and
McDowell 2012; Neuwirth 2011; Nussbaum 2011) it is difficult to apply a standardized
and measurable framework on uncontrollable and unpredictable settings.  A move toward
recognizing relationships, roles and behaviours, along with values within a mindset
provides a completely new paradigm from which to view societies and their interaction.
Chambers model of Adaptive Pluralism provides a way of positioning the communities
within this research and contextualizes their environment.  This will assist to understand
that ‘social capital is an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cultural,
cognitive, institutional, and related assets…’(Uphoff 2000: 216).
Figure 4 Adaptive Pluralism
Source: (Chambers 2010: 46)
I have constructed the Social Capital Theoretical Structure (Figure 3) to represent the
main features pertinent to understanding social capital and created the Social Capital
Development Framework (Figure 5) to attempt to expose the linkages and relationships
of the individual components. The Social Capital Development Framework I have
created based on the Social Capital Theoretical Structure assists in positioning the
research data at the most appropriate point in the development of social capital.  The
Social Capital Development Framework is a synthesis of the main topographies overlaid
with the location, outcomes and impacts of the development of social capital.  The Social
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Capital Development Framework also provides grounds for locating the reflexive and
therefore the sustainable nature of social capital within a financial cooperative
environment.
Figure 5 Social Capital Development Framework
Source: Authors own work
I have condensed the Social Capital Development Framework to highlight headline
themes in the development of social capital in Table 5. This table assists in unpacking
in more detail the meaning behind each of the headlines within the framework.  I will
return to the Social Capital Matrix to assist in discussing the research data in Chapter
Seven.
The last section of the framework is that of outcomes or consequences, what is it that
social capital which has been generated can purchase for the individual, the community
or the institution or a combination of all three stakeholders? Does it lead to stronger
communities, does it lead to a greater voice for individuals and institutions, and does it
empower certain groups to build capacity as well as wealth both at an individual and/or
a community level?  Do the norms and reciprocity that is generated and the close bonds
that communities form benefit them?
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Table 5 Social Capital Development Framework Comparative Table
Source: Authors own work including Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002d)
It is critical to note that the Social Capital Development Framework is not to be viewed
as a compartmentalized concept as there is overlap of the assets from community to the
individual and from the individual to the institution as well as a reflective aspect whereby
the outcomes and consequences affect the community and individual assets.  As I
originally noted at the start of this section there are ambiguities and intersecting aspects
of social capital development that cannot be neatly and simplistically categorized.
However for the purposes of the journey through the research this framework will assist
the reader to understand social capital development within a financial cooperative
context.
3.3 SOCAT and the Social Capital Schematic
The Social Capital Schematic (Figure 6) that I have created integrates the Social Capital
Development Framework (Figure 5) along with the SOCAT tool and seeks to visually
illustrate the influences occurring at differing intersections of community, individuals and
institutions from both a structural and cognitive level to generate and expend social
capital.  With further research this model could be vastly expanded with additional and
more nuanced components.  It does however clearly illuminate some of the major
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instruments of social capital that are continually active within the community, the
institution and individual at different levels.  Within the country research finding chapters
of four, five and six each of the country Social Capital Schematic components are graded
in various shades of blue as indicated in Table 6.  The lighter the colour the lower
indication of that component was present, conversely the darker the higher the indication.
I have provided a key below that outlines the colour coding.
Table 6 Social Capital Schematic Colour Coding Key
The Social Capital Schematic is a useful way in which to join, layer and position the
various elements that contribute to social capital.  While the schematic provides a visual
framework I also need to create a language to talk about the schematic and its various
layers.  In academia, knowledge is often referred to as a body of knowledge or a body of
evidence, similarly social capital affects people and impacts on the way they live their
lives.  Language around the body is often framed in terms of its health.  To understand
the role of the schematic and to provide a useful language in order to talk about its
function and health and the interactivity of the layers with each other I think it is useful to
appropriate the layers of a human body as the language and the way it functions in talking
about the schematic.  In this case the body as a whole is at the center of the picture with
the body built from the inside out.  I will endeavour not to torture the conceptual metaphor
however I want to position social capital as the whole body and proceed to align the
layers of the human body to layers of the schematic as follows.
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Figure 6 Social Capital Schematic
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Development Framework
3.3.1 Community Assets
Structural Assets
The overarching components of the Social Capital Schematic consist of three sections,
the Individual, the Community and Institution. I will begin by discussing the community
and its assets which includes the structural assets of a community.  These can be the
hard or concrete assets of a community, which are easily measured and observed.
These are structural assets that a community may have in varying levels.  These include
physical assets such as schools, communication services, sewage services, electricity
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etc. Included in the community assets are those that while concrete may be less evident
in terms of their physical manifestation that relate to demographic activity of the
community as well as the longevity and the economic movement within the community.
These include the community attributes which incorporate the number of years the
community has existed, the economic activity of the population as well as available
employment etc.  As we move around the Social Capital Schematic the human assets of
the community in relation to the capacity and cohesiveness is examined within the
context of migration and immigration as well as understanding some of the flows from a
gendered perspective which also contribute to the development of social capital.  The
educational assets of a community feature components such as access, quality and
attendance.  Similarly the health assets also include access and the facilities available.
The livelihoods assets include the type and yield as well as access. Community support
as a structural asset considers the resources available as well as the access to those
resources.
Cognitive Assets
The cognitive assets within the community assets are the society’s perception of their
standard of living and the trust within their community.  Levels of community organisation
as well as perception of crime have been deemed to be important to a community when
utilizing the SOCAT tool to measure social capital.
3.3.2 Individual Assets
The second of the components is that of individual assets that are seen as more abstract
or soft assets.  These include the relational, sociological, cultural and cognitive assets.
The relational assets are focused on family and geographically close neighbours and
have a focus on daily needs type of interaction.  It is within these relationships that we
can start to examine cognitive assets such as trust and reciprocity.  The cultural assets
are also interwoven within the assets of this section where we can understand and view
the contribution this makes to the development of social capital.  The sociological assets
are recognized through prisms including hierarchy, power, access and gender.
Structural Social Capital
The individual’s experience and perceptions of organisational density, which are
contained within networks and mutual reciprocity along with exclusion and collective
action uncover attributes of participation, homogeneity, leadership, causes of division
and exclusion.  Lastly within the structural social capital of the individual assets the
research seeks to uncover aspects of collective action.  These elements of collective
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action include its history, the frequency, and the level of community participation as well
as looking at the leadership.
Cognitive Social Capital
Solidarity, trust and cooperation as well as conflict resolution speak to the individual
resources that a community member can draw upon.  They express a community
member’s level of community comfort and their place within it. Within the solidarity
component of cognitive social capital of the individual the research seeks to position its
location.  The cognitive foundations of trust and cooperation are understood in terms of
the thickness of trust and the perceptions of cooperation.  The research seeks to uncover
the cognitive characteristics and perceptions of conflict resolution, the levels of harmony
and the location of any mediation.
3.3.3 Institutional Assets
When the third component of the schema is examined we expose the institutional or
organisational assets through participation, networks and organisational norms.  These
points of interaction assist in locating social capital within the institution and help with the
measurement of both quality and quantities of social capital.  That is, through the
interaction, we can view the stickiness of the glue (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004: 4) that
is social capital.  It also helps us locate where social capital is generated, accumulated
and expended.  When examining institutional assets the perceptions and experiences of
the users, and in this case the owners of the organisation, need to be scrutinized to
uncover the levels of social capital.  Assessing the levels of participation provides a
window into the inclusive nature of the organisation as well as is instructional in terms of
the forms of decision making and extent of engagement of all sections of the community.
The organisational culture helps to position the institutional practices and lay bare the
organisational norms that have emerged.  The capacity of the organisation as well as the
sustainability is understood through the types and levels and frequency of collective
action and participation.  The final section of the research seeks to understand the social
capital generated within the financial cooperatives.  From an organisational perspective
there were four key components that the research uncovered, that of leadership,
participation, organisational culture and institutional capacity and sustainability.  The
research looks at leadership from rotation, density and availability as well as diversity
and heterogeneity.  The leadership of the financial cooperatives is also examined from
the standpoint of the leadership quality and skills as well as the relationships with the
leaders, the staff and the members. Participation is one of the factors of successful
financial cooperatives (Albee and Gamage 1996; Goglio and Alexopoulos 2013; Lewis
1996; Nelson 2013). It is within this domain that the research seeks to discover the
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inclusiveness, the participation in decision making and the frequency of the meetings to
understand the available avenues for members to interact with their institution.
Participation by the elites within a community also flags the depth of social capital across
all sectors of the community.  The organisational culture of the financial cooperatives is
examined within the research through the institutional practices and the resulting norms.
Forms of self-generating institutional capacity and sustainability are evidenced through
the financial cooperatives specific capabilities and the collective action and the formation
of demands that occur.
3.4 Structural versus Cognitive Social Capital
Social capital has its foundations in neo-capitalist theory, that is, ‘investment in social
relations with expected returns’ (Lin 1999a: 30).  The investment manifests itself from
differing positions, from that of the community, the individual and/or the institution. There
is debate as to who possesses the social capital, Coleman (1988, 1990b) and Putnam
(1992, 1993a, 1995, 2000, 2002) argue that it is a collective asset whereas Bourdieu
(1995, 2002) argues it is possessed by the individual. Others such as Bolino et al. (2002),
Moran (2005) and Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) position social capital within the
institution.  Using the SOCAT tool the resultant research seeks to understand two forms
of social capital, that of the structural social capital and that of the cognitive social capital
within the three locations, the individual, the community and the institution.  Much of the
literature also adds a third form of social capital, that of network (Browning et al. 2004;
Inkpen and Tsang 2005; Kavanaugh 2002) or which is also called relational (Bolino et al.
2002; Buchan et al. 2002; Perreault 2003) social capital, however due to the format of
the SOCAT tool the network or relational component is incorporated into the structural
and cognitive aspects of the research.
Using Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002c) Forms and Scope of Social Capital (Figure
7) provides the ability to position financial cooperatives within the quadrants depending
upon the maturity of the institution.  Financial cooperatives would naturally sit in the lower
two quadrants being institutions positioned at between a micro and meso level within
society.  The level of development and sophistication in relation to the financial
cooperative would determine whether it would be more towards the cognitive end or the
structural end of the quadrants.  Younger, emerging financial cooperatives with high
levels of volunteers and levels of engagement would be closer to the cognitive end with
more mature financial cooperatives with their complex policies, procedures and
technology being more aligned to the structural end of the diagram.  The more mature
and developed a financial cooperative becomes the higher levels of professionalization
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occurs which sees the membership become more distant from the operations and the
decision making of the institution (Mason 2010).
Figure 7 Forms and Scope of Social Capital
Source: (Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002c: 4)
Building upon Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002c) and (Uphoff 2000) the research seeks
to demonstrate the linkages between that of the structural and the cognitive social capital
through the way it is generated or emerges (sources and manifestations) and its location
(domains) as well as the activity (dynamic factors) which occurs within these two distinct
realms.  Uphoff’s Complementary Categories of Social Capital (Figure 8) help to
demonstrate how the structural supports the cognitive and conversely how the cognitive
reinforces the structural aspects of social capital.
Figure 8 Complementary Categories of Social Capital
Source: (Uphoff 2000: 221)
3.5 Heterogeneous versus Homogeneous Organisations
Most studies that have examined social capital have distinguished between the
respondents in different ways due to the chosen elements of social capital which they
explore.  Some such as Dale (2005) Mancini et al. (2005) examine social capital from
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networks and their associated density while others (Fukuyama 1995; Macgillivray and
Walker 2000; R. C. Mayer et al. 1995) study it from the perspective of trust.  These
scholars have differentiated their respondents through either horizontal or vertical groups
or through heterogeneous or homogeneous groups.
Previous studies have established that the internal heterogeneity of a group is important
for the development of social capital and as well as the household economic wellbeing
(Grootaert 1998; Narayan and Pritchett 1999).  The heterogeneous groups are more
likely to generate social capital within their groups than homogeneous groups (Stolle
2003). This is disputed by others who argue that groups with higher levels of
homogeneity have an elevated sense of civic commitment and higher levels of
community ownership and one that is less diverse in terms of immigrants and less
financially stratified tend to do better in terms of social capital (Morenoff et al. 2011;
Portney and Berry 1999). Homogeneity from a financial cooperative perspective can also
be useful in terms of ‘group guarantees and loan supervision’ (Huppi and Feder 1990:
192).
Each of the village based samples are mostly of a homogeneous nature in relation to
ethnicity, and religion however there are definitely some variances in terms of the wealth,
educational, livelihoods and age.  The diversity becomes greater when the data is viewed
across the entire country sample.   The samples are of course completely heterogeneous
when viewed across the three countries surveyed.
3.6 Horizontal versus Vertical Organisations
Krishna and Shrader (1999) examine the significance of horizontal organisations as
opposed to vertical organisations to understand if horizontal organisations generate more
trust.  Putnam (1992, 1993a) argues that horizontal organisations promote the
development of social capital whereas vertical organisations tend to constrain the
development of social capital.  It is within these networks and associated relationships
that social capital is generated and expended and according to Putnam (1993b) no matter
how dense or thick those relationships may be, vertical organisations are inadequate
structures in generating and sustaining trust and cooperation.  This argument tends to
ignore vertical institutions that do generate significant social capital such as churches
(Swart 2006) military institutions and social organisations such as the Scouts (Berman
1997).  Often this tension between the horizontal and vertical organisation’s capacity to
generate social capital is ignored, especially when seeking to use social capital as a tool
to look at relationships and networks within a for-profit business organisational
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environment (Koka and Prescott 2002; Leana and van Buren 1999; R. C. Mayer et al.
1995).
Being democratic, member driven institutions, young financial cooperatives are initially
firmly positioned within the horizontal organisational space.  And while these institutions
have a profit motive as the underlying foundation for the organisations sustainability, they
utilize an enterprise model in operation with the institution’s mission to provide social
benefit to participants (Goglio and Alexopoulos 2013).  This translates into a hierarchical
(read vertical) structure from an operational perspective, with boards, management and
staff or volunteers.  However in young developing financial cooperatives the membership
is very close and influential, with the board, management and staff being highly
responsive to member’s needs and requests.  As the institution matures and the
membership grows the institution professionalizes (Mason 2010) with products and
services mainstreamed and access to decision makers becoming more difficult.
Members voices are only heard through more structured and controlled channels of
Annual General Meetings, and membership surveys.  It is at this stage that the financial
cooperative has changed into a vertical organisation and that the social capital begins to
diminish (Mason 2010), as the very mechanisms and forums that the membership had to
create norms and build trust disappear and particularly as their links to the other members
evaporate and their attachment to the financial cooperative becomes functional.  The
institution no longer is a social or community focal point but a business through which to
obtain financial products and services.
3.7 Formal versus Informal Forms of Capital
MacGillivrary and Walker (2000) have provided a differentiated table (Figure 7) that
clearly lays out the forms of capital that demonstrates the divide and intersections
between human and social capital and determines the differences between formal and
informal forms of social capital. Macgillivray and Walker (2000) extrapolate the different
positions of trust to demonstrate how formal and informal social capital interacts with the
type of trust.  The other components such as norms, networks and reciprocity are also
examined so as to position them.  Within this context they can be measured and
examined as they can be located using this framework.  Identifying where the social
capital is located assists in understanding what and how it is to be measured.
Table 7 is useful in two different contexts, firstly it is useful to understand the social capital
that is present in both the community and individual in relation to that which is present
within the institution.  It helps to explain how social capital can permeate across from the
human through to the institution.  Secondly it assists in understanding how as the
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institution matures the informal social capital can transition or migrate in terms of where
it is positioned in relation to the individual, community and institution.
Table 7 A Matrix of Human and Social Capital Components
Source: (Macgillivray and Walker 2000: 203)
3.8 Considerations in Data Collection
3.8.1 Data Collection
The data collection techniques used during this research included one to one interviews
and focus groups.  The one to one interviews were undertaken using a variety of
surveying tools.  Interviewees participated in the Household Questionnaire (HQ)
(Appendix 5), the Community Questionnaire (CQ) (Appendix 4), the Organisational
Profile Interview (OPI) (Appendix 7) and the Financial Cooperative Profile (FCP)
(Appendix 6).  Focus groups were used for the Community Profile Asset Mapping
(CPAM) (Appendix 8).
3.8.2 Research Design
The research design strategy was based around the three methods, that of quantitative,
qualitative and participatory.  The participatory method was used during the CPAM
exercises while the quantitative material was collected using the CQ and HQ survey tools
where the FCP survey tool encompassed both qualitative and quantitative methods
whereas the OPI survey tool was purely qualitative in approach.
The research covered 3 countries, 33 site locations and 1425 respondents (Table 8 & 9).
The common point of reference was their cooperative financial institution.
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Table 8 Respondents within the SOCAT
Table 9 Data Collection Sites
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A number of sampling techniques were used during the data collection. Purposeful
sampling was used to select the sites to survey.  Other forms of sampling were not
appropriate due to the nature of the research.  Villages in each country were selected
based on having a financial cooperative. Within the village, stratified sampling occurred
when collecting the data for the OPI as it was necessary to have respondents that
interacted with the institution in different ways.  Random sampling occurred when
undertaking the HQ to ensure that there was a wide cross sample of the community, not
just community members that were members of the financial cooperatives but also
individuals that were having their financial needs met elsewhere.  The size of the village
determined the randomization technique utilized.  If it was a small village then nearly all
of the houses would be door knocked to request time to answer the survey.  If the village
was larger only every second house would be approached to participate.
The OPI survey was perhaps the most complex due to the diversity of respondent
required.  For this survey I used stratified sampling (Simon 2009: 169) whereby I
identified the segments of the institutions that I needed.  I required a varied voice within
the sample with the dominant voice being that of the financial cooperative members. I
also needed non-members to understand the institution from not only the outside but
from a general community perspective.  Similarly I needed to understand the physical
environment in which the financial cooperative operated in so I surveyed households and
individual community members to gain this information.  Institutionally I interviewed board
or committee members as leaders of their institutions as well as members and volunteer
workers within the institution.  The sampling also sought to survey across a spectrum of
age groups as well as attempting to include a gender balance.  The composition of the
research participants were:
 Members
 Non-members
o Non-members who wanted to be members
o Non-members who did not want to be members
 Board/Committee members
 Staff/Volunteers
 Community members (either members or non-members)
 Households (either members or non-members)
3.8.3 Contextual Considerations in Data Collection
The constructivist (Moses and Kunutsen 2012; Silverman 2011; Turner 2000) approach
that I took ensured that I had to consider issues that exceeded logistics and processes.
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There was a need to consider the social and cultural circumstances that I would be faced
with as I have little understanding in terms of the respondent’s experiences and the
influences that inform their everyday life which were completely different to that of my
own.  Basing my understanding of difference on the meta-narrative of  Chamber’s (2010)
work has assisted in separating my own perceptions of how I “should” seek out the data
and what is the “right” way to do the research.  It provided, not a view in, but a position
from which I could reconcile that I perhaps would not understand the respondents lived
experience.  It provided a way of understanding that the “self” and the “other” (Plummer
2000: 195) are created through each other.  The meaning of “self” is continually shifting
through the never ending interaction with the “other”.  Societies are also continually
negotiating “meaning” which in itself is an interactive process.
3.8.4 Timing, Location, Sampling
The timing of the research in each country and each location was not critical from either
the research question nor from the participant’s perspective as the institutions operate,
and the members access them up to 5 days a week only closing for weekends, public
holidays and festivals.  For this reason the selection of which country to start the research
was simply informed by the relative ease of access to the participants and the institutions.
The Cambodian data collection was completed first as there were the greatest number
of financial cooperatives to choose from and physical access was the easiest of the three
locations.  Access to skilled interpreters was also easier and quicker whereas the
Solomon Islands was geographically more challenging and access to interpreters and
assistants took much more time to arrange and demanded more attention in terms of the
initial interpreter training that needed to be provided.  Solomon Islands data collection
was undertaken after Cambodia followed by Timor Leste.
The leaders of the financial cooperatives were asked to invite their members to the
institution on given days so that they could be interviewed.  Many of the institutions were
small so often a majority of the financial cooperatives members were included in the
survey.  Others were asked to participate after undertaking the community or household
surveys which utilized a randomized sampling (Simon 2009) approach.  Within the
qualitative research data contained within this thesis I undertook a process of purposeful
sampling (Silverman 2011: 388).
Within the context of seeking to understand social capital within financial cooperatives
the sampling bias was ameliorated in the surveys (Community and Household
Questionnaires) that were not focused on the financial cooperatives directly.  It was
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important to be able to generalize the data (Moses and Kunutsen 2012) from these
surveys to understand the environmental and societal impacts on social capital.
The three countries in this research represented social capital development in financial
cooperatives from both the Pacific and Asia.  This allowed me to also understand if there
could be other macro influences at play within these unique environments, that of
government, religion, and culture.  By examining different financial cooperatives in
different locations in each country I have been able to draw out the micro level differences
with social capital development in financial cooperatives, that of leadership, access to
community resources and collective action which will allow a more nuanced or micro level
discussion of the influences and inhibitors of social capital development.
The selection of financial cooperatives was first determined by ensuring that there was a
mixture of both urban and rural institutions, a mix of salaried and subsistence participants
as well as a diversity of industrially bonded financial cooperatives and community or
geographically centered institutions.  The institutions ranged in size with some having
close to three thousand members to others that have just one hundred members.
3.8.5 Culture, Race, Ethnicity and Identity
It was understood from the beginning of this research that the attitudes of the participants
being surveyed could be affected by being a foreign researcher, while this could not be
totally overcome, the use of local interpreters at least ensured this went some way to
offsetting my influence.  ‘Race, ethnicity, class, gender, religion, marital status and other
non-demographic characteristics, … often define the position and identity of the
researcher in relation to the researched community’ (Apentiik and Parpart 2009: 34).  A
rapport was able to be developed by commencing the survey with introductions and then
discussions about things other than the survey questions.  When people appeared
sufficiently at ease chatting effortlessly then the surveying would commence.
Much of the qualitative research questions are focused around the everyday interaction
with the financial cooperative, the membership and management as well as the
community more broadly.  The underlying concept of the OPI was to take a step back
from a group of six to eight research respondents and then with a number of questions
posed to the group, let the conversation begin and listen to the discussion allowing the
salient themes and points of agreement emerge from the group.  From an ethnographic
research perspective this is still very much an ‘artificial research situation’ (Kees van
Donge 2009: 180) but it did however open up space for unexpected and less predictable
opinions and beliefs.  The interplay between each of the participants created an
environment where there was discussion and debate that enabled comments that would
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otherwise not have surfaced within the context of a structured survey questionnaire.
Within this environment the respondents were able to interact, not with an outsider, but
with people they felt most comfortable, their neighbors and colleagues.  Their identities
and cultural belonging was able to be evident in that interaction (Desai 2009).
3.8.6 Local Customs and Protocols
In undertaking this research there was a need to understand the social structure in which
the data was to be collected.  As Apentiik and Parpart (2009) has posited the researcher
never really fully comprehends and appreciates the complexity of the social interactions
and relationships, ‘given the role of agency and meaning in human activity, there may be
good reasons to doubt whether the social world exists independently of its interrogator’
(Moses and Kunutsen 2012: 152) however I endeavoured to be aware of my lack of
understanding and continually consulted with my interpreters as the data collection and
translation occurred.  There were a couple of examples where I was aware of the local
custom and protocols in relation to going into small villages, particularly in the Solomon
Islands.  While I had gained preapproval to enter the village it was important from a
position of respect to seek out the Village Chief or big man (Ambang 2007).  Likewise it
was important, once having entered the villages in Timor Leste and to a lesser extent in
Cambodia, to at least seek out the Village Chief and ensure that he was aware and
agreed with my presence and activities.
In each of the countries contained in this research there is a strong sense of shared
identity, or a ‘collective identity’ (Giguere et al. 2012) what Tajfel and Turner (1979) have
defined in their social identity theory.  One of the significant focuses of the data collection
was that of collective action, as the financial cooperative is fundamentally based on
collective action.  I also understood that I needed to, at a preliminary level, seek out their
initial motivation so I could navigate a way in which they would allow me to tap into that
collective activity and undertake a data collection process within the community.  The
offer to share the information flowing from the data collection along with the findings once
the thesis had been completed would provide valuable information that might allow the
financial cooperative to become more attuned to their membership and their
environment. The leaders of some of the financial cooperatives understood that their
assistance in having their institution and membership participate may improve their
institution and at the same time understand why their community participates which may
lead to greater engagement from others in the community leading to institutional growth
and strengthening.
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3.8.7 Power Structures and Control of Knowledge in the Field
This type of “outsider” (Sidaway 1992) research has been criticised because it produces
knowledge without the expressed input of the people being interviewed and it produces
it from a position of privilege and power (Moses and Kunutsen 2012).  Adorno and
Horkheimer (1979) argued, it is through the systematic knowledge humans take control
of their lives.  It could be argued that research undertaken by an outsider to make sense
of “others” (Mead 1934) is a process of disempowering those that we seek to understand.
‘Development research entails a confrontation between the powerful and the powerless,
a relationship fraught with possibilities of misunderstanding and exploitation’ (Beazley
and Ennew 2009: 189).
Power was a significant consideration in the design and implementation of the data
collection.  The collection of data encompassed multiple power relationships within the
interactions.  There were power relationships between me as an outsider to the
community and to the customs and culture, as a development practitioner, as guest in
the community.  There were power relationships inherent in my age (hierarchical
societies), as a male, as educated and literate and perceived to be rich (Brydon 2009).
Regardless of having spent significant time in a professional capacity in the countries of
research I do not believe that I could have a full understanding of the complexities of the
power relationships and the influence that this could have on the participants and the
manner in which this affects the way the participants responded to the survey questions.
Power from the respondents view in relation to the researcher is also informed by their
experiences when interacting with their governments, of which some are very corrupt,
which as Witsoe (2011) has argued, ‘corruption is a naked signifier of power…[which
has] reinforced elite dominance’ (Witsoe 2011: 82).  This then affects the respondents as
each of the minor levels of government (Village Chief, and in some cases Commune
Governor) had been informed of the research and a request for their permission had
been sought. The participants were aware of this permission which may have on the one
hand increased their willingness to participate but on the other hand it may have been
out of fear or compliance rather than that of an embodied sense of willingness due to
their attachment to their financial cooperative.
3.8.8 Language and Communication in the Field
In understanding the respondent’s answers, language, both verbal and non-verbal
needed to be considered.  Much of what the respondents were communicating during
the data collection was communicated through body language and signs.  Many of the
non-verbal indicators where not necessarily apparent to me as an outsider however the
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local interpreters involved in the process were able to identify many of these.  As Apentiik
and Parpart (2009) have argued, language, both verbal and non-verbal, is important in
defining identity ‘language [also] affects the way we look at the world’ (Moses and
Kunutsen 2012: 193).  Acknowledging the role of language within the data collection
process enabled me and the interpreters to read the situation and adjust the
circumstances in which the interview would occur.  Being able to adjust the approach or
environment upon reading the respondents verbal and non-verbal cues allowed a better
flow of information and for trust to be built during, and of, the process.
3.8.9 Gender Considerations and Participation
I want to move past the discussions on the rationale for having gender balance within the
research respondents as it has been covered many times before (Momsen 2009;
Nussbaum 2011; Pantoja 2002; Willis 2009).  I want to move on to how I ensured that
there was a proportionate response.  While there is much literature (Hunt 2012; Hur 2012;
Kabeer and Mahmud 2010; Simanowitz 2011) that espouses the benefits of having
women economically and physically engaged in development activities, often due to
women having the role as primary care givers in the family, there is disconnection
between what is seen as good practice and what occurs in the field.  Within this research
it was evident that women play a substantial role as both members and as volunteers at
an operational level.  With the exception of a couple of financial cooperatives across the
three countries the governance structure was dominated by men.  Including women’s
voices as members, staff or volunteers was easier than ensuring enough men were
available to participate however when seeking a gendered balance within the boards or
committee membership responses of the institutions it was far more difficult.  The
research data has a distinct bias in the absence of women’s voices within the governance
level data.
3.9 Surveys
3.9.1 Social Capital Assessment Tool
The Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer 2002b,
2002c) (Appendices 5-8) incorporates methodologies that report on both the cognitive
and structural forms of social capital.  The tool incorporates both quantitative as well as
qualitative data collection that has been used across numerous countries and can be
used to understand social capital from both a micro, meso and macro level and assists
in uncovering the relationships between community, the institutions and the individuals.
In utilizing the SOCAT there was a recognition that the tool needed to acknowledge and
address a number of essential conditions.  The tool needed to work across a range of
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cultural settings and therefore needed to ‘be sensitive to cultural variation while at the
same time provide a unifying conceptual framework’ (Krishna and Shrader 2002: 23).  It
also needed to examine both the cognitive as well as the structural elements of social
capital and at the same time be sympathetic to the localized form of collective action and
institutional development.  In order to understand both the formal and informal types of
social capital it also needed to gather both qualitative and quantitative data and provide
a participatory device that ensured respondents voice was evident in the resulting data
(Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002d; Grootaert et al. 2004; Krishna and Shrader 2002).
3.9.2 Indicators and Variables
The SOCAT tool divides the constituent stakeholders into the individual, the community
and the organisation and then further divides these into cognitive and structural
components.  From this level the SOCAT tool then fragments the data into a number of
headline conceptual categories with the outer level or what is in fact the foundation of the
research data, measurable and observable information.  This model of discovery ensures
a view of the environment in totality.  The fusion of this data in the Social Capital
Schematic allows the constituent social capital elements of trust, group characteristics,
norms, togetherness, everyday sociability, relationships and participation to be
understood holistically. In order to understand how the individual components operate I
have drawn from the work of those that have focused on each individual element and
amalgamated them into a cohesive whole.  The Social Capital Development Framework
and the resulting Social Capital Schematic are the tools by which a consolidated
understanding can be developed utilizing the individual theoretical components to
understand Civil Society, Groups and Networks, Trust and Solidarity, Collective Action
and Cooperation, Reciprocation and Mutual Aid, the Durability and Ownership of Social
Capital.
3.9.3 Mapping and Measuring Social Capital
Social capital by definition is heterogeneous in nature, that is, it can be found and
developed in various settings. There are numerous definitions of social capital and this
therefore makes it very difficult to measure due to the various methodologies that have
been used to understand and lay bare the concept (Bjornskov and Svendsen 2003).
Bankston et al argues that ‘the difficulty in defining, locating, and measuring social capital
is at core a philosophical confusion of language’ (Bankston and Zhou 2002: 385) due to
the use of the term capital.  Given that there is no consensus regarding neither the term
nor the method by which to measure social capital, I have sought to select a tool (SOCAT)
by which to capture the core constituencies of social capital found within a financial
cooperative and the membership and associated community. That is, the financial
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cooperative as an organisation, the individual as a member and the community as the
environment within which the social capital is generated and expended.
3.9.4 Mapping and Measuring Social Capital and Civil Society
The conceptual tool I have chosen to understand the complexity of measuring social
capital in civil society is that of Narayan and Cassidy (2001) Measuring Social Capital in
Communities (Figure 9). By breaking down the elements of social capital into headline
items that can then be articulated into everyday actions and behaviors of which many
can then be viewed within the data collected using the SOCAT tool.
Narayan and Cassidy (2001) Measuring Social Capital in Communities is a generalized
synthesis of the broader cognitive and to a lesser extend structural characteristics of data
capture.  It demonstrates the significant cognitive elements that may emanate from a
community and that can impact the structural forms of social capital within a financial
cooperative.
Figure 9 Measuring Social Capital in Communities
Source: (Narayan and Cassidy 2001: 67)
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3.9.5 Mapping and Measuring Groups and Networks
The development of relational groups that form strong networks undertake a series of
steps within an environment that brings about consolidation.  As Putnam (2000) has
posited the social capital that is generated is a type of glue that binds people together.
To extend that metaphor, when the glue sets it has a certain amount of give or flexibility
that enables the community to operate within boundaries or norms and generalized
behavior without the breakdown of the relationships contained within. That is, arising
from the development of social capital the community develops ways in which to operate
and to deal with everyday relationship issues.  Ways which include reciprocity,
communication, and trust which allow communities to interact on an everyday basis.
Dale (2005) argues social capital within Network Formation (Figure 10) progresses
through a number of stages, that of the community being empowered, developing
relationships and connections, reciprocity and developing ways in which to communicate
through to deliberative dialogue.  Through this trajectory Dale argues that the network
passes through phases that enable it to bond, bridge and link (Putnam 2000).
Figure 10 Network Formation
Source: (Dale 2005: 24)
This model is useful as it can be overlaid with the institutional development pathway taken
by financial cooperatives.  As a small group forms and develops it finds its voice through
empowerment of its initial members in understanding the concepts of running their own
financial institution.  As the institution grows so too do the interactions between the
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members in the everyday operations and the interactions where the relationships begin
to mature as people build deeper and more durable connections. Links start to form
outside of the institution, to organisations such as the government and other like-minded
institutions and to other individuals in the broader community which are necessary to
operate their financial cooperative.  As the relationship connections grow, so too does
the trust and reciprocity, not only between the members and the institution but also with
a broader group of stakeholders which are integral to running the financial cooperative.
As the diversity of their membership grows the institution and its members become more
considered and sophisticated in their communication to a point where the institution
matures and professionalizes and its management and board become an important and
respected part of the community.
3.9.6 Mapping and Measuring Trust and Solidarity
At the core of a financial cooperatives existence is trust which in turn enables participation
and eventually solidarity.  Trust has a number of forms according to Arneil (2006), that of
thick and thin trust.  Thin trust is a form of trust that is placed on the generalized other
(Putnam 2000) or what Arneil calls ‘civic trust’ (Arneil 2006: 125) with thick trust
positioned with people that you have had interaction previously. It is within the human
relationship that social capital emerges with trust emanating from the development of
social capital rather than representing social capital in itself.
Using Mayer et al (1995) Model of Trust (Figure 11) that is generated within an institution,
a cyclical process can be examined whereby the factors of perceived trustworthiness:
Ability, Benevolence and Integrity join to form trust and progress to generate outcomes
for the group which feed back into the groups initial precursors to create further trust and
further outcomes for the group and so it continues.  This model when overlaid with the
research data enables the clear mapping of the process of trust creation through the
various interactions that are occurring in the operation of the financial cooperative.  That
is, the leadership (ability) the social mission and behaviour (benevolence) and the
transparency and accountability (integrity) of the financial cooperative feed into the
communities sense of trust that is generated by the institution.
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Figure 11 Model of Trust
Source: (R. C. Mayer et al. 1995: 715)
3.9.7 Mapping and Measuring Collective Action and Cooperation
Collective action ‘arises when the efforts of two or more individuals are needed to
accomplish an outcome’ (Sandler 1992: 1). Collective action is demonstrated through
groups coming together to fight a localised concern or in the case of financial
cooperatives address a market failure or an identified need.
Sandler (1992) points to defense and safety as historically collective actions.  It is within
these types of action problems we see interdependency of individuals within groups. As
the interdependency of a society develops so too does the need for collective action.
Olson’s (1971) work is premised on the basis that individual rationality is not sufficient for
collective rationality. Sandler argues that Olson’s position is most concerned where there
is collective failure due to individuals pursuing self-interest.  This is in opposition to Smith
(2003) and his “invisible hand” whereby he argues that self-interest in a market
environment will benefit the collective interest.  Therefore collective action can be
examined in relation to an individual’s welfare being optimized by the collective nature of
the activity, as Sander has argued this needs to be understood in context to the
‘underlying game structure’ (Sandler 1992: 8). Birchall and Simmons (2004) argue that
the self-interest paradigm used to explain game theory has progressed to where self-
interested individuals can learn to work together and cooperate (Figure 12). There is a
growing emphasis now being placed on ‘the importance of habitual behavior, the growth
of social solidarity, and resulting high trust relationships, in modifying the individual’s
calculation of utility’ (Birchall and Simmons 2004: 2). Birchall and Simmon’s (2004)
collectivist approach is particularly useful in understanding the motivation and the
collective action of financial cooperatives as it uses three variables to understand
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participation, that of shared goals, shared values and a sense of community.  Each of
these variables fit comfortably into the process of both community and institutional
building which are integral to the development of a financial cooperative.
Individual participation is based on an analysis of the benefits and cost and the overall
opportunity cost of that participation. Individuals make this assessment from the view of
resource constraints (Brady et al. 1995; Brady et al. 1999; Verba et al. 1993a, 1993b).
Additionally the mobilisation of participation will be affected by the issue at hand, often a
‘catalysing issue’ (Birchall and Simmons 2004: 472) that is sometimes negative, ie an
issue that affects the individual, or an opportunity that has benefits to the individual.
Mobilising participation is also affected by recognition and “being asked” and the
closeness or relationship within the social network of the person asking (Brady et al.
1999; Klandermans 1984; Rosenstone and Hansen 2002).  Lastly although not
sequential but linked is the motivation to participate. The factors contained within the
resources and the mobilization affect the motivation and conversely motivation affects
the resources and the mobilization.
In the following chapters both quantitative and qualitative data contained within the five
survey components of the SOCAT has been analyzed and cross tabulated to understand
the depth and quality of the collective action within the research communities.
Figure 12 Individual and Collectivist Incentives
Source: (Birchall and Simmons 2004: 496)
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3.9.8 Mapping and Measuring Reciprocity and Mutual Aid
As societies move to a market based economy they replace mutual reciprocity with
market transactions which leads to a decline in social capital (Coleman 1990b; Leider et
al. 2009).  There are two types of reciprocity, that of a direct-reciprocal exchange and
that of network-generalised exchange (Buchan et al. 2002).  There is also a relationship
between the social distance and level of cooperation within the mechanisms of exchange
(Buchan et al. 2002).  Reciprocity must however be positioned within the cultural context
‘of the symbolic systems, or cultural capital, that imbues social relations with meaning’
(Perreault 2003: 328).  Given that the nature of this research is based on the function of
financial cooperatives it is important to differentiate between reciprocity and social
exchange. Social exchange is based on an economic exchange and reciprocity is based
on social relations and has an element of altruism contained within whereby there is no
expectation of a benefit which is directly linked.  The reciprocity within this research is
founded on the type of exchange that occurs between actors, or community members
and the social and institutional structures (Wohn 2011).
Reciprocity and mutual aid within this research is framed in context to access and
collective action of communities in relation to financial services.  The cooperative
behavior examined is, as Deutsch (1962) has argued, based on goals that are
interdependent.  The value of cooperative behavior and mutual aid within a social context
can be viewed as the same as within the marketplace (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004).
The reciprocity has a value at both an individual and community level.  The Svendsens
(2004) argue the economic and the cultural aspects of the interaction are so closely
entwined that they cannot be split. They argue it then allows the material and non-
material interaction to be examined within society.  ‘non-material capital as social capital
lubricates the interaction between individuals, thus facilitating generalised trust and
reduced transaction costs’ (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004: 16). It is here that the non-
material is as critical as the material to achieve economic growth. As Coleman (1990b)
has contended, the word social from social scientists and the word capital from the
economists be put together to operationalise and facilitate a new way of thinking about
the market. Social capital can be ‘broadly viewed as an informal exchange embedded in
cultural systems which, none the less, presumably holds important economic
implications’ (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004: 16).
Financial cooperatives are based on a democratic model of membership. ‘Membership
itself [is] an act of generalising reciprocity’ (Jarley 2005: 5).  What is clear from Jarley’s
(Jarley 2005) research is the importance of the “opportunity” to undertake activities of
reciprocity and to have a forum to develop bonds and shared values that can be
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maintained and strengthened. The democratic processes of participation and
engagement within financial cooperatives provide this very forum.
3.9.9 Mapping and Measuring Durability of Social Capital
Understanding the conceptual durability of social capital is demonstrated in Maak’s
(2007: 340) Responsible Leadership, Stakeholder Engagement and Social Capital
schematic (Figure 13).  And while Maak’s thesis is centered around leadership and
engagement, the way in which he has built on Mayer’s et al (1995) work on trust in terms
of ability, motivation and opportunity (benevolence) it is nevertheless instructive on the
structural and cognitive dimensions utilized within the SOCAT tool to collect the research
data and demonstrates the manner in which durability of social capital develops within
either the relational linkages between a community or an institution through returning
value to the community through the structural, cognitive and relational dimensions.
Figure 13 Responsible Leadership, Stakeholder Engagement and Social Capital
Source: (Maak 2007: 340)
3.9.10 Mapping and Measuring Ownership of Social Capital
Baliamoune-Lutz has argued that ownership and ‘the effect of social capital is stronger
among less educated people in regions where legal enforcement is weaker’
(Baliamoune-Lutz 2011: 336) and while this research is not focused on this specific
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question the research data does cover communities of varying educational levels, from
the professional middle classes in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste of industrially
bonded (mostly public service) financial cooperatives, to the rural subsistence farmers in
Cambodia and Timor Leste and Solomon Islands.  This research does not speak to the
question of the legal environment within which each of the financial cooperatives are
located, however it is not unreasonable to state that the governance and legal structures
of each country within this research is less than optimal.
Social capital has been conceptualised at multiple levels. Analysis of social capital has
been discussed at a national (Huysseune 2003; N. Mayer 2003; Putnam 2000),
organisational (Campbell 2000; Munn 2000), community (Hart and Dekker 2003) and
individual level (Comim 2008). Researchers are only just beginning to integrate social
capital across the different levels (Reid and Salmen 2002). Sociologists Bankston and
Zhou (2002; 1994) observe that social capital does not consist of resources held by
individuals or groups, but of processes of social interaction leading to constructive
outcomes. However, social capital has until now, has largely been defined as the
resources (Burt 2001; Lin 1999a, 1999b) available to one through the networks that they
hold (Figure 14).
Figure 14 Modelling a Theory of Social Capital
Source: (Lin 1999a)
Similar to Lin (1999a) Putnam (1995) posits the tensions of collective action can be
addressed by understanding that unlike economic and human capital, social capital does
92
not belong to the individual or to institutions but resides in the relations between the
actors (Figure 14).  This type of capital can only be drawn down upon by collective action
rather than through the individual.
Bourdieu extends the ownership proposition by viewing the need for “investment
strategies” from either an individual or group to maximise the return on investment in
order to give meaning to the relationships and connections of kin and those of the
workplace and neighbourhood. Maintenance needs to be continually undertaken to
preserve value and convertibility. Bourdieu’s (2002) view is any form of capital is a form
of accumulated labour that it requires work to maintain.  So it is not only the individual
that needs to maintain investment strategies but also the group’s solidarity that needs
investment.  Bourdieu (2002, 2003) writes that while the group needs to maintain
investment in the network and the solidarity that is formed there is a resulting material or
symbolic benefit gained through that effort.  For this benefit to be realised over the long
term Bourdieu (2003) added that the relationships must have inherent obligations that
are durable and experienced by the actors.  Application of this understanding could best
be seen within small Self Help Groups (SHG) in a development context, whereby the
group will come together to decide who should be next to receive a loan.  Within this
interaction and decision making a personalisation of the transaction creates and
permeates the group’s cohesion. The interaction needs to be a process of unceasing
sociability (Bourdieu 2003).
The journey through the theoretical foundations of the Social Capital Development
Framework and the resulting Social Capital Schematic is necessary in order to
understand the elements operating across the community and the institution as well as
the role the individual plays in creating social capital. While the sections above are neatly
separated into individual theoretical components this is not the case as demonstrated in
the Social Capital Schematic. All of these elements are at play continually through the
intersection of activity and interaction in the lives of the individuals and the activity of the
community and the institution. In order to develop a framework that would accommodate
an examination of the social capital within financial cooperatives it was necessary to
position the theoretical underpinning of the important elements of social capital.  The
components could be broken down further however for the purposes of this research an
understanding at this main component level is adequate to facilitate the understanding of
the Social Capital Development Framework and therefore the Social Capital Schematic.
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3.10 The Research Data
Using the Social Capital Schematic and positioning the research data within the
community the individual and the institution a further fragmentation needs to occur to be
able to unpack and closely examine the devices of social capital. The research data from
the community has been viewed through the structural assets of which the physical
assets have been categorized through themes of access, quality, change and problems
whereas the community structural assets have been viewed through economic activity,
employment availability, population movement.  Under the structural assets of the
community within the human assets I look at migration to understand this particular
element of social capital development.  The educational assets again are viewed through
access, quality as well as the geographic nature and attendance.  The health assets of a
community also are an important part of the structure of a community and access,
geography and facilities are measured within the data.  Livelihood assets form an integral
part of the social capital development and have been viewed through access, type,
financial condition and yield. The community support section of the research includes an
examination of the type and support as well as access and the available resources.
Lastly within the community asset section the case studies examine the standard of living,
trust, crime, environmental issues in context of community organisation.
The individual assets also contain both structural and cognitive social capital
components.  Within the structural social capital elements the country data chapters
examine participation through organisations and look at density, participation,
homogeneity and leadership.  Networks and mutual aid is also examined through
leadership and laying bare the forms and types of networks with which the individuals of
the community engage.  Exclusion is also examined to understand what causes division,
how division is handled and what types of exclusion occur.  Conversely collective action
is examined to look at the history of the individual community, the frequency of collective
action and the forms of leadership that take place.  The country data chapters also
examine the individual in relation to the cognitive social capital.  The research data
examines the location of solidarity, the thickness of trust and the perceptions of
cooperation and conflict.  Conflict resolution is examined in terms of the levels of harmony
and the location of perceived authority to undertake mediation.
Social capital development is examined within the financial cooperatives through the lens
of leadership and its elements of rotation, density and availability, the diversity and
heterogeneity as well as the quality and skills of the leaders and the relationships within
the institutions.  Financial cooperatives also rely on participation which is observed
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through frequency, decision making, and inclusiveness. Participation by elites within the
institution is analyzed to determine the diversity of membership.  The organisational
culture is considered within the data through the institutional practices and norms that
emerge.  Organisational capacity and sustainability is analyzed through specific
capacities and collective action and the formulation of demands within the institution.
3.10.1 Community Profile Asset Mapping
This participatory part of the research was undertaken through group interviews whereby
up to eight community members would dedicate up to an hour and a half to map out the
community assets and services available to their community.  Both the positive and
negative features of their community were discussed and listed along with the formal and
informal institutions available to the community. Diagrams were developed to assist the
group in “remembering” whereby the services and institutions where cross referenced
and connected depending upon the type and level of interaction and intersection. Open
ended questions and discussion threads where used at the beginning of the meeting with
more structured questions used later in the proceedings. There was no gender
segregation within these groups nor was there any bias in terms of age, education level
or position within the community.  While there was often disagreement during the
discussion, in nearly all cases the groups came to a consensus around the outcomes of
the discussion.
The CPAM was useful to understand the activities that the community undertook
together.  It provided an understanding of the nature of collective action.  More
importantly it was a useful exercise to build trust for further individual surveying work that
was to follow. The questions asked during the meeting were: 1. The identification of
community assets and their understanding of the definition of community, 2. Collective
action activity within their community, 3. Decision making processes that were enacted
and followed, 4. Discussion of the links between the local organisations, 5. Institutional
relationships and behaviours with the community, and 6. Linkages between their financial
cooperative and other institutions within their community.
The format of the discussion integrated a combination of direct, and open questions
which were semi-structured and encouraged the participants to outline perceptions,
opinions and ideas. Many of the discussion topics commenced with a broad question
that then had a subset of questions to unpack the theme of the main question.  The group
was also asked to use flipchart paper and pens to map networks.  This exercise enabled
those that were perhaps not as verbally inclined as others to participate more fully.  It
also allowed the group to interact with each other more fully and coalesce around their
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ideas in a less formal manner.  Both the group discussion and the drawing activity
enabled the group to test their recall of experiences, perceptions and opinions. The data
flowing from the CPAM is qualitative and assists in highlighting the degree and character
of the community’s social capital.
3.10.2 Community Questionnaire
The Community Questionnaire is structured to first capture the community assets and
the associated deficits.  The questionnaire then seeks to document items which are
quantifiable measures of social capital i.e. principal services, migration, education,
health, environmental, and community support.  The questionnaire was modified slightly
for each geographic context along with some of the language.  Additionally instead of
undertaking this survey in a group setting it was conducted on a one to one basis with
the results consolidated.
The CQ is broken down into the Community Characteristics, where the community is
mapped in terms of quantifiable and structural descriptors. The Principal Services are
then outlined to understand access, quality and issues with community utilities such as
electricity, telecommunications, water and sanitation etc. Labour Migration is also
examined to understand the economic underpinnings of the community.  The CQ also
examines the access and quality of four levels of education from preschool to adult
education.  The fifth area of examination is Health whereby access and quality of health
services is viewed in relation to the health issues by demographic affecting the
community. The community activity around the Environment is also considered within
this survey along with the Agricultural activity from production through to distribution and
technical assistance and access to credit. Lastly Community Support is examined in
context to social, economic and recreational networks and associations and the providers
and location of those services as well as the participation demographics.  In this part of
the survey respondents are surveyed on problems that exist in their community around
crime, substance abuse, and domestic violence as well as a number of other social
issues such as teen pregnancy, prostitution and gangs.
The CQ uses a combination of different questioning formats.  Respondents were
sometimes given a list of possible responses and asked to pick one, in other questions
they are asked to list two top responses to a question.  Some of the questions are a
choice of yes or no with subsequent questioning used to unpack the initial response.  The
questionnaire also uses a scaling system, eg. “increased, decreased or stayed the same”
with other questions the respondent is required to provide a number linked to a form of
measurement relating to the question.
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3.10.3 Household Questionnaire
The Household Questionnaire is structured into five main areas, the Identification of the
Household, the Housing Characteristics and Household Roster, the Structural Social
Capital and Cognitive Social Capital.  The Structural Social Capital section examines the
Organisational Density and Characteristics, networks and Mutual Support Organisations
which the household members belong to or participate in.  This section also looks at
issues of Exclusion as well as previous Collective Action.  The Cognitive Social Capital
segment of the survey unpacks Solidarity, Trust and Cooperation, and Conflict
Resolution.
This questionnaire provided data that could be batched and analyzed from a quantitative
perspective with details collected around the household characteristics, family
relationships, social networks and memberships, which spoke to the extent of each
household’s social capital.  Within examining the households social capital the survey
sought to uncover the density and characteristics of their memberships and the levels
and quality of participation along with the perceptions of reciprocity within those networks.
The household’s social capital questions also identify exclusion as well as collective
action that had occurred.  Lastly the household survey assists in unpacking the cognitive
dimensions of social capital.  This is captured by examining the norms, trust, solidarity,
attitudes and beliefs.
The HQ used a number of interrelated questions that saw responses dependent upon
previous answers.  The Household Roster within the questionnaire contained ten
questions that saw some further questioning become obsolete in certain circumstances
due to the dependence upon previous responses.  The HQ also contained relational
groupings which were connected to the initial response whereby the respondent would
be required to reflect back on the initial three responses and then respond or elaborate
further in each of the three cases.  The questionnaire also asked respondents to answer
in either the positive or negative in some questions while other questions they were asked
to scale responses or choose a predetermined scaled rating.
3.10.4 Financial Cooperative Profile
The features, density and durability of the financial cooperative were collected through
the Financial Cooperative Profile questionnaire. Questions around the Leadership,
Participation, Organisational Culture, Capacity and Sustainability were asked in
individual interviews.  The interviewees needed to be members of the financial
cooperative.  Within this sample group there was at least one committee member, one
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volunteer staff member and a larger sample of members, both depositors and people
whom had loans, both current and repaid.
The Leadership questions were framed around the rotation as well as the availability and
density of the leadership. Exploratory questions were asked about the diversity of the
leadership and the opportunity of others to participate in a leadership role.  The quality
and skills of the leadership is examined in the data as well as the relationship between
the leadership, the staff and the membership.
Institutionally participation forms a large part of the success of a financial cooperative.
The FCP asked respondents questions about the frequency of meetings, participation in
decision making and the inclusive nature of the meetings including whether there was
participation of the communities elites within the financial cooperative.
Knowledge transfer was examined within the context of Organisational Culture.
Respondents were also questioned around the institutional behavior of members and the
willingness of the organisation to confront members if there was a problem.  This section
of the survey also sought to understand if the organisation was willing to impose
sanctions on transgressors.
The Organisational Capacity and Sustainability section of the survey sought to provide
insight into the specific capacities of the financial cooperative through a 360 degree
process.  Included in the respondents were not only board or committee members and
management of the institution but also the members.  The outcome of the survey was a
more rounded and balanced viewpoint of the capacity of the institution to carry out their
activities.  This segment of the survey also looked at the collective action of the institution
to meet the needs of the members.  Here both activity and frequency was examined as
well as the way in which the institution was able to manage the interests of the
membership.
The questionnaire consisted of yes or no responses as well as questions which asked
the respondent to scale their answers.  The questionnaire required the respondents to
choose from a list of possible replies with some of the questions seeing the respondents
having to state two responses to an open question and then reflect back on those
responses in relation to the positive or negative areas of enquiry.
3.10.5 Organisational Profile Interview
The Organisational Profile Interview was conducted in a semi structured format which
examined the relationships within the community to the financial cooperative.  This
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interview sought to identify the various pathways within the networks and relationships.
The results speak to the quality of the membership and issues of inclusion and exclusion
along with the capacity and linkages to other organisations both internal and external to
the community.  The interviews were undertaken with committee members, volunteer or
staff members along with regular members.  Interviews were also held with non-members
within two categories, those that wanted to be members and those that did not want to
be members.  This cross sample provided insights from a whole of community
perspective and positioned the financial cooperative within the context of importance and
function within community life.
The OPI survey tool examined the relationships between members, board or committee
members as well as non-members and assisted in highlighting the bonding and bridging
social capital within the community through the financial cooperative.  By breaking the
interview into segments that focused on a component and constituent of the financial
cooperative, the interaction between the stakeholders assisted in identifying the tensions
and points of solidarity and highlights the cognitive rationale for participation.  Additionally
issues of institutional and personal trust are highlighted through the discussions.  The
OPI provided a qualitative tool to provide an institutional narrative from all sections of the
community.  It gave voice to those outside of the institution to provide a more holistic
qualitative community view.
The format of the OPI was similar to the CPAM with the exception of the division of
questions focused on different segments of the respondents as outlined in previous
paragraphs.  The questions were tailored to the position of the person being interviewed
and were written to elicit perceptions, opinions and experiences from their interaction with
the institution.  Many of the questions were open ended and offered the ability of the
respondent to provide a narrative stemming from a range of probing questions.
3.10.6 Research Data Analysis Tools
The quantitative research data from the field was translated and transcribed into
spreadsheets and consolidated and coded.  Due to the vast volume of quantitative and
qualitative data collected there was a requirement to segment it into an appropriate form
from which it could then be viewed and analyzed.  The quantitative data was analyzed
using SPSS program and the qualitative data utilizing NVivo program.
3.11 Ethical Considerations
Deakin University, Human Research Ethics Committee approved the research on the
20th of October 2010. While formal approval was not sought nor necessary from the
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federal or provincial governments in each of the countries that form part of this research,
an approval process was put in place to gain the consent of the Village Chief, in
Cambodia and in some cases the Commune Governor.  Permission was also obtained
by the board or committee of each of the financial cooperatives which participated in the
research.  Additionally in both the Solomon Islands and in Timor Leste authority to carry
out the research was obtained from the business or the government authority in which
the financial cooperative operated and from which the members were derived.
The research data is coded to conceal the identity of the respondents and to create
confidence in the participants that their information could not be traced (Simon 2009:
164).
3.11.1 Conflict of Interest
The organisation that the researcher works for is CUFA, this organisation has a
relationship with the institutions that are contained within this research.  While the
researcher doesn’t work directly with the institutions and communities, the researcher
was known to some of the respondents.  The identified conflicts of interest was the
inherent unequal relationship in being identified as a person coming from an organisation
that funds development activities with their institution or community.  The respondents’
sense of duty to participate was no doubt intensified due to this relationship however I
sought to mitigate this perceived pressure by clearly explaining the separation of function
and highlighting in the Plain Language Statement that identified their autonomy in
deciding whether to participate.  Highlighted in these discussions was the clear pathway
of complaint and withdrawal from the research which was explained verbally in local
language as well as in written form in the local language.  A local contact name and
phone number and email address was also provided to the respondents which they could
use if they had concerns.  The respondents were also informed that they could
anonymously contact the local representative if they had concerns or felt that they were
unfairly treated or wanted to report any incidences.   A name and phone number and
email address was also provided for Deakin University where respondents could contact
if they had any concerns.
3.11.2 Funding Considerations
The research was funded in part by CUFA, the employer of the researcher.  The
researcher as a part of current employment conditions is entitled to study assistance and
this assistance was provided in the form of funding of $9,000 that paid for airfares, and
accommodation, office and administration support in each research location as well as
access to interpreters in each country.  The focus of the research was deemed by the
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CUFA Board of Directors to be of benefit to the organisation and its objectives.  The
employer of the researcher has asked for the ability to quote information and findings
from the thesis in material to funders and donors.  As indicated in the ethics application
this does not equate to the commercialization or impact on the intellectual property rights.
3.12 Planning and Logistical Considerations
3.12.1 Selection of Field Locations
The selection of field locations was driven by a number of factors both within and outside
of my control.  The countries were purposely chosen as they spanned across Asia and
the Pacific region with Timor Leste being somewhat in between, being a predominately
Austronesian and Melanesian ethnic group on the edge of Asia.
Cambodia had been historically dominated by the French, Timor Leste by the
Indonesians and previous to that by the Portuguese, and the Solomon Islands by the
British, so there were some similarities in terms of having a colonized history. The
colonizers of each country within this research have had their own long history of
cooperatives (ACCU 1981; Lewis 1996). While each of the countries has had European
influences as a common factor I have not explored this as a part of the research.  I did
however feel it was important to note it for perhaps further investigation at a later time.
Each of the countries were colonized up until recently with the Solomon Islands being
independent for the longest period (Government of Solomon Islands 2002b).  The other
common factor between each of the countries is that they are all recent post conflict areas
and have suffered both internal and externally driven conflict.  As we travel further out
from the nucleus of commonality we see that each of them now have what appear to be
stable governments but their form and practice of governance is somewhat precarious in
differing ways in each of the research countries.
The selection of survey locations provided a number of challenges, firstly the research
design dictated that I obtain data from both urban and rural financial cooperatives, I
needed to survey both industrial bonded as well as geographically / community bonded14
financial cooperatives to ensure that I covered the breadth of form of financial
cooperative.  Lastly I needed to ensure that my sample size also included both larger and
smaller financial cooperatives.  These variants ensured that I obtained a representative
14 There is one religious based financial cooperative included in the Solomon Islands data
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sample of each country.  It also ensured that I could fragment my data to cross tabulate
the findings both across the individual country as well as from country to country, for
example, do small financial cooperatives generate a greater amount of social capital than
that of bigger financial cooperatives across the three countries?
The selection of the financial cooperatives was determined by where they were located,
that is, some villages simply did not have these institutions so the selection was also
based on availability.  None of the financial cooperatives that were approached to
participated refused, all were happy to be involved however some were found to be
smaller than initially reported so additional financial cooperatives were found to ensure
that the data for each country was complete.
3.13 Conclusion
This chapter provided a comprehensive explanation of the methodology and
epistemology behind the theoretical framework of the research. The constructivist
approach to the research outlined in this chapter has enabled me to account for human
agency and difference in the analysis of the data. ‘Action is social in so far as, by virtue
of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes
account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course’ (Parsons 1947:
88).  The data collection tool and the research design, data collection implementation
and the associated qualitative and quantitative software tools used to analyze the data
have been a significant factor towards achieving the objective of this research.
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Chapter Four: Cambodia Research Findings
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the Cambodian data gathered using the SOCAT tool
and presented utilizing the Social Capital Schematic.  This chapter begins by looking at
the entire Cambodian data set and then proceeds to examine the central components of
Community, Institution and Individual in relation to social capital.  The data analysis in
this chapter is then discussed in comparison to Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands in
Chapter Seven to understand its relation to the generation and expenditure of social
capital within the financial cooperatives. These research findings seek to locate and
document the types of social capital which appears to be in varying levels in the countries
examined as a part of this thesis.  This chapter positions an understanding the social
capital and it relation to the success or failure of financial cooperatives as it relates to the
Cambodian financial cooperative context.
The discussion of the results commences by examining the various layers of the data
within the Cambodian Social Capital Schematic, to understand the relationship between
the results of each category and the way this impacts on how and where the social capital
is formed. The types of social capital informs whether it is structural or cognitive social
capital which can then be understood in context to the site of generation.
Historical and Environmental Context
Modern Cambodia has endured a history trapped between geopolitical rivalries as well
as more localized class and power struggles which has resulted in war and genocide.
While the experience of genocide is the more recent narrative of Cambodia the early
history speaks to a rich cultural environment that saw the Khmers and the related Mon
peoples stretch from what is now Myanmar and Thailand to southern Vietnam (Church
1995).  With the emergence of the Angkor Kingdom between the 9th and the 14th centuries
along the northern end of the Tonle Sap (Great Lake) a population thrived through a
bureaucracy of officials that saw irrigation and construction develop, harnessing the
population and providing food through multiple rice harvests (Osbourne 2000: 33) and
trade. This was not a peaceful time for the inhabitants, under Suryavarman II15 much of
the empire stretched across what is now modern Thailand, Lao, Cambodia and Southern
15 Suryavarman II reigned between 1113-1150
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Vietnam (Church 1995; Rooney 1999) which was the peak of Angkor’s power (Freeman
and Jacques 2011; Osbourne 1997).  It was Jayavarman VVII16 who is responsible for
much of the construction including Angkor Thom and Bayon to promote Mahayana
Buddhism (Church 1995).
Different forms of Buddhism had existed alongside Hindu Devaraj however by the 13th
century Theravada Buddhism was becoming the dominate religion throughout Khmer
society (Church 1995; Osbourne 1997).  By the 1440s the Angkor region had been
abandoned by the Khmer ruling class. There are many theories surrounding the reasons
of abandonment including ecological deterioration, (Church 1995), the rise of Theravada
Buddhism (Osbourne 1997) and the importance of trade of which Phnom Penh being
more suitably placed (Freeman and Jacques 2011). Between the 16th and 18th centuries
there was sporadic wars that occurred especially through both Thai and Vietnamese
incursions (Church 1995) however trade and cultural exchange continued during this time
(Rooney 1999).
The French colonial period began in August 1863 with the signing of the treaty of
protection which ensured the commercial interests of the French (Church 1995;
Osbourne 2000). Initially this change meant little to Cambodia until in 1884 when the
French took control over all administrative areas of the country.  The resources available
to export and trade where limited with rice being the most abundant (Church 1995).
Regardless of the limited export opportunities from Cambodia the Mekong remained an
important trade route (Osbourne 2000) and therefore Cambodia was strategically
important.
World War II saw the transfer of the northern provinces of Cambodia to Thailand under
the Japanese17.  The French allowed the Japanese movement of their forces in exchange
for their agreement that they would continue to administer Indochina.  As a
counterbalance to the rising power of the Japanese within Cambodia the French assisted
in the development of a type of Cambodian Nationalist movement for young Cambodians
(Church 1995; Hall 1994; Tarling 2001).
16 Jayavarman VVII reigned between 1181-1219
17 These provinces were returned in 1947
104
The period after World War II saw the French propose limited Cambodian self-
government due to the prevailing nationalist mood in Indochina.  The French retained
control of finance, defense and foreign affairs however this arrangement became
dysfunctional with the political process becoming factional and unworkable.  King
Sihanouk saw this as an opportunity to internationally campaign for independence. In
October 1953 the French where in difficult circumstances in Vietnam and so gave in to
the independence movement.
The period between 1953 and 1970 saw Sihanouk deeply engage with the political
process with him abdicating in 1955.  The economy suffered during this time through a
lack of focus however there was an emerging educated class that were underemployed
and with Cambodia’s domestic peace at threat with neighboring conflicts the continual
recalibrating of geopolitical powers saw allegiances continually shift. While the urban
areas became more conservative the more remote areas saw the communist groups take
hold.  In 1970 while Sihanouk was overseas the National Assembly withdrew confidence
in him and replaced him with the Prime Minister Lon Nol as the head of the new
government the Khmer Republic (Church 1995; Kingsbury 2001; Osbourne 1997, 2000).
With Sihanouk no longer the leader of the government and an alliance with the Khmer
Rouge escalated tensions which saw a full scale civil war by 1972.  By 1975 the country
was in famine and unable to feed itself.  Support for the Khmer Rouge grew and on 17
April 1975 they entered Phnom Penh and deposed Lon Nol creating Democratic
Kampuchea (Church 1995; Kingsbury 2001).
Under the leadership of the Paris educated teacher, Saloth Sar known as Pol Pot (Church
1995) Cambodia would see a program of radical reform that aimed to build a new
Kampuchea starting at year zero in 1975.  The consequences of the reform are well
documented (Brinkley 2011; Church 1995; Ear 2013; Hughes 2009; Hughes and Un
2011; Osbourne 1997, 2000; Tarling 2001) and were extremely catastrophic for the
people, creating severe hardship as well as decimating a large proportion of the
population.  On the 25th of December 1979 the Vietnamese re-entered Cambodia which
saw the Khmer Rouge forces collapse.  During 1979 to 1991 the Vietnamese acted as a
“protectorate” (Church 1995: 33) however Vietnam understanding the international
perceptions of their incursion into Cambodia set up the People’s Republic of Kampuchea
headed by Cambodians including the current Prime Minister Hun Sen.
Elections were held in May 1993 under the auspices of the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), two months later the government was formed known
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as the Royal Government of Cambodia recognizing Sihanouk as Cambodia’s King
(Brinkley 2011; Church 1995).
To this day ‘Cambodia remains a shallow democracy’ (Ear 2013: 13) beset with human
rights abuses, poor governance and plagued by corruption and nepotism (Brinkley 2011)
and after more than 20 years since UNTAC is still dependent upon aid (Ear 2013). This
provides an interesting juxtaposition in relation to the experience in the rural areas of
Cambodia where there were high levels of self-sufficiency observed as the following
chapter will highlight.
Cambodia currently has over 14.3 million people (UNData 2014b) throughout 23
provinces (CIA 2014a) administered through an executive branch consisting of a Chief
of State, King Norodom Sihamoni and a Head of Government Prime Minister Hun Sen.
The legislative branch is bicameral and is made up of a Senate and a National Assembly.
The main drivers of the economy are garment manufacture, construction, agriculture18
and tourism however approximately 4 million people still live on less than US$1.25 a day
with more than 50% of the population under 25 years of age (CIA 2014a).  With more
than 50% of the government budget coming from foreign aid (Ear 2013) the growth of the
economy is at 7% GDP with inflation running at 3.2%. Cambodia is a net importer of
goods with US$6.7 billion in exports in comparison to US$8.8 billion in imports (CIA
2014a) although there is no reputable published data on the public debt of Cambodia.
This research focuses on the development of social capital within an institutional context
of financial cooperatives.  However due to the impact of poverty on the respondent
communities it is important to reflect on the indicators of poverty especially in relation so
the components of social capital that are discussed throughout this thesis, that of self-
reliance, access to services, and exclusion.  To do this I have reflected on the relevant
indicators within the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (United Nations 2014b)
which are led by the United Nations. The relevant indicators will be discussed in relation
to the structural assets of social capital.
The most recent segregated data discussed in this section and which is available to the
public ranges from 2007 to 2010 (United Nations 2014a).  Poverty levels as at 2007 were
18 56% of the labour force is engaged in agricultural activities
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at 30.1% indicating that almost one third of the country is still living below the poverty
line. While the indicators for primary school enrolment in 2010 is at 94.8%, youth literacy
rates are lower at 87.5%.  Educational gender equality is at 72.9% of females to males
while employment parity in agriculture and industrial wages levels is at 56% and 44%
respectively and at 30% for the service sector.  The health data in relation to cases of
malaria and dengue fever is at 4.4 people per 1,000 people with 75 deaths per 100,000
people for tuberculosis. These indicators provide some context to the environment within
which the respondents live their everyday life.  For some of the more detailed data within
the research I have also utilized the Cambodian Government’s National Institute of
Statistics of the Ministry of Planning data (S. S. Than 2008b, 2008a; C. Than 2012).
Respondent Community
The data collection was undertaken in 10 villages, each with a financial cooperative.  Of
the respondents 54% of them where between 40 to 59 years of age with 74% of the
survey sample earning US$100 or less per month and 50% having only completed up to
3rd year of primary school.  There was a larger participation of females (64%) to males in
this survey sample.
Cambodian Social Capital Schematic
Figure 15 Cambodian Social Capital Schematic
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The Cambodian Social Capital Schematic highlights a number of weaknesses (within the
.1-20% scale range) in the structural assets, particularly in the community component.
At the same time there are a number of strengths (60.1-100% scale range) within the
cognitive assets.  The schematic approach tends to smooth out the extremes of strengths
and weaknesses.  The resulting social capital levels within Community, Individual and
Institutional components are all equal within the 50.1-60% scale range indicating an equal
contribution to the generation of social capital within the community, the individual and
the institution of the financial cooperative.
The Cambodian Social Capital Schematic following (Figure 15) provides the reader with
a graphic representation and a high level statistical snapshot of the survey data, the
breakdown of the individual components has been provided in Appendix 1
4.2 Community
The Community component of the Cambodian Social Capital Schematic (Figure 16) was
measured at 50.1-60% scale range. This was made up of 63.14% within the Cognitive
Assets and 45.6% within the Structural Assets indicating a 17.54% spread between these
two components of the Community Social Capital.  This indicates that the cognitive
assets of the community are stronger than the structural assets and therefore contributes
substantially more to the community social capital component.
The following sections of Structural and Cognitive Assets provides an analysis of the
contributions and tensions that are contained within the sub sections of these asset types
and examines the interactions between the sections and the possible cultural and social
metanarratives (Chambers 2010) at play.  The following sections will discuss the
relationships which as Chambers (2010) has argued encompass a predisposition to be
personal, reciprocal, facilitative and democratic.
108
Figure 16 Schematic - Cambodia – Community
4.2.1 Structural Assets
The Structural Asset data range which contains the Physical, Education, Health,
Livelihood, and Community Support Assets as well as Community Attributes was
measured at a 40.1-50% scale range. The diversity within this component ranged from
70.1-80% scale range for the Community Attributes down to 20.1-30% for Physical
Assets.
The Physical Assets within this data set are composed of tangible objects that impact on
people’s everyday lives. The Physical Assets are general assets that are usually
available to all of the community such as housing, electricity, public lighting, water,
telephone, post, internet, sewage services, garbage collection, public markets, transport,
recreational facilities and security services. Physical Assets within the SOCAT tool help
answer one of the key questions when looking at social capital in relation to the direction
of causality ‘is it social capital that makes higher household welfare possible, or is it
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existing household welfare that allows the acquisition of more social capital’ (Grootaert
2002: 42). The Structural Assets within the Cambodian data set clearly indicate that the
household’s access to physical assets is very low however the resulting generation of
social capital is still able to occur regardless of access.
The data indicates that the services are less than adequate, often nonexistent and those
that do exist are costly, which in some cases limits access, however the communities
report that they are see improvement and are generally happy with the quality.  The
schism viewed between inadequate services yet the perceived view that they are
improving and that they are of a reasonable quality may be due to the nature of the
provision of the services and a strong sense of self-reliance. The Iterative Adaptation
and Ambiguity (Chambers 2010) orientates the mindset of the community to live between
what is available and what they may potentially have in the future. In many cases the
community, either through their Village or Commune Chief or through collective or
individual action, take responsibility for the provision of these services.  So while the
respondents were happy to point out the deficiencies, their perception was that these
services are improving, perhaps due to their own endeavours. This process of
empowerment can emanate from the activity of collective action and the resultant
‘collective self-objectification….actualizes participants’ social identity against the power
of dominate groups’ (Drury et al. 2005: 309).  Identity within this context of collective
action is positioned whereby the act of empowerment enables the community to
reimagine and reconceptualise their position and responsibilities within the community
and create new narratives and new skill sets (Britt and Heise 2000). The new skills
developed through this transformation assist in the poor’s struggle to access resources
(Missingham 2003).
Physical Assets
The National Cambodian Government provides funding for housing in some resettlement
projects (ADB 2011) however in general there is no housing assistance given to
Cambodians. The survey data indicates that the availability of suitable housing is
somewhat deficient however there is a significant proportion of respondents that view the
quality of the stocks of housing as having improved.  The respondents appear to claim
that the improvement is due mainly to their own economic efforts (Figure 17). There is
no evidence of the national government being engaged in planning, developing or
regulating housing.
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Figure 17 Reasons for Changes in Quality of Housing in Community
Utility services provided or coordinated by the national government tends to be focused
in the urban areas.  The large cities such as Phnom Penh, Battambang, Siem Reap and
Sihanoukville tend to be the main beneficiaries of coordinated government utilities (S. S.
Than 2008a; C. Than June 2010).
Electricity is provided in the rural areas in a number of forms.  Some villages that are
close to main transport routes may have access to main line power that links major cities
and towns however those that reside away from these sources tend to access electricity
in a number of different ways.  Some have access to diesel generators, others have
access to car battery services that are used for basic home lighting with some villages
now having access to solar power installed by international and local NGOs. Despite
only a small percentage of the community having access to electricity the respondents
have generally a positive view that this utility has improved. The respondents however
did raise the issue of cost in relation to accessing the service (Figure 18). Throughout
the data there is a recurring sense of solidarity, that is, all families are struggling to pay
for electricity and their individual situation does not warrant any special attention as
everyone is in the same position, this form of egalitarianism positions the individual
respondents as part of a communal situation.
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Figure 18 Problems with Electricity Service
Water and sanitation services was reported as deficient. There was a lack of access to
both pipe borne water, communal wells and pumps however a majority of respondents
indicated that they were generally positive that the level of potable water had improved
however unclean water was still a major concern (Figure 19).   Part of this concern is
linked to health issues identified within the survey but not reported in this part of the data
set.  Water borne diseases are a major health risk in the villages with dengue fever,
diarrhea and stomach issues being reported as major health problems facing children in
the villages surveyed. Men were reported as suffering from typhoid as well as malaria
and dengue fever and diarrhea whereas women reported lower incidences of typhoid,
dengue fever and diarrhea and did not report malaria as a health problem.
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Figure 19 Problems with Potable Water Service
Sanitation in the villages is also somewhat limited.  Some of the government buildings in
the villages have septic tanks although these are usually limited to the police station and
sometimes the commune office.  In the village areas the local commune takes care of
maintenance and construction of waste disposal through digging simple channels for
drainage with individual households often using pits for their waste.  Despite the lack of
services the respondents are positive about the facilities they have available to them and
have indicated that they have improved although they did indicate that there are some
significant problems with the sewage systems available to them (Figure 20). Sanitation
in the form of public garbage collection services in the villages is non-existent with
villagers disposing of their own waste mostly through incineration.
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Figure 20 Problems with Public Sewage System
General telecommunication services is limited across Cambodia. A public telephone
service is unavailable both in the urban and the rural areas. Landlines in the rural areas
are rare, and unconsidered so respondents were framing their answers in relation to the
mobile services that they either own themselves or that they pay to use by the roadside,
which is a form of commercial “public” telephone.  Respondents stated they have limited
access but they see this service improving although they have stated the cost is very
high (Figure 21).
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Figure 21 Problems with Public Phone Service
Other forms of telecommunications such as a public internet service is also limited
however smart phones are starting to become more prevalent (Vong et al. 2012) within
the Cambodian telecommunications market albeit mostly in the urban centers.  While
many older people have basic analogue phones, they are becoming obsolete and within
a short period of time these phones will be replaced by smart phones.  The main
challenge for some of the older people will be adapting to this new technology as they
have limited or no English unlike their younger counterparts in the urban centers. There
are only limited Khmer language smart phone applications available. Internet shops or
cafes can be found in larger towns but are not available in the villages.
Other forms of communication such as a national postal service is non-existent in
Cambodia so the survey respondents did not have any experience of such a service and
therefore there were no responses to this part of the survey.  Letters, documents and
parcels are delivered through an informal system of friends and family when they are
travelling or through the commercial bus system who often informally assist in the delivery
of packages and letters throughout the country.  This component is being included for
the purposes of completeness in relation to the Timor Leste and the Solomon Island
chapters.
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The provision of public services is extremely limited to those in the rural areas such as
public lighting, adequate transport options, access to markets and recreational facilities.
There is however a greater equality in terms of access to security services in the form of
policing across both the rural and urban locations.
The response to the question of public lighting was limited because the communities
surveyed have not experienced this in their village.  Public lighting is limited to the major
urban centers therefore due to the lack of responses the data sample size cannot be
considered as valid however the item of public lighting was included for the purposes
previously outlined.
Access, participation and availability of common space for people to come together to
undertake commerce was strong.  While many of these spaces are deemed to be public
space they are not formal markets that have been built by the government but informal
spaces that people have taken over and constructed either temporary or semi temporary
structures in which to sell their goods. While many sellers in these markets are required
to pay a small fee for their market stall to a government official these payments tend to
not make it into the governments revenue.
Other common areas includes a diversity of recreational space used by different
segments of the community which reflects the communal culture that is evident in other
aspects of the Cambodian everyday life. The data includes sporting fields along with
separate children’s play areas.
Movement within the surveyed communities was aided through significant access and
availability of transport, this includes everything from commercial buses through to
private motor taxis, bicycles and tuk tuks. The classification of “public” denotes private
and commercial forms of transport as there is no state owned forms of public transport
in village areas. Phnom Penh only recently began trialing a public bus service which has
been financially supported by the Japanese government (JICA 2013).  The movement of
the vast majority of the community is within the commune area, that is, to market, to
school, to commune government offices, and to the rice mill. There were a number of
concerns raised in relation to the changes the community would like to see to improve
public transport however the main concerns included better roads and frequency of
service (Figure 22).
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Figure 22 Changes to Improve Public Transport
The communities within this data set have a high sense of security, high levels of access
and see the security services available as good quality.  The security services referred
to by respondents are those of the commune police.  These police have a very unclear
chain of command and the commune or Sangkat Fund that is used to pay the police is
somewhat limited (Sedara and Ojendal 2011).  The results found in this data are
surprising given the lack of accountability and transparency of this service.  A possible
explanation may be that the commune police are local community members and
therefore are regarded with particular respect due to their participation in local communal
activities of village life.
Community Attributes
The Community Attributes section of the Cambodian Social Capital Schematic consists
of a combination of both the static history and current dynamic structure of the community
surveyed.  As Grootaert et al. (2004) has stated ‘it is important to recognize that social
capital is not a single entity, but is rather multi-dimensional in nature’ (Grootaert et al.
2004: 3).
The communities surveyed are well established and are reasonably large and have
enjoyed significant internal growth albeit only to see many people move out of the
community for work related purposes.  Regardless of employment opportunities
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increasing within their communities, much of the movement out of the community has
been younger people moving for educational opportunities (S. S. Than 2008a).
The majority of communities within this survey have existed for 20 years or longer which
aligns with the mass movement of displaced persons during the early 1990’s ‘rather than
going “home” to their families actually became pioneers, some carving out new villages
and farms for themselves…’(Hughes 2009: 76). The villages are large with 73% having
more than 100 households.  Many of the villages in this data set are located around
natural resources such as rivers and lakes as well as manmade facilities such as markets
and road networks. There is growth within the communities surveyed. The census
results for 2008 indicates that there has been annualized increase of 2.21% in the urban
population and a 1.43% annual increase in the rural population between 1998 and 2008
(S. S. Than 2008a: 25). Population growth is organically occurring (Figure 23) rather
than through immigration although the data does indicate a significant movement out of
the community through migration.
Figure 23 Cambodia – Community - Structural Assets - Community Attributes - Reason for
Population Movement
The survey data indicates that men predominately tend to work the land and are engaged
in agrarian activities.  This may be a mix of working on their own land or as day labourers.
In addition to their main income stream most reported working on household land to grow
vegetables, fruit and raise some livestock, including pigs and chickens.
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While women are also engaged on the land there is a high proportion in home based
manufacturing activities along with selling at either a roadside stall or at a market. Self-
directed employment with both men and women is more prevalent in the rural areas with
a higher proportion of salaried employees in the urban areas (S. S. Than 2008a).
The respondents had a sense that employment opportunities had increased.  The 2008
census data indicates that over the last 10 years the number of economically active males
15 to early 20’s has decreased due to increasing educational opportunities but at the
same time males over 60 who are economically active had increased (C. Than August
2010: 35) which would be due to the disruption the genocide caused to the demographics
of the country.
Human Assets
There is much movement into and out of the communities surveyed, much of it for
agricultural work purposes.  The outcome of this movement is a distortion of the family
unit whereby many families are made up of either one parent and/or grandparents and
the children, sometimes these distortions are seasonal and sometimes they are yearlong
(C. Than 2012). The respondents indicated that the migration out of the community was
for work with the majority of this migration being internal although it must be noted that
the respondents were not from communities close to borders which often increases
opportunities for migration out of the country.
Respondents reported that there is an even split in terms of the gendered nature of
migration although the type of work differs significantly with construction work and day
labouring being the main reason men migrate with women moving for factory or
construction work.  Much of the migration is based on the potential to earn higher wages
elsewhere and to be able to send remittances back to their family in the community (C.
Than 2012).  This type of work tends to be semiskilled and unskilled.  There are social
impacts with children being left behind to be cared for by grandparents, with husbands
and wives being separated from each other and their support networks (C. Than 2012).
Movement into the communities tends to be for agrarian purposes with the harvesting of
crops such as rice being one of the main reasons for immigration.  There again are social
impacts brought about by this movement of people, especially if they remain after the
harvest with competition for often scarce resources in particular housing and alternative
forms of employment.
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Education Assets
The educational asset quality and availability to communities appears to be sufficient
however due to the lack of available transport, access is often a limiting factor.  Primary
level education appears to attract the greatest participation however this drops at a
secondary level, which may be due to accessibility and to the financial situation of the
family whereby there are insufficient funds for the child to study at a higher level and the
need for the child to produce an additional income to contribute to the family’s financial
needs.
The data indicated that access to education becomes more difficult at the secondary level
although this may be a reflection of the lower numbers that transition from primary school
to secondary school (C. Than 2007) and therefore the resulting necessity to build as
many secondary schools. A significant proportion of the population have access to
education within a 4 km distance however this drops to just 18% when the distance is
measured at 2km.  While 4km may be seen as close, when taken in context to families
not having access to private forms of transport anything further than 2km may be
considered as too distant for children to access.
The respondents however appeared to be satisfied with the number of schools and
teachers along with the quality of the physical condition of the schools. Many of the
teachers are however under-trained for their positions, they are also underpaid, earning
as little as US$60 per month19 (Ear 2013) with this often leading to teachers taking “gifts”
from students to supplement their government salary. While teachers are moved around
the provinces they do become part of the local community so the responses on the
quantity of teachers or the quality of the schools may not be based on classroom
observation or their child’s progress but may be influenced by their direct relationship
with the teacher as a part of their community.
Primary school attracts the highest attendance with it tailoring off at a secondary level
according to the respondents. The survey was taken in predominately rural areas with
poverty being flagged as the main reason for poor attendance.
19 Private conversations with Cambodian teachers
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Access to adult education was reported as being limited although this survey did not
qualify the difference between formal and informal adult education as there are many
NGO’s providing educational opportunities around health, agriculture and livelihoods
however these were perhaps not considered as adult education due to what Henke
(2011) has called the NGO-ization of civil society in Cambodia.
Health Assets
Access to health services appears to be adequate and while there are high levels of trust
there appears to be a reluctance to use the “free” services as there is often an informal
payment that is made to access health services (Vian 2008). The data indicates
respondents tended to access the health clinics for essential health care needs such as
maternal care and emergency situations and less for preventative care with rural
households only spending US$2.48 per month on visits to public health services and
hospitals (Levine et al. 2012: 11).
Access to health clinics was reported at 60% although this needs to be viewed in
connection to use, which this study did not consider, however may be further examined
within the report completed by Levine et al. (2012).  While the data showed high levels
of trust with the health services there is significant research to indicate that the health
services are only used in extreme circumstances due to perceived costs (Levine et al.
2012). The high levels of trust appear to be separate from their experiences of attending
free clinics only to be asked for payment or “gifts” by the health workers which are used
to supplement their low wages (Jacobs and Price 2006).
The majority of people have access to health care within a 4km distance of their
household however this can be problematic if families do not have any forms of private
transport, especially if they have to transport a severely ill family member. The
measurement of access geographically has been gauged at 2km whereby only 15% of
respondents have access. The government investment in health services is growing
(Jacobs and Price 2006) with the number and spread of health clinics continuing to
expand although Cambodia still has the 46th lowest life expectancy and the 38th highest
infant mortality rate (Levine et al. 2012: 11). Respondents report having sufficient human
resources such as doctors and nurses within the health care system but are less satisfied
with the level of physical health care resources in terms of hospital beds, ambulances
and available medicines.
Livelihood Assets
The communities surveyed enjoyed a high degree of homogeneity in relation to their
livelihood activities as most earned their living from the land and sold their crops and
121
livestock through the same channels and reaped similar financial rewards for their efforts.
There is a shared sense of community and struggle as they see each other facing the
same challenges in terms of earning a living.
The type of livelihood assets available to the respondents are closely linked to the land
through either rice cultivation or animal raising. There is homogeneity in terms of
principle livelihood activities with 82% of respondents indicating rice cultivation as a
primary activity.  This result needs to be taken in context to the data collection occurring
in only in rural areas.
Local middle men appear to be the main channel through which the community sell their
crops and livestock. They note that the brokered price being paid by the middle men is
a problem.  The small margins they make on their crops and livestock are consumed by
transportation costs.  There are a number of NGOs that have been providing farming
technical assistance to the villagers20. One such initiative is to place a notice board up
at the entrance to villages where the market prices for the main crops are now being
publically posted so that villagers are aware of the “real” market price, which can position
them to negotiate more effectively with middle men.
All areas that were surveyed had access to a financial cooperative and in many cases
they also had access to other types of financial services, particularly NGO and
commercial microfinance services. The data indicates access to a variety of different
forms of microfinance from a number of different providers (Figure 24).  It is however
often difficult for the very poor to access these financial services due to the requirements
to have collateral against which to borrow (Figure 25). Additionally many of the
commercial and NGO owned microfinance entities charge very high interest rates due to
the nature of their external funding sources (MIX 2014) making cooperative finance more
attractive and suitable for the communal nature of the villages.
The survey data includes cooperatives that are classified as either financial or
agricultural. There is often a clear distinction between the function of a financial
cooperative and that of an agricultural cooperative, however those in the data set that
are classified as agricultural cooperatives predominately service the financial needs of
20 Agriteam Canada, JICA
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farmers and have agriculturally tailored financial products, e.g. loan products that are
repayable at the time of harvest, products tailored to purchase seed and fertilizer etc.
Figure 24 Cambodia – Community - Structural Assets - Livelihood Assets – Financial Condition
The very poorest agricultural producers tend to have difficulty in accessing loans due to
their lack of collateral, high interest rates and experience with crop failure and the
financial pressure this then puts onto the family.  Reputational risk was also flagged by
the respondents by their concern that if they could not pay back the loan they would be
seen as “untrustworthy” by their community.
Figure 25 Cambodia – Community – Structural Assets – Livelihood Assets – Problems of
Agricultural Producers in Gaining Loans
There was no capacity within the survey questioning to understand the corelations
between access to financial services and yields however respondents indicated that their
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yields had increased and correspondingly that their levels of sales had also increased.
This hadn’t necessarily translated into increased wealth as indicated earlier as the
margins between cost of production and transport costs and the sale price are extremely
small.
Community Support Assets
The community support assets such as a financial or agricultural cooperatives are highly
prized due to the intersection with their economic lives as demonstrated by the
membership.  Those with power or economic influence also play a role in the support of
the community.  The economic influence is not necessarily linked to wealth creation but
more so to access tools that will enable them to build wealth.
Respondents report that they have access to a wide range of community organisations
although the types within which they mostly engage are predominately those of an
economic nature and less so of those that have a civic or cultural focus. Community
development organisations and economic cooperatives enjoyed high engagement while
sports and cultural groups each had low engagement levels. Most of the support for
community organisations came through the NGO sector and that of their local commune
or village level government. Support from business and the national government play
only a very small role. While economic activity features significantly in many areas of
people’s engagement, support from business is perhaps limited due to the size of most
businesses in the rural areas.  Many of these businesses are family enterprises of a micro
or small size. The buildings utilized for community activity were dominated by the
community “elite”, that of community leaders, local government and religious buildings
as well as those that have direct influence on members of the community.
While there is equality in access in terms of gender, there appears to be a higher skew
of older people having access which could be due to the movement of younger people
out of the community for employment and educational purposes with those that are locally
employed certainly having greater access than those unemployed.
4.2.2 Cognitive Assets
Shared goals or vision (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998) and shared culture (Inkpen and Tsang
2005) create the sense of trust and perceptions of their environmental conditions, that is,
what is valued or important and what is not, what the community see as acceptable and
who is allowed to work with, and for, the community’s benefit.  The cognitive assets work
as a group of indicators that bring forth and lay bare the otherwise hidden reasoning that
underpin the actions of the community.
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Community Assets
The community assets are a group of indicators of a cognitive nature that highlight the
community perceptions of their environment.  The Cambodian communities appear to
view their standard of living and levels of trust as having improved. They understand that
their lives are becoming better however this is tempered by their perceptions of crime
with high levels of violent crime apparent within their communities.  The underlying theme
emerging from this part of the data is that of a strong sense of self-reliance within the
community.
Respondents report an improvement in the standard of living with this attributed to
economic improvement through increased job opportunities and better prices for crops
(Figure 26). On first reading this appears to contradict responses given previously where
respondents stated they do not get sufficient money from crops however in this part of
the survey the respondents are referring to the incremental improvements and are not
inferring that the prices for crops are sufficient. The majority of the respondents have a
perception of their communities as average in terms of the standard of living, that is,
neither poor nor wealthy.
Figure 26 Cambodia - Community - Cognitive Assets - Community Assets - Standard of Living
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The survey results indicate that there are high levels of cognitive trust, additionally
respondents indicated that levels of trust have mostly improved.  In comparison to other
communities they see their community as having either more or at least the same levels
of trust as other communities. The levels of trust in relation to lending is very high at 87%
however this may be due to the sample being dominated by members of the financial
cooperative.
While there were indications that levels of trust had improved there were perceived high
levels of violent forms of crime such as domestic violence, assaults and violent disputes
however nonviolent social issues such as teen pregnancy, prostitution were perceived to
be low within the surveyed communities (Figure 27).
Figure 27 Cambodia - Community - Cognitive Assets - Community Assets – Crime
There were reported high levels of violent crime within the social environment however
the responses about the physical environment where all of the villages surveyed were
located inland were positive (Figure 28).
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Figure 28 Cambodia - Community - Cognitive Assets - Community Assets – Environment
The respondents perceived view of improvement in, and the quality of, the environment
as being very good to good.  The focus of this environmental improvement was positioned
within individual responsibility rather than through government regulation or third party
influence.
Community organisation was however predominately focused on economic activity with
the exception of health which could be deemed as a self-interest activity.  Participation
in community organisations focused on cultural or civic activities was low. Local
government and NGOs were the greatest supporters of community organisations.  Much
of the support was based on the economic development of the community organisations
which may have had an impact on the outcome of the responses. The main buildings
that are used for community activity are those that could be seen to play a significant role
in the community members’ life, that of the government (schools and health), religious,
and local leaders’ homes. The survey data indicated that participation in community
organisations tended to be from those who were older and economically active.  The data
demonstrated participation was balanced in terms of gender.
127
4.3 Individual
Figure 29 Social Capital Schematic - Cambodia – Individual
There are strong outcomes for the forms of Cognitive Social Capital (71.82%) within the
Individual element of social capital while the Structural Social Capital (48.12%) was found
to be significantly less.  The total for the Individual component of social capital was again
similar to the Community component in the 50.1-60% range at 59.97%.  It is within the
Individual component of the Social Capital Schematic that we find the separated activity
of interaction and networking, the individuals’ agency that brings resources or ones social
credentials to the group (Lin 1999a)
4.3.1 Structural Social Capital
Individual Structural Social Capital takes into consideration Collective Action, Low
Exclusion, Networks and Mutual Support Organisations, and Organisational Density &
Characteristics.  Each of the Individual Structural Social Capital components are within
5.81% spread which indicates a strong similarity of positioning of this social capital
component. The Individual Structural Social Capital arises from the sense of social
cohesion and shared sense of connectedness to others within their community.  The
individual sense of identity has been bought about by a collective identity that has been
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largely based on sense of homogeneity and one which believes is accepting and inclusive
but which is in real terms driven by a common cultural, political and religious identity
(Fominaya 2010).
Organisational Density & Characteristics
Organisational Density and Characteristics is composed of Participation, Density,
Homogeneity and Leadership.  There is a wide variation of outcomes within this section
of Structural Social Capital however the reasons for this are evident when examined
individually.
Due to the nature of the survey the respondent selection was intentionally biased so it is
unsurprising that the respondents where most active within the financial cooperative. The
data indicated participation in other forms of association however the levels of
participation was concentrated in economically focused organisations.
Contained within the survey sample were 47% of the villages which had over 250
households, so given the relatively large size of the village it is surprising that there was
a 49% overlap of participation in the groups. Membership density could potentially be
linked to the financial nature of the organisation serving a very important function within
the community with possibly cross functional and institutional relationships to the other
community organisations and their members. Lin (1999a: 31) argues ‘individuals engage
in interactions and networking in order to produce profit.’ The resources within the
interaction assist in producing better outcomes.  Those resources are: information,
influence, and social credentials with each of them contributing to reinforcing individual’s
sense of worth and greater sense of identity through the public claim to those resources.
Within the community there was a high level of homogeneity in terms of religion (92%),
political alliance (80%), occupation (83%), age (67%) and education level (61%). There
is however significantly less homogeneity in relation to the same family members
belonging to the same groups, where it appeared there was wide representation across
multiple groups within the family, however it was less common for multiple memberships
of an organisation within the one family unit.
The organisational leadership experienced within the groups appears to meet the needs
of the members with adequate levels of satisfaction. While the respondents indicated
satisfaction with the organisational leadership only 18.6% indicated that the leadership
was very effective.
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Networks & Mutual Support Organisations
The Networks and Mutual Support Organisation component of the Cambodian Social
Capital Schematic is composed of Leadership and Support, and Networks. The
leadership appears to be positioned within individuals that are powerful within everyday
life and is based on the relationship of the person in power and the issue at hand.
Problem solving was reported as being undertaken by either the powerful or within a
consensus framework (Figure 30).
Figure 30 Cambodia - Individual - Structural Social Capital - Networks & Mutual Support Organisation
- Leadership & Support
Groups of people such as the Village Association or the entire village, rather than
individuals were the dominant mechanism for action along with those that have implicit
power such as the local government. This reaffirms the outcomes demonstrated that
support is channeled through a consensus or power based framework.
Exclusion
There is a high perception of gender equality as 97.3% of respondents reported that the
reason for exclusion was not due to gender, there is however exclusion caused by
income, race, ethnicity and religion.  There is a reported strong respect for age and
political affiliation. Given the reported high levels of homogeneity within the community
it is not unexpected that high levels of exclusion could be in evidence where community
members did not fit the norms in terms of race, ethnicity or religion. Respondents
indicated an extremely low level of direct experience of exclusion in their own household
however there was a perception that many other people are being excluded except on
the basis of race or ethnicity.
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Causes of division were reported to include differences in education, wealth and
landholdings, this is particularly salient given the responses to other sections of the
research where there was clear evidence of a desire for sameness or the perceived
egalitarian nature of their community and their relationships.  While ethnicity and race
was reported as a reason for exclusion it was not reported as a reason for division
whereas political party affiliation and age rated as significant causes.
Division is handled through mediation by those in power, community leaders with both
family and neighbours also heavily involved in the mediation process. It appears that the
data tells us that these forms of mediation are not very successful as it appears to often
lead to violence.
Collective Action
The Collective Action component consists of Leadership, Participation, Frequency and
History. It would appear that regardless of a low level of success of the collective action,
the participation and frequency of occurrence is reasonably strong.  This may be due to
the leadership within the community or the communal nature of action and decision
making.
Respondents participated in numerous collective activities but many did not engage in
activities that bought them into contact with the government, however 94% voted in
elections and a further 56% personally assisted in election campaigns21.
The data indicates that there is a degree of consensus within communities of the strong
leadership influence within the decision making approach around collective action.  This
appears to be the preferred approach by the respondents with 87% indicating that group
membership is valuable individually.
There was high participation in collective action around associations and community
discussion around issues. There was also high participation around political obligations
of voting and electioneering.  These high levels of participation may be due to the
21 The government “sit in” question is an anomaly, I believe upon reflection that this was misinterpreted as
going to a government office for a service rather than protest, this chart should be omitted due to the
ambiguity of the question.
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positioning of the local commune authorities between their constituents and the higher
authorities especially that of the national government (Sedara and Ojendal 2011: 280).
4.3.2 Cognitive Social Capital
The Cognitive Social Capital is made up of Solidarity, Trust and Cooperation and Conflict
Resolution. Along with reliability and honesty, Fukuyama (1995) calls these Social
Virtues.  These behaviours only occur within a social environment, through a
connectedness to others and yet they are behaviours that can belong to the individual in
relation to the group.  These individual traits which are cultivated within the group,
whether that be the family, the workplace, or the community, engender a sociability that
assists in the functioning of the community and institutions.
Solidarity
The responses to questions of solidarity were composed of understanding the Location
of Solidarity.  In attempting to understand the location of where the individual forms a
sense of solidarity, several scenarios where put to the respondents to understand how
and where the actions of solidarity and connectedness occurred. There was an
extremely high sense of connectedness to the community however the family and
neighbors made up a significant proportion of the respondent’s social safety net both in
terms of needing assistance and those who would provide assistance in return. Of the
two scenarios which were outlined to the respondents the family centered scenario
scored higher in terms of assistance whereas the scenario that had an economic
assistance component scored lower.
Trust and Cooperation
The two components in this section were framed as actual – Thickness of Trust, and
perceived - Perceptions of Cooperation. There was a high degree of trust by the
respondents in relation to financial matters which perhaps is not surprising due to the
nature of the sampling as previously mentioned. Family and neighbours enjoyed the
highest degree of trust along with the Village Chief. Trust appears to be positioned within
the family and then to a lesser extent within institutions.  It should be noted that although
the Village Chief enjoys a high level of trust it is probably not simply because of the
position and function but because he (none were female) was first and foremost a
member of the community. The respondents also indicated that trust had increased over
the last few years and their village had more trust than other villages.
While perceptions of cooperation were high with family members, it is less so with friends
and neighbours. In scenario questioning about levels of cooperation there was a greater
desire to have singular ownership of a smaller landholding and/or house than to jointly
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own a proportionally much larger landholding or house with a friend or neighbour.
Outside of the ownership of property there appears to be a great deal of willingness to
cooperate and a willingness to look out for each other with 74% indicating that if there is
a problem there is always someone to help and that in their village most people will help
if needed. The respondents believe that there is a great deal of trust within the community
with 89% of respondents indicating that members of their village are more trustworthy.
They appear however not to want to test that trust and cooperation as only 21%
disagreed or strongly disagreed that they needed to be alert or someone will take
advantage of them.  And while they believe that there is a lot of cooperation within their
village they responded that when it comes to choices around direct financial gain, other
people will look after themselves first. Respondents indicated in a proposed scenario
that only 7% of people would return a purse if found.
Conflict Resolution
Conflict Resolution is composed of three areas, Perceptions of Conflict, Levels of
Harmony and Location of Mediation. These components encompass the nature and type
of relationship, the perceptions of the relationships and the way they work along with the
site and nature of the mediation.
The respondents view their communities as very peaceful and are willing to contribute to
common development goals however the respondents indicated that they were less
generous and less likely to contribute time and money than other villages. They viewed
their villages as harmonious and very similar to other villages in this respect and located
the mediation of conflict within the family, neighbors and community leaders.
4.4 Institutional
The Institutional component of the Cambodian Social Capital Schematic (Figure 31)
seeks to consolidate the Structural and Cognitive Assets due to the interrelated nature of
the components at the next level of the schematic. The intertwined nature of Leadership,
Participation, Organisational Culture and Organisational Capacity and Sustainability
were such that they all had cognitive and structural traits that could not be separated out.
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Figure 31 Social Capital Schematic - Cambodia – Institution
4.4.1 Structural and Cognitive Assets
The Structural and Cognitive Assets within the Institutional Component of the Social
Capital Schematic are comprised of Leadership, Participation, Organisational Culture
and Organisational Capacity and Sustainability. From a financial cooperative perspective
each of these components speak to both organisational attributes and qualities and
membership capabilities and perceptions. Organisational Culture is at the same time
observable and measurable and is also inherent within the social relations between the
institution and the members and also between members.
Leadership
Leadership is made up of Relationships, Quality and Skills, Diversity and Heterogeneity,
Density and Availability and Rotation.  The Leadership section assists in explaining the
way in which it affects the institution through understanding the type, continuity,
attributes, and areas of strength or weakness.  The components provide a contextual
framework in both a concrete (e.g. gender, time in leadership positions etc.) and abstract
(e.g. vision and acceptance etc.) format.
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Leadership within the Cambodian financial cooperatives, according to the respondents,
tended to be mostly static indicating that while there was regular change of leadership
and that the time in leadership roles was sufficient there did appear to be mechanisms
for people to remain in their leadership roles for as long as the membership wanted.
There appeared to be institutional succession capabilities within the financial
cooperatives with adequate numbers of willing candidates to take on a leadership role.
Respondents reported that 50% of past leaders remained active within the financial
institution so it appears that the transition to new leadership happens amicably and
respectfully whereby past leadership can still contribute and be valued by the institution.
There is a lack of gender equity in terms of women in leadership roles however there is
diversity in terms of where the leaders come from with 80% indicating that leadership is
diverse in terms of its origins. The perception of the quality and skill levels of the financial
cooperative leadership is rated as excellent-to-good in terms of, education and training,
dynamism and vision, professionalism and skills and honesty and transparency. The
leaders of the financial cooperatives tended to have harmonious relationships with both
the staff and management and enjoy a high level of acceptance and legitimacy within the
community.
Participation
Participation is understood through examining the Decision Making, understanding the
role of the Elites in the institution and the Inclusiveness of the organisation. This provides
a view of participation in terms of who and how this activity manifests itself within the
institution.
The respondents indicated that they were satisfied with the frequency of the meetings of
their financial cooperative with 60% deeming the level to be adequate. There is also an
extremely high level of opportunity to participate in decision making within the financial
cooperative. It was reported that information was disseminated prior to meetings, there
were opportunities for informal discussion along with grassroots consultation, debate,
and a dissemination of results from the meetings. The data indicates the decision making
process and the resulting information sharing and consultation is managed particularly
well.
As one of three categories, the poor tended to have much higher levels of participation
than that of youth or women. There was a high degree of perceived improvement in
participation of women and the poor and there were perceived high levels of broad
representation and participation within the financial cooperative with 60% indicating that
more than 75% of the population feels included in the community activities however
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participation by the community elites within the financial cooperative was particularly low
but they were however seen to be a resource for the institution.
Organisational Culture
Organisational Culture is composed of the Institutional Practices and Norms and can be
a prism through which to examine the practices within the institution and at the same time
understand the resulting cultural norms that emerge in undertaking the day to day
activities and the resulting social interaction. Respondents indicated that Institutional
Norms and Practices were widely known and disseminated with low tolerance for non-
contributing members or for members who take advantage of the bigger group. There
was a willingness to confront problems and enact sanctions and fines, and in extreme
cases expel from the group.
Organisational Capacity & Sustainability
The Organisational Capacity and Sustainability section comprises Specific Capacities
and Collective Action and the Formation of Demands.  This examines the structural in
terms of the technical and process capacities as well as the cognitive in terms of problem
solving and learning capabilities. The Cambodian institutions within this survey had a
high level of technical capability to carry out tasks, supervise, and prepare financial
reports.  The data indicated that the institutions were reflective and had a longer term
institutional view and were able to manage members and their expectations and needs.
The institutions had solid processes and procedures to manage their institution and their
membership’s demands. The respondents indicated there were clearly defined
processes of identifying common needs and priorities of its membership along with
informal processes to communicate these.  There is evidence within the data set that the
institution focusses on the collective voice in terms of addressing demands.
4.5 Conclusion
The Cambodian Social Capital Schematic highlights the equity within the three main
components of social capital. The even distribution between these main components
was not consistently generated throughout the arterial, skeletal and muscular layers of
the schematic.  The stronger elements of the Cambodian Social Capital Schematic were
cognitive rather than structural.
The cognitive aspects of the lived experience tended to provide strong feelings of
equality, inclusiveness, a sense of fairness and of identity and an equal access to
resources.  A sense that the economic benefits were equally enjoyed and shared. There
was a personal connection to others within the community and a sense of obligation and
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a communal sense of responsibility for others.  The network of responsibility was at its
most dense within the family and then radiated out to relatives then to neighbours and
then to the rest of the community.
The shared sense of identity positioned trust in those within the community.  Institutions
outside of the community enjoyed the least levels of trust whereas the closer the
institution to the community the stronger the trust.  The institutions that were staffed by
community members were valued more regardless of the real value or quality these
services provided to the community.
The shared sense of equality should not be confused with the desire for and respect of,
leadership.  The communities within the Cambodian data set placed high value on
leadership and the inherent relationships between and within the institution and the
community.  This was also evident within the function of mediation and the leadership of
decision making and problem solving.  While decision making was framed around
consensus it was prefaced on having a member of the community take a leadership role
to facilitate and bring together the parties.
Where there was direct participation and ownership of activity or institutions the stronger
and higher the value.  This was particularly evident in the cognitive elements of the
survey. The collective action in creating and operating a financial cooperative has
leveraged off the shared identity and social cohesion of the community and individual
agency along with capitalizing on networks, shared norms and reciprocity of the financial
cooperative to create robust institutions along with stronger communities. The
homogeneity of the communities within the data contributed to cognitive inclusiveness.
The Cambodian Social Capital Schematic highlights the equal role that the Community,
the Individual and the Institution play in generating the social capital which is evident in
the Cambodian financial cooperatives.  It also demonstrates that the cognitive
components of social capital in the Cambodian financial cooperatives contribute
significantly more to the generation of social capital than that of the structural
components. Operationally and financially the Cambodian financial cooperatives are
very strong however there is evidence the social capital is now declining as the bonds
within the institutions become weaker through the growth of the institutions where it is
impossible, due to the membership size and geographical spread of the institutions, to
continue to build trust, provide space for reciprocity and develop solidarity.  The
Cambodian financial cooperatives are moving to preference the economic over the social
mission of their institutions and are therefore inhibiting the opportunity for social capital
to emerge from member to member and from member to institution interaction.
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Chapter Five: Solomon Islands Research Findings
5.1 Introduction
The analysis of the Solomon Island data utilizes the same methodology, tools and
structure as the previous chapter.  Similarly it discusses the findings utilizing the Solomon
Island Social Capital Schematic to lay bare the results and to demonstrate the
relationship between the data and the impact this has on where different types of social
capital is formed.
Historical and Environmental Context
The Solomon Islands consist of over 1000 islands across 27,556 square kilometers
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2008) with a population of 515,870 (SINSO 2014). There
are 87 languages spoken (Allen 2012; Economist Intelligence Unit 2008) and around
85% of the people living in rural areas (Allen 2012). The main islands are Guadalcanal,
Choiseul, Santa Isabel, New Georgia, Malaita, and San Cristobal. The social system of
“Wontok” is central to social cohesion and is a ‘village based traditional cultural practice’
(Thompson and Baschiera 2011: 81).
The Solomon Islands is predominately made up of a Melanesian population which first
reached the islands around 4-5,000 years ago.  The Solomon Islands did not exist as a
country under any leader, it was Alvaro de Mendana y Neira the Spanish navigator in
1568 (Hou 2002) who first named the group of islands.
Western missionaries settled there permanently in the 19th century (Laracy 1976) and in
the late 1800s thousands of Solomon Islanders were forced to work the plantations of Fiji
and Northern Queensland in Australia otherwise known as “Blackbirding” (Kent 1973:
96).  During this time there were no localized colonial plantations in the Solomon Islands
and it wasn’t until 1893 that the islands became a British protectorate (Kent 1973: 102).
The rule of the British was punitive which saw many clashes between the indigenous
people and the Europeans (Tahu 2001).
During World War II the Solomon Islands endured some of the most intense and
prolonged fighting especially on Guadalcanal Island.  The Americans and Japanese
fought here between 1942 and 1943 which saw the Americans eventually dislodge the
Japanese occupying force with ‘the last Japanese detachment surrendering on Choiseul
in 1945’ (Kent 1973: 141).
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A nationalist organization called Maasina Ruru22 (Hou 2002: 27) or  Marching Rule (Kent
1973: 142) was launched after the war which called for political autonomy. In 1960 while
still under British control the Solomon Islands adopted a new constitution that saw the
creation of a legislative and executive council. In 1976 the Solomon Islands achieved
political autonomy and became independent on the 7 July 1978 (Government of Solomon
Islands 2002a).
Ethnic tensions (Stratford 2000) have led to instability and low level conflict and general
lawlessness (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008).  There was ongoing tensions from the
late 1990s through to 2003 when the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) intervened (Greener et al. 2011) which was an abandonment
by Australia of a long-held ‘position of non-intervention in neighboring states’ (Dinnen
2009: 70).  Again in 2006 riots followed the general election (Stratford 2000) which saw
Snyder Rini elected as Prime Minister and subsequently resign soon after.
There have been frequent changes to the leadership due to the nature of the shifting
political alliances (Hameiri 2007). Dinnen argues that the challenges of the modern
Solomon Island state relate to its colonial past where ‘Great Britain imposed arbitrary
borders and foreign systems of government with little consideration as to their fit with
existing indigenous polities and social organization’ (Dinnen 2009: 71) others argue that
the tensions signify the dissatisfaction that the Solomon Islanders feel being marginalized
from the political and economic processes and the resentment of the Chinese business
class (Greener et al. 2011; Hameiri 2007; Tahu 2001).
The Millennium Development Goals Progress Report for Solomon Islands 2010 states
‘An important reason why the survival of democratic governance is an enabling condition
for the attainment of Millennium Development Goals is the underlying human rights and
universalist philosophy basic to the Millennium Development Goals effort’ (Mishra et al.
2010: 29).  Indicators within the report provide insight into the environment in which the
respondents reside and provide some context to their responses in relation to the social
capital components that are evident within their communities, institutions or as
individuals.  The first goal of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger for the Solomon
Islands is somewhat mixed as while there are not large proportions of the population in
22 Maasina Ruru means brothers ruled.
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extreme poverty there are a high percentage of the population living just above the
poverty line.  Achieving the goal of universal primary education is on track however the
goal of promoting gender equality is not being achieved especially in terms of political
representation and in the formal employment sector.  The health indicators are improving
with cases of tuberculosis decreasing along with the malaria infection rates however
there is some doubt, according to the report, as to the veracity of the data utilized. The
MDG goals of ensuring environmental sustainability is particularly important given the
high number of Solomon Islanders that live extremely close to nature and their
dependence on it for their everyday needs.  This goal identifies logging and deforestation
as a concern as well as rising sea levels and climate change.  The report identifies
challenges to water quality also as a serious concern.  While the majority of the
respondents within this research were urban waged employees, many of them belonged
to clans that were responsible for customary land and supported family members who
still reside on that land.  The environmental impacts will be felt by the respondents
economically should there be a greater need to support family members if the customary
land is unable to sustain them.
Respondent Community
The research was conducted with 13 financial cooperatives across the capital of the
Solomon Islands, Honiara as well as in North East Guadalcanal and Central Malaita.
Respondents included a mixture of both waged professionals working in the formal
economy, subsistence farmers and traders as well as those that are internally displaced
such as the Lord Howe Island community. The communities surveyed were either
geographically, religiously or industrially bonded.  They included urban and rural
populations across a spectrum of age, income and educational backgrounds.
Solomon Islands Social Capital Schematic
The Solomon Islands Social Capital Schematic (Figure 32) highlights a number of
seemingly contradictory data points as well as unexpected results given the cultural
context and recent history.  The Solomon Islands enjoys a communal culture with socially
strong ties however the data indicates that the social capital is highest within the
institution rather than the community and in fact the community is the weakest of the
three components.
Within the community social capital data set the Community Attributes component is the
strongest and may be attributed to the strong data showing low levels of movement in
and out of the community.  Additionally, while unemployment is very high in the Solomon
140
Islands (SINSO 2014) there was high reporting of economic activity for both men and
women.  The strength of this component was offset by very low levels of Physical Assets.
The individual social capital segment of the schematic highlighted strong levels of
cognitive social capital.  Particularly strong was the sense of solidarity which may be due
to the strong cultural identity (Kent 1973) or the reported high levels of homogeneity and
participation.  The strength of these components is in direct contradiction to the low levels
of collective action reported which given the strong social relationships23 evident
throughout communities does not align with expected results.  Perhaps further work in
this area could be undertaken to understand if collective action is positional, that is, if it
is not found in the larger group could collective action be found in family groups, is
collective action contingent on familiar relationships rather than geographical (read
village) or groups of common interest.
Institutional social capital was reported as the strongest component of the schematic
which may be explained through cultural traditions of hierarchy and strong leadership
(Government of Solomon Islands 2002b, 2002a).  The financial cooperatives were found
to be very homogenous in their membership and therefore very low on diversity.
At the outset of this study there was an expectation that the results would demonstrate
strong levels of community social capital and weak levels of Institutional and Individual
social capital however the reverse of this position has been found.  The formalization or
institutionalization of relationships and ways of mediating everyday life may have
accentuated and maximized the existing relationships and while the institutions
themselves are extremely weak from an economic viewpoint the social relationships have
been strengthened.  This would go some way to explaining why after many of the
institutions have failed repeatedly the membership continue to use these institutions.  A
staff member of the Central Malaita Credit Union provided this case study that reinforces
this position:
“A member came in to withdraw a small amount of his savings from the
credit union but as it was late in the day we didn’t have any money left as
we had given it all out in loans earlier.  The member had over $20,000
dollars [Solomon Island Dollars] in his savings however we had no money
23 Wontok
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left, but he said it was OK and that he would try again tomorrow and
hopefully he could get some money.  He said that other people must have
needed the money more than he did.”
Source: Staff member of the Central Malaita Credit Union – person was not a survey respondent
The Central Malaita Credit Union has failed and been restarted by its members twice and
yet even with this knowledge the member did make any demands of the institution to
obtain his money.
Figure 32 Solomon Islands Social Capital Schematic
5.2 Community
The Structural and Cognitive Assets of the Community Social Capital Component (Figure
33) were both within the 40.1-50% scale range resulting with 47.1% for this component
indicating a very narrow statistical spread between the structural and cognitive aspects
of the Solomon Island community.  Across the community social capital arterial layer of
indicators the Physical Assets scored as the weakest with 31.1% and the Community
Attributes scored the strongest at 62.23% indicating that the strength in this component
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resided in the village structure where the population movement was very low and the
economic activity very high whereas the structural services in this component, mostly
provided by government were very weak.
Figure 33 Schematic - Solomon Islands - Community
5.2.1 Structural Assets
The wide variance in the Structural Assets ranged from 15% through to 93% with the
physical assets of the schematic scoring the weakest whereas those relating to the
human structures tended to rate as very strong.  It appears from the data set that the
issues that were within the direct influence of the community tended to benefit as
opposed to those that were within the domain of the government.  Health and education
assets were reasonably strong but the cause of this may have some direct relationship
to the providers of these services with teachers and nurses often employed directly from
the community.  Additionally the results are perhaps weighted given that a large
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proportion of the data was collected in Honiara where the respondents have access to
the highest quality of services in the Solomon Islands.
Often some of the respondents did not seek to provide a response to some of the
questions around the assets due to their lack of direct experience of these services, such
as public lighting, the internet and garbage collection.  The services that they did have
direct experience of such as electricity and transport they scored the quality as poor but
gave reasons of cost and intermittent service as the main problems.  The government
was often acknowledged as the party responsible for taking action.  That is, they were
not satisfied with the service but did not see that the responsibility sat with the commercial
providers but saw it as within the domain of the government.  It was clear that many of
the respondents appeared to think that the government was the only provider rather than
a regulator or contractor of the service.
Physical Assets
Housing needs to be considered in context to the survey location.  The data is a mix of
both urban and rural populations however urban respondents tend to dominate this
sample.  Housing also needs to be viewed through the lens of the wontok system
whereby there is a communal and shared responsibility for ensuring that your family
members have somewhere to stay.  Given that many people in this survey were based
in various parts of Honiara they did come from other islands and parts of Guadalcanal
and therefore often rely on their wontoks for housing.
The quality of the housing varied in quality and type.  Some in the urban areas enjoy
public service housing provided by their employer, or at least subsidized, while others in
not only the rural areas but also often in the urban areas lived in palm frond huts with no
running water or electricity.  They stay in the huts that their relatives construct in their
gardens for visiting wontoks.
Fifty six percent of the respondents indicated that the quality of the housing has improved
but indicated inadequacies in terms of availability are mostly due to the lack of financial
resources.  Respondents pointed to employment and education as contributing factors
to the improvement.
Access to electricity was extremely limited with low reach.  Additionally many of the
respondents complained about the quality in relation to the frequent power outages and
the high cost. Many of the respondents rated the quality of public lighting low however a
third of respondents indicated availability as being the major concern.  This must be
viewed in context to the higher number of respondents from urban areas.  Again for the
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same reasons access to potable and/or pipe borne water was flagged as having
improved.
Reach and coverage of mobile telephony is also high and while respondents reported
access to public phones (again due to the urban location of the respondents) with
Solomon Islands Telecom, the government owned telecommunications company being
responsible for provision.  The number and access to public telephone services drops
significantly outside of Honiara.  Postal services are available in Honiara, albeit
somewhat limited, with access and availability plummeting outside of the capital.
Similarly at the time of the data collection the reach of internet services was limited to the
capital city with intermittent and low quality services to the main cities outside.
Sewage and garbage services were deemed to be inadequate with only around one fifth
of respondents indicating improvement. Most villages outside of the urban areas live
close to nature and utilize the natural resources close at hand.  These are then discarded
on the ground to decompose naturally posing limited health risks.  Urban settings such
as Honiara see a greater deal of plastics and man-made materials utilized but disposed
of in the same way leading to health risks.  There are small initiatives undertaken by the
government and local NGOs to educate the population to dispose of their rubbish
differently than in the villages however these initiatives are very small scale and have
had limited impact.
The availability of markets appeared to be adequate although the use of the markets in
the data was rated as low. While there are formal spaces for trading activity, much of the
trade is undertaken informally with small kiosks set up along the side of the road, on
footpaths and people moving about selling goods out of a bag.
Transport availability was rated as high with reasonable levels of use and perceptions of
improvement to the quality also high. The transport in Honiara is network of private mini
buses and taxis.  There is no public transport provided by the government.
Security was rated as low which given the collective memory of recent civil conflict this is
unsurprising.  The Solomon Islands media regularly reports robberies, theft and violence
in Honiara.  The research data includes a greater weighting of respondents based in
Honiara which could assist in understanding of why a low security score was achieved in
this survey.
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Community Attributes
There has been significant growth within the communities surveyed however given that
a large proportion of the respondents are from the capital city Honiara it is not surprising
that there is a report of growth.  Respondents indicated that a third of this growth was
internal.
While there were high levels of reporting of available employment, much of the economic
activity for both men and women was self-employment.  Much of the employment for men
was focused around market sales, in particular betel nut, cigarettes, and kerosene.  Much
of the self-employment for women focused on the sale of produce and home cooked
foods.
Human Assets
There appears to be movement out of the community for the purposes of work with more
men than women moving for this purpose with many of them moving to a city within their
island or region.  Many of the men are reported as moving for professional (office
positions) or trade positions whereas the small number of women that are reported as
moving for reasons of study or to take up a professional position as nurses, teachers, or
banking positions. Movement into the community appears to be for reasons of
employment.  For positions such as teaching, policing, nursing with only a very small
number reporting that there is movement into the community for better living conditions.
Education Assets
Access to public preschools is high but drops for primary schools however then increases
for secondary schools.  Geographical access is very high for preschools as well as for
primary schools however the distance from a secondary school for the community
becomes greater.  There is general satisfaction with the physical quality of the schools
and number of teachers across the three levels of education.  Attendance at each of the
levels of education is reported as high.  This reporting may be skewed by the urban
influence as well as the education levels of many of the respondents within this survey
given that many of those surveyed belonged to bonded financial cooperatives and were
white collar workers.  Some of those that belonged to financial cooperatives that were
geographically or religious based were also within, or close to, major urban centres which
may have influenced the survey responses.  The reasons for children not attending
school included cost and lack of transportation.
There was reasonable access to adult education opportunities reported within the
surveyed communities. Many of these opportunities are provided by both NGOs and
146
church organisations and are often focused around livelihood development and health
and sanitation.
Health Assets
Respondents reported high levels of access to health clinics within a 1-2km range with
good access to the physical health care needs such as basic medicines and hospital
beds.  Access to doctors and other health care professionals was reported as much lower
than access to nurses.  Malaria treatment was reported as the principle health care need
followed by water borne diseases for men, women and children.
Livelihood Assets
Respondents reported that chickens and pigs were the main livestock activities with rice
and cocoa as the main agricultural products.  The responses to these questions are
founded upon the islands within which this survey was undertaken.  Some islands
cassava and sweet potato would be the main crops.  Coconuts was flagged as a crop
but featured low, surprisingly so too did betel nut as a cash crop.  Both these items, given
their everyday use, may not have been considered as a cash crop for sale given high
levels of personal consumption.
The community market was the principle place of business followed by markets in
neighbouring villages. Transporting agricultural produce outside of the immediate area
appeared to be low however livestock appears to have different channels of sale with
middle men and retailing being more dominant.  The cost and lack of suitable means to
get livestock and agricultural produce to other markets appears to be the main barrier.
There also appears to be a lack of agricultural and livestock technical assistance within
the communities.  The technical assistance that is available is mostly provided through
the government at a federal level.
There was a lack of responses to the questioning around access to financial services
with most people using their family networks (wontok) to access money.  There was a
reported lack of financial services aimed at agricultural producers (Figure 34).  It appears
that the respondents simply do not borrow for agricultural purposes nor see the need to
do this based on their perceptions of their ability to access financial services. They
reported they could not afford the loans, they couldn’t work out the paperwork necessary
to apply for a loan nor could they receive adequate returns on the sale of their produce
to be able to pay back a loan.  The respondents framed their response around their
financial cooperative and there was a varied response.
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Figure 34 Problems of Agricultural Producers in Gaining Loans
It appears that many of the respondents do not interact with formal financial services with
the majority of respondents indicating that they do not access any financial services
outside of their community.  This would tend to strongly infer that they lean heavily on
their family and relatives for their financial needs.
The yields of the crops and the level of livestock production appear to have remained the
same as have the level of sales.  There appears that there is no improvement. Some
respondents reported that their communal land holdings were small and therefore lent
themselves to subsistence farming rather than to cash crops.
Community Support Assets
The level of participation in community groups tended to be around the cultural and social
types of organisations with economic organisations having the lowest level of
participation. The organisations were strongly supported by religious institutions with
significant support provided by NGOs and government.  The community appears to be
the biggest support of the organisations although this survey did not differentiate between
volunteer types of support and that of financial support.  The religious buildings were
mostly used for the community activities with commercial buildings and political leader’s
homes used the least.  There was a balance in terms of gendered participation and
employment status however youth tended to be more excluded in their participation.
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5.2.2 Cognitive Assets
Cognitive Assets are viewed as subjective and intangible.  They encompass norms and
attitudes, values, reciprocity and trust and ‘predispose people toward mutually beneficial
collective action’ (Krishna and Shrader 2002: 19).  The SOCAT is structured at a broad
level to examine three larger themes of cooperation and trust, solidarity and conflict
resolution.
Community Assets
Ninety four percent of the respondents stated their quality of life had either improved or
at least remained the same.  Many respondents put this improvement down to the
benefits of education. Most respondents highlighted the problems within their community
and identified the reasons for change as economic and security centered. There is a
correlation within the data that on the one hand the respondents’ indication that education
has improved their lives but a lack of education is also listed as a reason why other
people’s quality of life has not improved. The respondents did not identify with being
poor, most identified that their community was average however one third of respondents
indicated that their community was in fact well to do, but not wealthy (1%).
Levels of trust within the community was reported as remaining the same at 71.4%
however in matters of trust in relation to money only 44.4% indicated trust whereas 55.6%
of respondents indicated a lack of trust. Fifty seven percent of the respondents thought
their community enjoyed about the same level of trust as other communities with 25.3%
indicating that they had less than other communities.
Social issues around substance abuse were lower than that of other social concerns such
as prostitution with violent crimes of assault and property crime of vandalism and robbery
also high although violent disputes and domestic violence scored proportionately lower
than other forms of violent crime even though they had identified as being affected by
these forms of crime.  There appears to be a rupture in identifying the major concerns of
the community and the lived experience.  The respondents rate substance abuse and
domestic violence is less important to the community but at the same time indicate higher
levels of being affected by these issues.
The respondents appear to be very conscious of their environment reporting that there
are low levels of polluting industries or harmful practices to their natural environment
however 50% indicated that their environment was very good to good and 49% said that
the environment had improved.  Respondents indicated that this was due to education,
mostly provided by the government and the leaders of the community. They did indicate
that the government should be doing more to provide more education and better
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environmental services.  Most of the solutions and initiatives raised required either the
government or the community leader/s to take action.  There was a strong inference that
other people should be made responsible, if not for the actual task then at least to provide
the leadership within the community to solve the problems.
Community organisation according to the respondents was around sporting and cultural
issues rather than economic issues.  The survey participants appear to see the
organisation around economic issues as outside of their sphere of control whereas
sporting and cultural issues remain rooted within their communities.
5.3 Individual
Figure 35 Schematic - Solomon Islands - Individual
The outcomes for Cognitive Social Capital are mixed with high levels of solidarity
(89.35%) yet much lower levels of trust and cooperation (40.87%) particularly in the area
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of Thickness of Trust where this component only scored 29.67%.  There appeared to be
multiple strong avenues for mediation of conflict.  There were stronger outcomes for the
forms of Cognitive Social Capital (65.71%) than that of Structural Social Capital (51.14%)
within the Individual component of the schema (Figure 35). Within the Structural Social
Capital, Networks and Mutual Support Organisations were strongest (64.82%) with
demonstrated Collective Action being the weakest at 31.34% with low levels of a history
and frequency of collective action.  Participation was reported as being absolute with
100% however this may be due to the particularly strong element of homogeneity within
the surveyed groups (Krishna and Shrader 1999).
5.3.1 Structural Social Capital
There is a wide diversity of results within the Individual Structural Social Capital schema.
The Collective Action component sees a low result for Frequency and History of
Collective Action but this is not necessarily reflected in extremely poor leadership or
participation.  This may be due to the manner in which communities take action.  While
collective action speaks to the Structural Social Capital in one way perhaps the manner
in which Solomon Island communities’ effect action is through personal relationships.
Evidence of this may be demonstrated through the Organisational Density and
Characteristics result where Participation was at 100% and Homogeneity at 81.55%.
Action is therefore taken through these personal networks rather than mass collective
activity.  The management of Exclusion was weak within the data, this changed
depending upon the geographical positioning of the survey respondents.  In the urban
areas where there is a diversity of people there appears to be higher levels of exclusion
in contrast to the rural areas where people tend to be related and outsiders to the
community appear to be rare.  This is perhaps further complicated due to identity issues
especially on Guadalcanal island whereby the emergence of the settler versus the
landowner narratives that have recently developed and emerged due to the growth of the
resource industries (Allen 2012).
Organisational Density and Characteristics
Participation in membership groups was at 100%, with respondents reporting that the
membership of various groups included some overlap between family members with
35.8% belonging to the same extended family.  While the groups tended to be
homogenous in terms of religion they were not gendered nor strongly politically aligned
or from the same occupation, age or educational groups.  The lack of homogeneity did
not appear to have an effect on the perceptions of the leadership of the groups as 53.93%
rated the various groups as having very effective leadership.  In reflecting back on the
participation in other civil activities there appears to be great respect for people who are
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prepared to lead the community and take responsibility for some type of action that has
wider benefits than just for the individual.
Networks and Mutual Support Organisations
Leadership from a Solomon Islands context is framed within a consensus driven
approach where matters are dealt with communally through appointed local leadership.
Matters are not left to the individual nor to just the family or neighbours but to larger
groups of people and often at a local government level. Issues relating to institutional
leadership are positioned as close to the users of the service.
Exclusion
Exclusion from services such housing, employment, water and transport is a lived reality
for many of the respondents.  They also perceive others in the community also being
denied services with the most dominant reasons being income level, occupation and
social status.  Reasons for exclusion lessen based on age, gender, race, language,
religious beliefs or political affiliation however a lack of education sees exclusion
increase.
The ways in which exclusion is mediated is again through community and religious
leadership.  Individual mediation is very low with the judicial system also utilized less.
Division in terms of access often leads to violence.
Collective Action
Collective action in a Solomon Islands context is positioned within strong leadership
rather than group decision making.  That is, collective action appears to work best if there
is strong leadership to drive the collective action.  Leadership of group membership is
seen to be valuable whereas reliance on group decision making is particularly low.
There were high levels of participation in collective action especially at a political level
and at an association level (financial cooperative).  Respondents reported participation
in structured, sanctioned forms of political participation, their engagement in political
marches, sit-ins or demonstrations or lobbying the media on issues was significantly low.
There was also extremely low interaction in legal forms of engagement with government
in terms of petitioning action on common issues.  This may be due to the very low levels
of success of collective action (17.1%) in the past. This reinforces the argument that
Solomon Islanders within this survey see the value of their government having a big role
in their daily lives. The government is seen to be an active agent in people’s lives and
therefore the people are politically active in the formal democratic process.  Conversely
collective action is significantly lower when considering the activity of charity work which
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is somewhat surprising given the role the church and its benevolent, welfare and
development activities play in people’s lives.
5.3.2 Cognitive Social Capital
In this section I will discuss the elements of Cognitive Social Capital which is comprised
of Solidarity, Trust and Cooperation and Conflict Resolution. The Solomon Island’s data
highlights some contradictions.  There are high levels of Solidarity (89.35%) reported
however low levels of Thickness of Trust (29.67%) and while there appears to be
adequate access to Mediation (93%) and perceptions of reasonable Levels of Harmony
(59.1%) and Cooperation (52.08%) quantities of reported trust are very low.  This could
be explained through the geographic location of the participants and the cleavage that
occurs within the survey data as many of the respondents had relocated from their village
to an urban area for work.  The data shifts dramatically when only villages are included
in the data set.  The Cognitive Social Capital of the Individual increases as the levels of
trust and cooperation increase.
Solidarity
The conceptual form of solidarity in this survey could also be discussed in terms of a
communal forms of life within the Solomon Islands cultural context.  The shared cultural
meanings and relationships can be parlayed into a more academic framework of
solidarity, that of reciprocity and mutual obligation and shared understanding and shared
experiences that form the bonds and obligations between families, neighbours and
community members.  Respondents reported high levels of solidarity particularly in times
of disaster such as death and economic hardship.
Trust and Cooperation
While there are high levels of solidarity there are not corresponding levels of trust and
cooperation.  Fifty percent of respondents reported indicated levels of trust in the village
in terms of lending and borrowing but at the same time reported that there was 25.3%
less trust in their village than in other villages. Only 17.3% of respondents indicated that
levels of trust had improved over the last few years however 59% of respondents believe
that the members of the village are trustworthy with 82% indicating that if there was a
problem there was always someone that would help them in the village.  These positions
are contradictory to other responses in relation to cooperation and trust whereby there
were strong indicators that people are only interested in their own welfare and that one
has to be alert or someone will take advantage of you.  Additionally formal mechanisms
for cooperation through contribution to community projects was low.  A scenario was
positioned within the survey to locate trust and cooperation within economic advantage
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whereby with cooperation and trust, the economic benefit would be greater than those
where the benefits are derived individually, only 28.9% indicated cooperation regardless
of increased economic gain. Despite these contradictory positions respondents felt
connected and accepted as a member of their village and believed that their village had
prospered in the last five years through cooperation.
Conflict Resolution
There were high levels of perception that the relationship with other villagers is
harmonious (81.8%) and peaceful (81%) and their village has less conflict than other
villages.  When there are disputes the location of mediation is positioned predominately
in the village leadership rather than in individuals, again there is a communal approach,
or “whole of village” which addresses conflict and seeks solutions.  Police and the judicial
leaders tend not to be engaged in local conflict.
5.4 Institutional
Figure 36 Schematic - Solomon Islands - Institution
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In this section the structural and the cognitive elements of the Solomon Islands Social
Capital Schematic are combined because of the unified features of the components
(Figure 36).  There is both a cognitive and structural element to Leadership, Participation,
Organisational Culture and Organisational Capacity and Sustainability.  Further research
could be undertaken at a later stage to separate the cognitive and the structural within
the institutional component of Social Capital.  The lack of separation does not directly
impact on the broader analysis undertaken in this thesis however a more nuanced
analysis of social capital at an institutional level would be achieved with further research.
5.4.1 Structural and Cognitive Assets
The Institutional Structural and Cognitive Assets in the Solomon Islands are reasonably
strong with Organisational Culture and the Institutional Practice element particularly
strong.  There are however a number of elements that affect the durability and
sustainability of the institution that the respondents reported as weak.  Areas of Density
and Availability of Leadership is problematic for the Solomon Islands financial
cooperatives.  Additionally the frequency of meetings was reported as reasonably low
which speaks to the engagement of the members in the institution and gatekeeping of
those within the governance and or management structures.
Leadership
The relationships of the management and staff are very harmonious where there is an
acceptance of the legitimacy of the leadership.  This may have emerged through the
perceptions that the leadership was of high quality and had the necessary skills to
competently manage the organisation.  The respondents indicated that the management
was highly skilled in providing a vision and carrying it out through training and education
and was honest and transparent in their dealings with both staff and members.
The respondents indicated that the leadership came from the whole of the community
however there was a lack of women in positions of authority within the governance and
management structures.  The community’s perception of diversity was tested by
examining the low number of people within the community that had acquired leadership
capacity.  Additionally the reporting on the number of people who came forward to
participate in institutional leadership was also low.  The participation of previous leaders
was moderate which indicates that the transition to new leadership is handled reasonably
well and that there is respect for the work of previous leaders.  The regular rotation of
leadership appears to be high indicating that the act of volunteering is understood in
terms of ownership of the position.
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Participation
Membership participation in the financial cooperatives was recorded as very high
however this statistic is somewhat misleading as the level of participation of women is
very low with youth and the poor having higher levels of engagement.  The level of
participation of the community elites is low however the financial cooperative do
understand the potential of the elites, particularly the prosperous families to be a resource
for the institution.
Participation in the decision making through all stages was particularly strong. The level
of dissemination of information prior to making a decision was high along with the
opportunity for informal discussions, grassroots consultation and debate.  After decisions
had been implemented the results were disseminated effectively.  While the decision
making process was well respected the respondents felt an ambivalence to the frequency
of the meetings of their financial cooperative.
Organisational Culture
The social aspects of the organisational culture appeared to be well understood with the
majority understanding the procedures and the norms of their financial cooperative and
a willingness to confront institutional problems and in serious cases a preparedness to
impose sanctions upon those members that did not comply with the rules. Sanctions are
however culturally contingent with examples of financial cooperative staff embezzling or
misappropriating funds from the institution being cast out of the community.  After a
period of time they are then accepted back into the community.  No examples where
given by the respondents where the formal judicial system was used to punish
wrongdoers.
Organisational Capacity and Sustainability
The process for identifying members’ needs could be linked to the decision making
process outlined previously whereby members have ample opportunity to voice their
views.  This process strengthens the collective action of the members and provides a
conduit for members to voice demands of their institution.  The respondents indicated
that there were both formal and informal ways to address the members concerns but
indicated a low need to take collective action to formally petition for any group demands.
So while the members understand the process and their rights to voice their views and
their demands they rarely take this course of action.  This may be due to their consensus
driven approach to solving problems which is based on relationships and consensus
rather than confrontation. The respondents also viewed their organisation as very
capable in carrying out a wide range of institutional tasks including preparing financial
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reports, planning for the future, supervising staff, and resolving both internal and external
problems.
5.5 Conclusion
The Solomon Islands Social Capital Schematic produced unexpected results.  There was
an expectation the research would generate strong results for the Community component
of the Social Capital Schematic and weak results for the Institutional component.  The
reverse was found whereby the Community component was weakest.
There are perhaps a number of reasons for this result which are explored in detail in
Chapter Seven.  The data does however highlight strong levels of cognitive social capital
underpinned by strong levels of solidarity and high levels of homogeneity and
participation.  Surprisingly there were low levels of collective action which could be
studied further to understand if this activity is positional. Collective action in the data was
positioned around strong leadership rather than group decision making.  The financial
cooperatives operate with the institutional leadership acting as gatekeepers, this is
particularly highlighted by the low number of meetings. This may be due to the
harmonious relationships between the leadership, management and staff which was also
evident in the data.  The membership looked to the leadership as visionary, competent
and honest.  The membership saw their institutions as well managed.  The desire to look
to the leadership for direction rather than undertaking collective decision making may be
due to the very low levels of successful collective action in the past as indicated in the
data.  In many facets of the data the respondents indicated that they look to the leadership
to solve problems and take charge.  This gaze to leaders reinforces the argument that
the Solomon Islanders within this survey see value of the insertion of government in their
daily lives.  While the respondents look for leadership there is little evidence of
accountability within the relationship.  The Solomon Islander respondents indicated low
levels of government services but did not indicate great dissatisfaction.
The institutional strength of the financial cooperatives could also be founded in the
homogeneity and low levels of diversity within the membership surveyed.  Long term this
is detrimental to institutional development (Richardson 2000) however in the short term
this strengthens the bonds between the members (Huppi and Feder 1990).
The data additionally revealed a preference for the respondents to meet their financial
needs through family members and other close networks.  This may contribute to
understanding why the Institutional component is strongest given the nature of many of
the financial cooperatives in the Solomon Islands, which are bonded within a village or
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close network being either a religious or employer institution.   Financial cooperatives are
grassroots organisations that are owned by a network of people, be they from an
employer or from a village, a group of people that know each other and interact daily.
The financial cooperative is therefore not seen as a formal financial institution but rather
a familiar network of people.
While the Solomon Islands data indicated high levels of general trust the levels of trust
drop in relation to matters of money which is contradictory to the previous point.  It is at
this intersection that perhaps the individual divorces the social and cultural obligation
from the rational being, that is, the financial cooperative is useful from an individual
rational perspective and goes some way to meeting social and cultural obligations but
when putting aside the cultural and social obligations the respondents are rationally
opposed to trusting in matters of money due to the free rider (Sandler 1992; Smirnov et
al. 2010) problem.  The localized financial cooperative provides a first line of defense in
terms of addressing this issue for community members, as well as an informal network
where members can obtain loans outside of the wontok system.  So trust in relation to
money is institutionalized providing a localized solution to a cultural obligation.  Trust is
also contexturalised in terms of need.  General trust may be relatively low but as soon as
there is a need for help, levels of trust increase, which maybe framed in terms of social
obligation.  Trust as a cultural and social mechanism comes into play when needed.  This
trust is clearly demonstrated in the way in which a whole of village approach is taken to
mediation and conflict resolution.
The Solomon Islands data is further examined in comparison to the other countries in
Chapter Seven. While Solomon Islands Social Capital Schematic emphasizes the
strength of the Institution over the Individual and Community in generating social capital,
operationally the institutions are immature and the levels of social capital is
underdeveloped.  The tensions between the community social and cultural processes
and practices being adaptive and reflective in contrast to that of the institution which is
lineal and rigid.  These competing tensions need to be reconciled in order for the Solomon
Islands financial cooperatives to mature.  The history of the Solomon Islands financial
cooperatives indicates that this process will happen at a very slow pace.
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Chapter Six: Timor Leste Research Findings
6.1 Introduction
The structure of this chapter follows the same conventions as the previous two chapters
relating to Cambodia and the Solomon Islands. As will be discussed in the comparative
and concluding chapter the financial cooperatives in each country find themselves at
different stages of their lifecycle, and as such, the results flowing out of the Timor Leste
dataset highlight this more so than perhaps the previous two chapters.  While the
Timorese financial cooperatives are not the oldest of the three studied they have the
greatest interaction with their government, they are very small but at the same time are
the most integrated with a very active federation.  The following data indicates that the
social capital is therefore generated in different locations and in different ways.
Historical and Environmental Context
Republika Demokratika Timor Lorosa’s (Tetum) or Republic Democratica de Timor-Leste
(Portuguese) is made up of 13 districts and is governed by a Chief of State: a President
and a Head of Government: a Prime Minister, they govern through a legislative branch
which is unicameral.  Timor Leste is a small island to the north of Australia which is
located between islands belonging to Indonesia to the east and the west.  Timor Leste
has been central to trade routes along with political and resource disputes.  With a
population of just over 1.2 million people (CIA 2014b; World Bank 2014) they are made
up of Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Melanesian, Papuan and Chinese ethnic
groups with 96% being Roman Catholic (CIA 2014b).  The population growth is currently
at 2.9% (UNData 2014a) with over 60% of the population under 25 years of age with a
median age of 18.5 (CIA 2014b).  Timor Leste has a land mass of 14,874 square
kilometers (CIA 2014b) and shares a border with Indonesia.
Timor Leste’s borders are a result of years of conflict.  The island of Timor saw the
Portuguese arrive in 1516 however their control over the island was usurped by the Dutch
in 1653 where they lost Kupang but constructed a based in Lifau in Oecusse.  This was
the start of the division of the island.  In 1769 the Portuguese moved their trading base
from Lifau to Dili (Tarling 2001).
Timor Leste’s struggle for independence was shaped by the decolonization that was
happening in the Asia Pacific region between 1945 and the 1970’s.  The pro-
independence group Fretilin was formed in 1974 and was modelled on African-Marxist
movements (A. L. Smith 2001).  Fretilin and was at the forefront of East Timors
independence movement.  Fretlin was founded by intellectuals with left leaning
influences which created a fear in Indonesia that East Timor may ‘become a regional
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“Cuba”’ (Ishizuka 2010: 14) which was a seen as a threat to Indonesia’s security.
‘Indonesia feared that independent Portuguese Timor would be vulnerable to influence
from the Soviet Union and China’ (Ishizuka 2010: 7).
The revolution of 1974 in Portugal and the subsequent order to withdraw from the
colonies saw the Indonesians capitalise on the upheaval with the invasion of East Timor
on the 7 December 1975. East Timor was then incorporated as the twenty seventh
province of Indonesia (Borthwick 1998).
During the time of Indonesia’s integration of East Timor there was a large deployment of
troops in the province and was a time of brutality for the Timorese, ‘two months after the
invasion, 60,000 East Timorese were claimed killed by the Indonesian troops’ (Ishizuka
2010: 15).
The Indonesian President Habbie announced in January 1999 that East Timor would
hold a referendum to decide if they wanted independence or autonomy within Indonesia.
With this announcement Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)24 commander
in chief General Wiranto along with senior officers created local militias and set about
arming them to create mayhem and disorder (Kingsbury 2001).  Much of the violence in
1999 was undertaken by Timorese via paramilitary organisations supported by
Kopassus. Some of the Timorese participated through forced subscription (Hughes
2009). Nevertheless the vote went ahead under a UN presence despite the intimidation
and killings with East Timor returning a resounding vote for independence.
The economy as well as its infrastructure was destroyed during 1999. Along with its
isolated location as well as small population, Timor Leste as a new nation faced many
challenges.  In December 1999 US$520 million was pledged in the form of aid grants (A.
L. Smith 2002: 66).  At this time with most Timorese undertaking subsistence farming
with only 4% of land used for permanent crops (CIA 2014b) and with mountainous terrain
and poor quality soil the Timor people needed to import food.
One of Timor’s exports is coffee but this is prone to price fluctuations and the amount
exported is minor in comparison to the level of goods imported.  The exploitable reserves
of oil and gas is having a significant impact on the economy (Government of Timor Leste
24 From 1999 ABRI was called Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).
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2011: 197-98) although there is dissatisfaction with the treaty signed with Australia for
the Sunrise fields. ‘In mid-2013 the Timor-Leste Government referred a dispute with the
Australian Government, relating to the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the
Timor Sea, to international arbitration in accordance with the dispute resolution
procedure in the Timor Sea Treaty’ (Woodside 2014).
The National Government of Timor Leste have published a strategic development plan
(Government of Timor Leste 2011) that outlines a twenty year vision of ‘collective action’
(Government of Timor Leste 2011: 10). ‘In the area of social capital, the Strategic
Development Plan seeks to improve the lives of Timorese people – our human capital –
by setting out strategies and actions, along with targets, in the critical areas of education,
health and social inclusion’ (Government of Timor Leste 2011: 16).  The Strategic
Development Plan seeks to harness the ‘collective vision [and] …spirit of solidarity’
(Government of Timor Leste 2011: 218) of the Timorese people.
The Strategic Development Plan speaks to the numerous economic, infrastructure and
social challenges Timor Leste that this young nation faces. It also reflects some of the
themes that will emerge in this chapter, particularly the insertion of government into the
lives of the Timorese.  The research data discusses the desire of the Timorese to have
the government solve their problems at an infrastructure and at a social level. The
Millennium Development Goals Timor-Leste 2009 report (United Nations Development
Programme 2009) provides context to those government challenges in terms of the
conditions in which the Timorese experience in their everyday lives.
Despite the close attention that is being paid to the levels of poverty both at a government
and multi-lateral level, poverty worsened between 2001 and 2007 with the people living
in poverty increasing to 49.9% (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 18)
which indicates that a significant proportion of the population as highly susceptible to
economic shocks. Only 10% of the workforce is in paid employment (United Nations
Development Programme 2009: 20).
Over 40% of the population is below 15 years of age and there has been a drop in
participation of primary school education to 63% from 78% in 1999 (United Nations
Development Programme 2009: 25).  This will impact on the capacity of the country in
the years to come and will affect the ability of the population to move from a position of
dependence on their government to that of self-reliance.  In areas of gender equality in
education there are more girls than boys in both primary and secondary levels however
this is reversed for tertiary education.
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The MDG in relation to health and in particular to cases of reported malaria has doubled
from 2001 to 2007 but measures for prevention and treatment have increased (United
Nations Development Programme 2009: 50) which may simply reflect better reporting
due to greater access to health care services especially in the rural areas.
Respondent Community
The financial cooperatives within this dataset are from both urban and rural locations,
from both the west and east districts as well as Dili, the capital city of Timor Leste.  The
data set includes financial cooperatives which are government bonded institutions as well
as geographically focused.  The institutions range from having small memberships of as
little as 50 members to those that have 800 members.  The Timor Leste financial
cooperative movement is small in size with only 6,000 members at the time of writing.
Timor Leste Social Capital Schematic
The dichotomy within the Timor Leste data (Figure 37) sees the Institutional Social
Capital as being stronger than the Community Social Capital.  The Timor Leste
institutions are extremely young and newly established in comparison to the Solomon
Islands and to a lesser extent the Cambodian financial cooperatives. Timor Lestes
physical assets are in a poor state and they therefore have a low contribution to the data
set. The Institutional Organisation and Leadership along with Solidarity was strongest.
This may have been influenced through other historical forms of organisation such as the
Timorese resistance movement and the sense of solidarity that was formed in the years
of struggle against the Indonesian occupation (Ishizuka 2010).  The effect of strong
leadership and post-independence conflict resolution and the manner in which they have
mediated a way to live side by side with their past occupiers may have developed skills
and behaviours that have translated institutionally for the financial cooperative.
The reported levels of collective action are not as high as would be expected given the
levels of reported solidarity.  This may be due to the competition for scarce resources,
particularly in relation to the low levels of structural assets.  It may also be due to the
positioning of the responsibility of provision of goods and services.  The Timorese
respondents clearly pointed to the government as having primary responsibility to
address their needs and meet their demands.  The respondents did not indicate high
levels of personal responsibility or self-determination in relation to fixing problems.  In
many examples from the questions around the environment, crime or housing the
government was viewed as the mechanism thorough which needs could be met and
problems could be addressed.
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The comparison between the Community Cognitive Assets and the Individual Cognitive
Social Capital deserves attention due to the variance evident between these two
components.  The variance may be explained through the types of cognitive attributes,
that is, the Community Cognitive Assets are concrete and observable with elements such
as the Environment and Crime whereas the Individual Cognitive Social Capital is more
abstract and relies on perceptions of Trust, Solidarity and Conflict Resolution.  While
initially this may look as if these two forms cognition should be treated separately and not
compared, I have positioned this distinction to allow us to view the abstract nature of the
Individual Social Capital as a closer view into the individual’s opinion of their community.
Figure 37 Timor Leste Social Capital Schematic
6.2 Community
The Structural and Cognitive Assets of the Community Social Capital Component (Figure
38) were nearly identical in terms of the scale range resulting in a .05% difference
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between the two. This component indicates a very narrow statistical spread between the
structural and cognitive aspects of the Timor Leste community. Across the arterial layer
of Community Social Capital indicators the Physical Assets scored weakest with 28.63%
with the Community Attributes the strongest at 69.97% indicating that the strength of the
Community Attributes resided in the economic activity for both men and women, although
employment opportunities did score low 32.6% as did access to livelihood assets at
29.8%. Additionally low population movement in and out of the community was evident.
The Physical Assets which were provided by government scored lower than those
provided by private enterprise such as transport and to a lesser extent security which is
often provided by the community. The Cognitive Assets focused on the Community
Assets which varied from reasonably low perceptions of the standard of living to slightly
above median scores of safety around issues of crime which may be related to security
being provided by their community.
Figure 38 Schematic - Timor Leste - Community
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6.2.1 Structural Assets
The Structural Asset data range which contains the Physical, Education, Health,
Livelihood, and Community Support Assets as well as Community Attributes measured
very low at 28.63%.  The Physical Assets within the Timor Leste data set are composed
of tangible objects that are provided by a mix of government, community and private
enterprise. While the Physical Assets are usually assets that are available to all of the
community such as housing, electricity, public lighting, water, telephone, post, internet,
sewage services, garbage collection, public markets, transport, recreational facilities and
security services, in this research data not all communities had equal access.  The
communities in Dili had far greater access than those surveyed in the more rural and
remote areas.   The Structural Assets within the Timorese data set clearly indicate that
the household’s access to physical assets is very low.
The data indicates that the services available to the communities in Dili are often
nonexistent to those in the rural areas. When the lack of access to services is cross
tabulated to attitudes of Quality of Life the Timor Leste respondents reported a very low
response.  The relationship between access to physical services and perceptions of the
quality of life in the case of Timor Leste appears to have a direct correlation.
Physical Assets
Respondents indicated that the availability of housing stock is adequate however there
were only low responses to the quality of the housing stock as having improved.  Similarly
the access to electricity was deemed as good however lower numbers of respondents
indicated that the quality had improved. Public lighting only exists in some locations in
the capital city so responses to this question were low with the ranking of quality
extremely low. Access to all types of water was low as was the perception of the
improvement to the quality.
The reach of landlines was extremely low however access to mobiles was significantly
high with good coverage.  There was limited experience of a public telephone service
with only some public telephones in a couple of telecommunications buildings in the
capital city. Similarly experience and therefore access to a postal service and the internet
was extremely low.
The reach of sewage services was very low with the quality deemed extremely low.
Access to a garbage service was poor as was the perception of any improvements to the
service.
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Market availability as reported by the respondents was adequate however the level of
improvement in terms of quality was deemed as low.  Use by the community appeared
to be somewhat less than the stated access.
Transport availability was rated high, as there is no land based public transport service
the types of transport that respondents included in their answers were microlets (small
mini vans), motorbikes, and cars that pick up paying passengers who are usually people
they know or are from their village or district.  The use of the available transport was
reported as low.  This may be due to the limited desire to travel outside of the village
given that most people’s needs are met within a small geographical area.  Additionally
many of the people surveyed in the rural areas have limited financial resources to move
about more broadly.
Respondents reported adequate availability of sporting fields however the number of
dedicated spaces for children to play was limited.  The quality was again an issue as only
very low numbers of respondents reported an improvement to these facilities.
Security according to the respondents was adequate in terms of availability and access.
In terms of quality the respondents it as less than adequate.
In all areas of the physical assets the respondents reported that the quality had not
improved. The reporting was consistent in both rural and urban areas with only slight
differences in the area of internet and mobile coverage.
Community Attributes
Most communities had been in existence for longer than 20 years with close to 40% being
bigger than 250 households.  There was significant population movement within the
communities surveyed with a large number of respondents indicating that this was due
to internal growth particularly due to marriage and increased birth rate.  Respondents
also indicated that people moved into the area due to better housing and schools.
Much of the economic activity for both men and women was self-directed employment
with a large number reporting the farming of rice, corn, cassava along with raising some
animals as one of the main forms of self-employment for men.  Small businesses selling
groceries and construction work was also reported as a significant area of employment
for men.  Given the sample also included public service financial cooperatives it is
somewhat surprising that larger numbers where not reported in this category.  Self-
employment was also highly reported as an economic activity for women with small
grocery businesses being the highest category followed by farming and a small number
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reporting as being employed in the manufacturing of handicrafts.  Self-employment may
be seen as a viable option to seeking out waged positions as the availability of
employment appears to be limited with 67.4% of respondents reporting that the
availability of employment either remained the same or worsened.
Human Assets
More than two thirds of the respondents reported migration out of the community for
purposes of work.  The number of men migrating outstrips women by more than 2 to 1.
Those surveyed that lived close to the Indonesian border appear to have a greater
propensity to migrate outside of Timor Leste.  This may have been confused with laboring
or selling goods over the border with living and working in another country, however most
respondents reported that the migration was to either a city in the region or to a city in
another region.  It appears from the data that the migration was from rural to urban areas
rather than rural to rural migration. There was however movement into the surveyed
communities for a wide variety of positions.  In the urban areas the movement into the
city was to take up public service positions.
Education Assets
Access to primary education was reported as the greatest followed by preschool and then
secondary school.  Access to secondary school was reported as less than half to that of
primary school.  The distance to primary education was the least with secondary school
facilities the furthest away from the community.  The survey respondents reported that
they felt there was adequate access to pre, primary and secondary forms of education.
There was a correlation between access and attendance, with primary school education
enjoying the highest levels of attendance of the three levels of education.
Health Assets
Nearly two thirds of the respondents indicated access to a health clinic within 2km of their
homes.  Access to sufficient health resources of both a physical and human resource
nature was reported as high.
Livelihood Assets
Principle livelihood activities was reported as being livestock which included pigs,
chickens, goats and buffalo followed by growing crops such as potatoes, beans, peanuts,
cassava, bananas, papaya and coffee.  Three quarters of the produce is sold at the local
community market with only 13.8% sold to middle men or exported.  Given there is a high
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degree of subsistence farming25 these responses are not unsurprising.  Transport, poor
roads and distance were all major barriers to selling the produce outside of the
community.  Some respondents pointed to the government as not doing enough to assist
the farmers promote Timorese products.  The availability and access to agricultural
technical assistance was reported as low with most assistance gained through various
Timorese government departments.
Respondents reported low levels of access to agricultural financial services with 51.1%
of the respondents reporting only 0-10% of farmers accessing loans for productive
purposes siting reasons of poor crop yields, lack of working capital, financial institutions’
lack of confidence in the farmers, reduced capacity to repay loans as well as a lack of
organisations available to access finance.
Seventy one percent of respondents indicated that crop yields either remained the same
or worsened, correspondingly 74.4% stated that sales of those crops had either remained
the same or worsened.  There appears to be little growth nor confidence or optimism by
the farmers in their productive future.
Community Support Assets
The types of community assets that respondents accessed where predominately social,
cultural and sporting organisations with economic organisations having one of the lowest
levels of participation along with the health and educational organisations.  Support for
these organisations was reported as predominately from the government followed closely
by religious organisations.  Organisations supported by school teachers, NGOS,
politicians and the business community along with prosperous citizens saw the lowest
levels of support.  Correspondingly the government sponsored community centers and
religious building were mostly used for community events.
6.2.2 Cognitive Assets
The Community Assets within the Timor Leste research data looks at the Standard of
Living, Trust, Crime, Environment and Community Organisation with the purpose of
understanding the actions and motivations of the community.  Along with the Structural
25 Reported rates of subsistence farming vary from 40% Aciar, ’Timor Leste’,
<http://aciar.gov.au/country/timor-leste>, accessed 26 June 2014 , ibid.to 80% Maff, ’Agriculture’,
<http://gov.east-timor.org/MAFF/>, accessed 26 June 2014
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Assets associated with Community the Cognitive Assets contribute to the generation of
social capital.
Community Assets
Respondents reported high levels of improvement in their standard of living with only
8.3% indicating that their quality of live had declined.  Those that saw improvement
related this to lower unemployment, successful business practices, increased support
from government, relatives overseas and donor organisations as well as a better, more
harmonious environment.  Conversely those that saw the situation not improving
indicated a difficulty in securing employment and a lack of education as main issues
faced.
Perceptions of their social status showed that 86.5% thought their community ranged
from wealthy to average with only 13.5% identifying as poor or very poor.
Trust in relation to lending and borrowing was high with 67.7% of respondents indicating
high levels of trust with 40.6% believing the levels of trust had improved with only 8.3%
stating that they had worsened with 75% indicating that their community had at least the
same or more trust than that of other communities.
The Timorese communities surveyed showed low levels of violent crime such as
burglaries or assaults although reported high levels of alcohol abuse and domestic
violence and saw teen pregnancy as a major concern which may be positioned in relation
to religious beliefs.
The respondents raised concern around their natural environment especially waste
disposal and water resources although 44.8% of respondents indicated that their
environment is good or very good with two thirds of the respondents surveyed indicating
that the environment had either improved or at least remained the same.  When asked
what actions could be taken to improve the environment 53.4% of respondents thought
that the government was responsible for any action that needed to be taken.
6.3 Individual
Cognitive Social Capital was substantially stronger (73.37%) than the Structural Social
Capital (39.8%) within the Individual component of the Timor Leste Social Capital
Schematic (Figure 39).  Particularly high levels of solidarity (96.5%) and the ability to
resolve conflict (71.8%) were evident in the data.  The Structural Social Capital data
overall is very mixed with strong levels of Organisational Participation (93%), Networks
and Mutual Support Organisations (65.28%) and Leadership (67.9%) however these are
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offset by very weak results for historic (32.8%) and frequent (23.5%) Collective Action.
Timor Leste has undergone a process of nation building based on the struggle that was
endured during the Indonesian occupation.  There is strong sense of belonging and
identity based on both the national narrative (Sahin 2011) and what Hicks (2007: 13)
argues sees ‘communities…identify with their local adat26 rather than with new values
filtering down from the capital’.  This may explain the contradiction between the high
levels of perceived cooperation but the low levels of reported Thickness of Trust.
Figure 39 Schematic - Timor Leste - Individual
26 Meaning the local customs and traditions.
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6.3.1 Structural Social Capital
Organisational Density and Characteristics was reported as being the strongest and
Collective Action being somewhat the weakest.  Given the narrative of solidarity and the
history of collective national struggle the results are not aligned with expectations.  The
cognitive values of Solidarity and Perceptions of Cooperation are high yet the structural
or lived examples of these are much lower.  While there are strong Networks and Mutual
Support Organisations and strong results for Organisational Density and Characteristics,
actual Collective Action and Thickness of Trust is weak. This may be explained by the
higher weighting of the research sample coming from Dili, an urban center where there
is less a sense of connectedness to others, only through formal structures of sporting
and recreational clubs.  So while there are strong perceptions of cooperation there isn’t
the accompanying sense of trust that may be found in more homogenous rural areas.
While the respondents may belong to networks and clubs and have a sense of solidarity
around the purpose of their participation they may not necessarily have a personal
relationship that extends to issue of money or family and is solely based on the activity
for which they have joined the club or network.
Organisational Density and Characteristics
The organisational density of the community’s memberships is characterized by a
significant overlap, the groups however, are not comprised by large numbers of the same
family members but were, due to the religious homogeneity of the Timorese population,
composed of mostly those of the same religion. There was gender balance in the
composition of the groups with the membership not aligned to one political party nor were
they comprised of the same occupations, age or educational levels.  So apart from the
religious alignment the membership groups were mostly heterogeneous in nature.
The leadership of these groups were split between two types of behaviours, that of the
leader consulting the group and then making a decision and the other where there was
a more consensus driven approach with the leader holding meetings where there is
discussion and the group jointly deciding on a course of action.  Both of these decision
making frameworks was rated as very effective by the respondents.
Networks and Mutual Support Organisations
The structure of leadership to deal with community issues is positioned within both an
authorized leadership type, that is, community leaders and the broader community.
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Localised issues tended to be positioned in those who are impacted by the problem rather
than the “institutional owners” such as the government.
Exclusion
Respondents reported a medium level of exclusion to services and indicated that this
was due to income and occupation and to a lesser extent, the lack of education.  Their
perceptions of other households being excluded was equal to their experience however
they indicated very low levels of exclusion based on race, gender or religious beliefs.
Exclusion was mediated through the authorized community leaders as well as religious
leaders, it was also handled at a family level.
The causes of division within a community according to the respondents are the
differences in education, wealth, landholdings and social status, between older and
younger community members as well as along political affiliations.  Religion, ethnicity
and gender was not seen to be a major contributing factor towards division within the
community.  Only 38 out of the 100 respondents expressed a desire to answer this
question however 68.4% of those respondents indicated that these divisions often lead
to violence.
Collective Action
Collective Action in the Timorese communities surveyed indicated there was high value
in joining together to achieve particular goals and indicated that the leadership of these
initiatives was very effective however the collective nature of the decision making is
somewhat less than “collective” whereby less than half of the respondents indicated that
the actual group make the decisions, leaving the leadership to make them on their behalf.
There were extremely high levels of participation in the electoral process and in
participating in associations however other forms of collective action was particularly low
especially in political collective action such as marches and demonstrations, sit ins or
even contacting an elected representative on an issue. The success of collective action
was reported as relatively low at 32.8% however collective action around charitable work
was very high.
6.3.2 Cognitive Social Capital
High levels of Individual Cognitive Social Capital (73.37%) was reported in the Timor
Leste data in comparison to low levels of Individual Structural Social Capital (39.8%).
Within the Individual Cognitive Social Capital data Solidarity was highest at 96.5% and
Thickness of Trust lowest at 33.8%. The data indicates that there is a divide between
perceptions of cooperation and solidarity and the actual behaviours as demonstrated in
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the Structural Social Capital data.  Earlier I outlined a possible cause being the weighting
of the data with Dili based respondents who are from outside the Timorese capital and
who may have higher levels of trust for people in their village but whose sense of trust
has not travelled with them to Dili.  They have high levels of participation in networks and
groups and a high level of solidarity with fellow network and organisational members but
this comes with parameters that does not include trust.
Solidarity
Extremely high levels of solidarity was reported especially in times of crisis of other
community members, that is, at times of death and crop failure. Here solidarity is framed
within a pastoral care context where support is given for pain, loss or sorrow.
Trust and Cooperation
In matters of borrowing and lending there were high levels of trust reported although the
respondents’ perceptions of trust in comparison of other villages was low.  These high
levels of trust were confirmed in measures of cooperation whereby scenarios of gain
indicated that people were willing to cooperate and trust others if there was individual
financial gain.  Additionally respondents indicated that people were willing to contribute
to community projects even if there was no direct or individual benefit.  Respondents
believed there was greater trust within their village in comparison to other surrounding
villages and stated that there was always someone within the community that would help
if there was a problem.  They see their village as prosperous and feel strongly connected
to their community.
Conflict Resolution
Respondents see their community has being extremely harmonious and peaceful and
perceive their community as more harmonious than other villages which is demonstrated
through their willingness to contribute both time and money to common community
development goals.  If there is a dispute the respondents identified multiple sources of
mediation to help bring resolution.  Respondents located the sources of mediation within
the village and in either positions of authorized power such as the Community Leader or
at the source of the issue within the family.
6.4 Institutional
The Institutional component of the Timor Leste Social Capital Schematic (Figure 40)
consolidates the Structural and Cognitive Assets due to the interrelated nature of the
components at the skeletal level of the schematic due to the interwoven nature of
Leadership, Participation, Organisational Culture and Organisational Capacity and
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Sustainability. This does not directly impact on the broader analysis undertaken in this
thesis however a more nuanced analysis of social capital at an institutional level could
be achieved with further research to develop more detailed indicators which could
separate the cognitive from the structural.
Figure 40 Schematic - Timor Leste - Institutional
6.4.1 Structural and Cognitive Assets
The Structural and Cognitive Assets contained within the Timor Leste data indicate
reasonably high levels of Institutional Social Capital.  Participation appears to be the
weakest area of the data however this may be due to the industrially bonded nature of
many of the financial cooperatives that are contained within this data.  The opportunity to
interact with other members (in the workplace) is often much greater than geographically
bonded financial cooperatives.  This can drive down the perceived need to hold regular
institutional meetings or where the meetings become informal and therefore not counted
in the data. Despite the lack of formal meetings the Leadership and Organisational
Culture were reported as strong in the data.
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Leadership
The legitimacy and acceptance of the financial cooperative’s leadership is seen as
representing the memberships interests well. The management and staff have a
harmonious relationship without any major problems.  The membership rate the quality
of their leadership as high especially around areas of vision, dynamism, honesty and
transparency. While the respondents indicated the leaders are selected from almost all
groups within the community, it appears that women do not have equal representation at
a governance or management level.  The respondents indicated there are many people
within the community which have leadership capability and there is never a lack of
candidates who are put forward to lead, however the majority of these are men.  There
is a regular change of leadership and the respondents believed that the period that each
leader serves is adequate however the data also indicates the active continuation of past
leaders is low demonstrating the leadership transition process may not be as harmonious
or non-conflictual as perhaps inferred by the respondents.
Participation
There are reasonably high levels of participation of prosperous families within the
financial cooperatives as the leadership of the institutions understand the value of
including the community’s elite in the group centered activities. The participation of
women is particularly low as is the participation of the poor, although respondents
indicated that this is changing with more women, youth and poor now participating than
previously.  The respondents did recognize that only a low percentage of the population
feel included in the institutions activities. And while the institution is not as representative
of all of the community the financial cooperative appears to be highly representative of
their membership.
Participation in the decision making process is extremely high through the prior
dissemination of information, the opportunity for informal discussion, the grassroots
consultation conducted by the institution along with widespread debate and finally the
dissemination of the outcomes.  The respondents did however indicate that they should
meet more often.
Organisational Culture
The majority of the members understand the procedures and institutional practices of
their financial cooperative and operate within the accepted norms of behavior.  The
leadership within the respondent sample have indicated a willingness to confront
problems and in serious cases enact sanctions and fines and even expel members.
175
Organisational Capacity and Sustainability
The leaders of the financial cooperatives indicated that there are thorough processes for
identifying the needs of their members and that in the last three years there have been
formal petitions from their membership on issues and that their institution has a procedure
for addressing the demands made by their members.  They also indicated that there were
informal ways that they could bring their needs to the attention of the institutional
leadership outside of these formal mechanisms.  The financial cooperatives appear to
have a culture of collective action institutionalized into the norms of behavior of the
membership.
The collective action by members is supported through the capability of the leadership to
carry through the demands of the membership. The respondents indicated that their
leadership has the ability to carry out the tasks of the organisation, prepare financial
reports and respond to challenges and learn from experience, however the membership
indicated that the leadership is weaker on looking towards the future and developing long
term plans.  The respondents rated their leadership highly when resolving both internal
and external problems.  This indicates that the leadership has a propensity to be reactive
rather than proactive in the management of the institution.
6.5 Conclusion
The results from the Timor Leste data clearly lay the responsibility of addressing the
needs and demands of the community within the hands of the government.  There were
low levels of personal responsibility or self-determination in relation to fixing infra-
structure such as those related to the environment and services and broader social
problems. Conversely local issues tended to be the responsibility of those whom were
impacted by the problem rather than the government. High levels of solidarity were
enacted to solve conflict. The respondents indicated personal responsibility for their
economic difficulties and pointed to a lack of education demonstrating they had some
sense of self determination and responsibility. The private and more personally
immediate issues were seen as the responsibility of the individual whereas the broader
social and structural troubles were the domain of the government.
The narrative of solidarity and the recent history of collective national struggle sees
results which are not aligned with expectations.  The cognitive values of Solidarity and
Perceptions of Cooperation are high yet the structural or lived examples of these is much
lower in a broader community context.  That is, there is ample evidence of organisational
participation, but low levels of frequent or historical collective action. When this is viewed
from the financial cooperatives perspective, collective action was high as was collective
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action in the form of charitable work.  This could be called Institutionalised Collective
Action whereby it is contained within a membership and institution.  A closed network of
collective action with common institutional goals.
The financial cooperatives being closed networks have high levels of trust in relation to
lending and borrowing.  This was not reflected in the broader community where the data
indicated there were low levels of reported Thickness of Trust.  An explanation for the
strength of trust aside from the behaviour of a closed network may be the religious
alignment of the groups which is the financial cooperative membership’s only
homogenous feature.   Additionally scenarios of gain indicated that people were willing
to cooperate and trust others if there was individual financial gain.  This was not the case
in other circumstances whereby respondents indicated that people were willing to
contribute to community projects even if there was no direct or individual benefit, which
highlights the high levels of perceived cooperation.  The linkages to individual financial
gain may be due to the environment whereby much of the economic activity for both men
and women was self-directed employment.   The data demonstrates an environment that
is geographically limited with very small spheres of economic links which tended to be
village based with limited reach outside of the immediate geographic environment.
The closed formal and informal economic networks within which the respondents live
provides a view as to why the financial cooperatives are successful in generating social
capital albeit in very small groups.  Institutional growth has been slow and the data
indicates that this may be due to the way in which the groups cognitively manage the
relationships within their networks. The stock of social capital in the Timor Leste financial
cooperatives has not been leveraged in any meaningful way to strengthen the operations
or economic advantages of the institutions.
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Chapter Seven: Concluding Comparative Analysis
7.1. Introduction
In this chapter I will provide an outline of both the structural and cognitive characteristics
of the communities within this research.  I will examine this data to highlight and discuss
the environment in which each of the three country’s financial cooperative movements
have emerged.  Furthermore, based on the SOCAT tool along with the Social Capital
Schematic and the Social Capital Development Framework I will utilize social capital
indicators which will provide a more consolidated and comparative view and analysis of
cognitive and structural social capital within the Individual, the Community and the
Institution.
A mapping of the social capital indicators will help identify the points of comparison. The
social capital development indicators include, Environment, Governance, Trust,
Leadership, Culture, Reciprocity, Networks, Norms and Consequences. The cross
country comparative analysis of these individual indicators will assist in the process of
answering the broader thesis question.
In each of the country chapters I utilized the quantitative SOCAT data that assisted in
construction of an empirical social capital narrative. In this comparative chapter I seek
to thread more of the voice of the actors within the analysis to further demonstrate the
agency of the community and their role as active agents within civil society and especially
within the development of their financial cooperatives. The voice of civil society is now a
dominant influence within development practices, this voice however, was not always
evident nor necessarily influential before the 1990’s (Bebbington and Perreault 1999).
The voice of the actors has always been central in the development of financial
cooperatives, especially those that have developed from within the community as
opposed to those that have been implemented by governments or international/local
NGOs.
The relationship of an NGO and/or government developed financial cooperative often
creates a different relationship between the state, the market and civil society.  There is
of course ‘political impacts of civil society formations’ (Bebbington and Perreault 1999:
397).  This discussion is course problematic when the term civil society is used in such a
broad context, especially in relation to social capital and the question of its location and
connection between joint action and group agency (Petit and Schweikard 2006). This
further confounds the question of voice and agency within cooperative membership.
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In this chapter I also seek to uncover the perceived and real structural differences
between the financial cooperatives of the three countries studied and seek to identify and
define the characteristics and location of social capital generation. Much of the work
around social capital has endeavoured, as Klesner has argued, to understand ‘whether
communities with higher levels of social capital gain development benefits from their
citizens’ involvement in social groups.’(Klesner June 2007: 2).  As Fine (2003: 33) has
indicated ‘social capital literature has been much more heavily focused on its effects than
its sources, …’. In this chapter I will look at both the participation in the financial
cooperative to understand the social benefits as well as look at the necessary social
conditions that are required to develop a financial cooperative.  This approach ensures
both causes and effects are viewed in both directions. In doing this I will also examine
the sources as well as the effects within this comparative analysis.
7.2 Social Capital Schematic Country Comparison
Earlier in Chapter Three I used the body as a conceptual metaphor to explain the various
layers and functions of the Social Capital Schematic.  In this section it is the layer of
muscle, the last layer before the body that is Social Capital is formed that I wish to
examine.
7.2.1 Community
The data from the Community component of the Social Capital Schematic indicates that
Cambodia enjoys the highest Community rating which is due to a particularly high rating
in relation to their Cognitive Assets (Table 10).
Table 10 Social Capital Schematic Community Data
Cambodia’s performance in this area is perhaps due to the Cambodian communities
having had existed much longer than either the Timorese or the Solomon Island
communities. Eighty one percent of the Cambodian communities had existed for more
than 20 years in comparison to Timor Leste at 55% and the Solomon Islands at 65%. At
the other end of the scale Timor Leste and the Solomon Island communities had a higher
percentage of communities that had existed for less than 10 years than that of Cambodia.
The size of the communities were also much larger in Cambodia, which given that all of
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the respondents in Cambodia were all based in rural locations contrasted to that of the
Timor Leste and Solomon Island communities where many came from urban areas.
The conclusions that may be drawn from this overview maybe one of community
longevity and geographical positioning which may have some effect on the Cognitive
Assets that were accumulated.  Additionally as demonstrated in the country data chapters
the Solomon Island and Timorese communities tended to draw heavily on their
governments for their structural needs whereas the Cambodian respondents tended to
have a stronger sense of self-reliance which could contribute to their sense of community
identity and therefore their cognitive assets.  The Cambodian respondents indicated that
they tended to participate in economic type organisations whereas the Timorese and the
Solomon Island respondents gravitated to the cultural, social or sporting related
community organisations.  The inference drawn from this could be that unlike the other
respondents the Cambodians saw their economic success as linked to others within their
community and so there was a greater cognitive perception of connectedness.  The
perception that their standard of living had improved was very high for the Cambodian
respondents as were the levels of perceived trust and relational trust which was in
contrast to the low response for the other two countries.
7.2.2 Individual
The Individual Social Capital Schematic data at a high level is indistinguishable and it is
only when we pull out some of the comparative data that we can start to gain a more
nuanced understanding of the Individual Social Capital (Table 11) being generated.
Table 11 Social Capital Schematic Individual Data
Timor Leste enjoyed the highest levels of solidarity although all of the countries surveyed
reported strong levels.  Timor Leste has, in recent history, been undergoing a process of
nation building based on a shared identity and sense of struggle during the Indonesian
occupation which may account for the particularly strong response. However a strong
shared identity did not correlate to the thickness of trust. Cambodia recorded the highest
levels of trust with the Solomon Islands recording the lowest levels. The questions around
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trust were financially framed which as previously indicated may be closely related to their
sense of close economic ties.
Perceptions of cooperation were high across all countries however the spread between
the highest and lowest being the Solomon Islands was 17% which aligns with the lower
rating of their perceptions of the village relationships being harmonious and peaceful.
The opportunities for constructive cooperation are most available in communities that are
viewed as peaceful and harmonious.  Collective Action was strongest in Cambodia
however within this data set Timor Leste reported as having rated the highest in terms of
Leadership.  The group decision making and the effectiveness of the leadership where
highly valued by the Timorese however they rated as the weakest in terms of
participation.  The narrative of Timorese looking to their government to meet their needs
may be also evident in this component, while they view their leadership as effective and
strong they may also be leaving it up to their leadership rather than playing an active role
in acquiring their needs. The Solomon Islands respondents had the lowest level of
success with Collective Action and also the lowest frequency. This may be related to the
way in which the manifestation of social structure in the Solomon Islands is heavily
influenced by relationships.  Collective action and direct signs of confrontation are not
useful tools when attempting to develop relationships with others. Change and access
to services may be generated through close (and individual) relationships rather than the
public and mass assertion of rights.
In comparison to Cambodian respondents the exclusion felt by both the Timorese and
Solomon Island respondents was high, particularly around access to services such as
health, education, housing and employment.  The major reasons for exclusion was due
to income and occupation whereas the Cambodian respondents reported very low levels
of exclusion. The Timorese and the Solomon Islander respondents reported much higher
capabilities in resolving any divisions and problems.  Much of the responsibility for
mediation being located in people with institutional power, that of religious leaders and
the judiciary.  The Cambodian respondents indicated that problem solving was located
within individuals in the community.   The position of responsibility for everyday life within
a Cambodian context appears to be located very close to the individual and then radiating
out to the family, the neighbours and then to the community.  Similarly the next level of
contact for issues would be the Village Chief, then the Commune Governor, then the
District Governor, followed by the Provincial Governor and then contact with the national
government. The data indicates Cambodians tend to look to resolve problems as close
to the source of the issue as possible with a reluctance to seek out redress through the
government or its judicial instruments due to the perceptions of the cost of justice.
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Whereas the respondents in the other countries tended to look to government much
quicker. The big causes of division in the Cambodian data set was education, wealth
and landholdings, similarly Timorese respondents also indicated education and wealth
as significant issues of division.  The Solomon Islands respondents tended to see all
causes of division within a 10% bandwidth including causes such as differences in ethnic
backgrounds, religious beliefs, political affiliations as well as tensions between men and
women, old and young, and between longtime residents and new settlers.  The biggest
disparity within the three data sets is the significance that wealth plays in causing division
for the Cambodian respondents.  The rating for the division that the economic differences
play in people’s lives is significantly high as opposed to issues of race, politics, gender
or religion.  Yet the homogeneity of the memberships surveyed was the greatest in
Cambodia and lowest in the Solomon Islands.  This homogeneity speaks to why race,
politics, gender and religion are not significant causes of division. However financial
circumstances could be an issue that causes division especially when individuals are so
much alike.
7.2.3 Institution
The institutional strength of the financial cooperatives surveyed was a combination of
both the Structural and Cognitive Assets (Table 12). Combining the two was necessary
due to the nature of the individual components having qualities that could be considered
both structural and cognitive
Table 12 Social Capital Schematic Institutional Data
The institutional leadership within the Timor Leste dataset was stronger than that of the
other two countries. The institutional leadership refers to both the management and the
governance mechanisms of the financial cooperative. The regular change of leadership
and the time spent in the leadership role contributed to a strong response to Timor Leste’s
institutional leadership rotation.  Additionally there many people available who were
nominated for election to the leadership and who had the capacity. The quality of
leadership in all areas of training, vision and honesty was highest in the Solomon Islands
dataset. The institutional leadership cumulative data was equivalent across the three
countries.  The leadership rotation, quality and selection speak to the respondent’s
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perceptions and to the institutional processes.  This information needs to be considered
with the actions carried out by those in power and examine the effects and the decision
making processes of their leadership.  The financial cooperative is an institution that has
members rather than direct owners or shareholders. The institutional leadership and
therefore the lines of accountability is directly from financial cooperatives management
to the board or committee then to members.  This process sees accountability for
decision making which affects not only the operational aspects of the organisation but
also membership participation.  Engagement throughout the community is an indicator of
a well-managed institution.
All three countries saw prosperous families within their communities as a resource for
their institution however there was low participation in Cambodia and the Solomon
Islands with only moderate levels of participation by elites in Timor Leste financial
cooperatives. The level of inclusiveness was particularly low across all countries for
women but rose for youth in the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste. This however may
be due to the large youth populations in these countries.  It may also be due to the
geographical positioning of the survey with a large sample of respondents from urban
areas in these two countries.  The respondents also indicated only a moderate level of
participation by the poor, however given that their perceptions of their community in
relation to poverty levels being low this is unsurprising.  When respondents were asked
if participation by women was increasing from previous meetings they indicated
significant growth.  The data shows a desire for more women to participate in the
institution but that growth was small.
Given there is a predominance of men participating within the institution and yet the
survey was slightly skewed with women respondents it is surprising that the respondents
indicated high levels of satisfaction with the representation of members by the financial
cooperative in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands with medium levels reported in
Cambodia.  The percentage of the population who had a feeling of being included was
highest for Cambodia and the Solomon Islands and yet lowest for Timor Leste.  Feeling
represented and feeling included may appear to be two different sides of the same coin.
The data previously presented and discussed showed that both the Solomon Islands and
Timor Leste respondents are happy to select a leader and then allow them to make
decisions on their behalf.  The Cambodian respondents indicated that they would prefer
high levels of consultation and a consensus driven approach to decision making.  The
Cambodian respondents wanted consultation and information at all stages of the decision
making and outcome process.  Once the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste membership
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had selected their leadership they had a sense of being represented, their role was to
vote for the leadership and with this task being completed they felt that they were being
represented.
Given the consensus driven nature of the Cambodian financial cooperatives whereby
they hold numerous meetings to gain consent from their membership it is unsurprising
that their sense of feeling included received a higher score.  Similarly a majority of the
Cambodian respondents were happy with the frequency of meetings whereas the other
two countries indicated dissatisfaction, it is possible that they may want less meetings
and feel that they have chosen their leadership and that their participation is
unnecessary.
The institutional practices in terms of known procedures and norms was reported as
highest for the Timor Leste financial cooperatives followed by the Solomon Islands. This
is unexpected given the decision making process in the Cambodian financial
cooperatives are consensus based with the membership engaged at an operational level.
The Cambodian respondents indicated a low response to the willingness to confront
problems in comparison to high levels in Timor Leste and in the Solomon Islands.  This
may be centered on the high value and form of relationships which see problems
mediated, to a large extent, away from institutions and directly through either individual
relationships or through village centered hierarchy.  In all countries the stated willingness
to impose sanctions, fine or expel from the financial cooperative was very high.  It
appears that for Cambodian financial cooperatives the decision is mediated in a location
that everyone accepts but the vehicle for punishment must be an institution.
All countries rated as high the process of identifying the needs of members however the
level of formal partitions from members on issues was very low for the Solomon Islands.
All countries reported that the membership could informally express demands however
the process of addressing the demands was poorest in the Solomon Islands.  The
collective action was weakest in the Solomon Islands which reflects the low levels of
participation in the financial cooperative operational and decision making functions.
The organisational capabilities were reported as strongest in the Timorese financial
cooperatives and weakest in the Cambodian institutions. Both the Timorese and
Solomon Islander financial cooperatives rated high on the ability to respond to changes
with Timor Leste scoring very high on the capacity to resolve problems both internally
and externally.
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The Cambodian institutional rating is the lowest of the three countries surveyed which
may be related to the way in which each is operated.  The membership of the Timor Leste
financial cooperatives tend to empower their leadership but provide some degree of
membership oversight whereas the Solomon Island financial cooperative leadership is
elected and then appears to have very little interaction from the membership outside of
this formal process.  The Cambodian financial cooperatives are, what is in contemporary
management language, micromanaged by their members with much of the decision
making filtering down to the membership continually.  This may be due to the relative size
and risk of the institutions, with the Cambodian institutions being the largest by assets
and by membership.  These issues are further analyzed by utilizing the Social Capital
Development Framework indicators in the following sections of this chapter.
7.3 Social Capital Schematic and the Social Capital Development
Framework
The Social Capital Schematic enables the reader to understand the constituent
components of the data from each location however for the purposes of comparison a
consolidation of the data into the Social Capital Development Framework provides the
reader with a more nuanced conceptual or thematic view of each of the countries within
the data set and pulls the data into a form that can contribute to the canon of literature
on social capital. The data from each country’s schematic will feed into the Social Capital
Development Framework headings of Environment, Governance, Trust, Leadership,
Culture, Reciprocity, Networks, Norms and Consequences (Figure 41) of which will
provide a further point from which to compare and contrast how and where the social
capital emerges.
Figure 41 Social Capital Schematic and the Social Capital Development Framework
Source: Authors own work
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7.4 Social Capital Development Framework Indicators
The Social Capital Development Framework indicators which will be discussed in the
following section, connect with the current literature and allow this research to be viewed
in relation to the current social capital debates.  It also enables a greater opportunity to
incorporate the voice of the members of the financial cooperatives and the communities
within which the research was undertaken.
7.4.1 Environment
The Environment indicator includes a number of considerations including Institutional,
Demographic, Geographic, Political and Economic factors. Each of these factors play a
role in the development of institutional social capital.  They influence macro level aspects
of social capital generation, some are within the institution and members control and
some are external.  Some have a bigger influence and play a bigger role than others
which is dependent upon the stage of the financial cooperatives’ development as well as
the power it has to have impact.  Each of these factors vary in each research location.
Institutional Autonomy
There is a great deal of literature (Ahmad 2013; Chirwa 1999; Rajasekhar 1996) about
the role of governments and local and international NGOs in developing financial
cooperatives and the effect this has on the likelihood of success of the institution.  The
development an institution which is community centered is dependent upon the trust
(Baliamoune-Lutz 2011; François 2002; Fukuyama 1995; R. C. Mayer et al. 1995) and
norms (Dequech 2009; Knack and Keefer November 1997; Konrad and Leininger 2011;
Zmerli 2010) that develop between the participants.  When government and or NGO’s
are inserted into this process a separate set of agendas emerge and may be in opposition
to those of the community (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Wigglesworth 2013).  Governments
may have political and economic agendas that are prioritized over the community’s’
desire for strong communal bonds and reciprocity.  Governments may encourage faster
development of the financial cooperatives so that they are able to promote “their efforts”
of increasing financial inclusion.  The communities may be influenced by the
government’s agenda for reasons of funding that is contributed to the community for this
purpose or it may be the soft power (Nye 2004) that is inherent in the relationship.
Similarly NGOs and multilaterals are mostly funded based on results and often have short
project timeframes so if the community wish to participate and receive the benefits they
are required to fit within the needs of the NGO rather than the needs and demands of the
community.  The other institutional pressure that is sometimes a threat to the autonomy
of the financial cooperatives is that from their federation or league.  Often once the
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financial cooperative has developed they start to voluntarily participate in regional or
country wide federations or leagues that represent the interests of the broader financial
cooperative movement.  They are often required to join the national federation or league
due to government regulation.  Often the benefit of joining and participating in a larger
body is offset by the loss of some autonomy.  When joining a representative body often
the individual institutions must subscribe to a set of principles and methods of operation
that may be contrary to their localized view of how their financial cooperative should
operate.
The literature on the influences in relation to institutional autonomy is vast (Addison and
Baliamoune-Lutz 2003; Hargrave and Van De Ven 2006; Mele 2003; Soto 2012) however
for the purposes of the discussion in this section I will focus on the four previously
outlined, government, NGOs (international and local), multilaterals and representative
bodies.
In looking at the issue of government intersection in each of the country’s financial
cooperatives we find that there is coverage of the complete spectrum.  The Solomon
Islands financial cooperative movement at the level of credit unions are required to join
and pay membership subscription fees to SICUL.  As a part of this obligation they are to
report to SICUL who in turn consolidates the reporting and provides this to the Solomon
Islands Central Bank Registrar of Credit Unions.  The reporting format and timing are
non-negotiable under the Solomon Islands Credit Union Act 1986 however the practice
doesn’t necessarily comply with the requirements. While the government has legislated
these requirements they do not have the financial or human capacity to supervise the
compliance.
The government interacts with the Timorese financial cooperatives differently.  They see
the financial cooperatives as a mechanism that they can influence directly by providing
funding for various initiatives to meet with the governments agenda in addressing a
market failure of financial inclusion.  Much of the cities and villages outside of Dili have
small populations and are difficult to travel to and are therefore unattractive to commercial
retail banks.  The government has recognized this market deficit and identified the
financial cooperative sector as a potential remedy.  The Timorese government includes
a National Directorate of Cooperatives, Micro and Small Enterprise which, at the time of
writing, resides under the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Environment.  The
recognition of the financial cooperatives has seen the Timor Leste Government provide
financial incentives for the financial cooperatives to carry out development initiatives on
its behalf. While there is no current legislation currently being considered to supervise
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the sector the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently discussing with
governments in the Pacific (including Timor Leste) the development and revision of
regulation for the financial cooperative sector.27 The government through its current
agenda has seen US$20,000 given to some of the larger financial cooperatives to
diversify into cooperative retail shops with some already disastrous results including the
management of the financial cooperatives utilizing the funds to capitalize their existing
financial institutions.   The funding was linked to the provision of monthly reporting of the
financial cooperatives results through the Hana Malu Federation.  The government is
endeavouring to provide a mechanism to grow the financial cooperatives quickly through
the community having access to subsidized everyday needs by becoming a member of
the financial cooperative.  Unfortunately the fast pace of the membership growth
outstripped the capacity of the institutions and its leadership which saw poor financial
management of the two businesses which resulted in a loss of trust in the financial
cooperatives by the community that led to a loss of membership.  The interference by the
Timorese government in a community organisation, and the desire of the community to
access funds from the government ensured that neither parties agenda or needs were
met with damage done to not only the institution but also to the levels of trust within the
community.  The Timorese dataset clearly reflects this reliance on the government for
leadership and direction.  The valuing of the communities strategy for their financial
cooperative was supplanted by directions given by the government.
The Cambodian financial cooperatives are not supervised by any form of government as
a financial institution nor are they covered under any type of Prakas28.  The only
requirement is a type of business operation registration that is secured from the district
government.  The growth of the credit led microfinance sector saw the Cambodian
government move quickly to enact a Prakas to regulate the sector however due to its
relative small size and slow growth the government is only now looking at regulating the
financial cooperative sector.  Currently financial cooperatives can and have registered
under the agricultural Prakas but this is inappropriate given the financial nature and
structure of the organisations.
27 Personal conversations with IMF Consultant Mr Pierre Seguin
28 Prakas is a regulation that is issued by a Minister or by the Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia
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NGOs and multilaterals have affected the institutional autonomy of the financial
cooperatives in each of the countries surveyed.  Both have focused on growth as a major
concern being driven by the current agenda of financial inclusion for the underserved.
Often funding from these types of organisations is tied to growth targets of both assets
and membership along with institutional health based on indicators of performance,
equity, asset quality, liquidity and sustainability (Richardson 2000).  The Cambodian
financial cooperatives contained within this research had both local and international
NGOs working with them on various aspects of their operations.  Many of the activities
were funded through the federation and therefore financial cooperatives were under
pressure to comply as the federations depend upon the NGO funding for their operational
expenses.  The influence of the INGOs is often mediated through a local organisations
and local NGOs.  Currently the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) is working
with the financial cooperatives in the Solomon Islands directly due to the institutional
weakness of SICUL.  The way in which the financial cooperatives have been engaged is
through financial incentives of participation.  The UNDP pay generous per diems to
members of the financial cooperatives to participate in their training which is often held
in the capital Honiara.  The UNDP is seeking to strengthen and grow the institutions
under their Pacific Financial Inclusion Program (PFIP).
The integrity of each of the institutions autonomy has been compromised in different ways
by different actors.  What is common in each situation is the impact this has on the agency
of the community and way which they may want to see their institution operate.  Clearly
the outside actors wish to see growth, stability and sustainability however financial
cooperatives are founded on a bottom up approach where the members of a community
have control of their institution and are free to learn from the mistakes that they may
make.  Financial cooperatives grow at a pace that is in line with their capacities.  The
respondents are in developing environments and so access to financial and other
resources influences their decision making to participate in many cases or the soft power
(Nye 2004) of their government or federation may also put undue pressure to allow
outside influences to hijack their institution and their voice.
“In my opinion, I think our financial cooperative has stability. Our financial
cooperative depended on an NGO in the past, but we now can run our
financial cooperative by our self.”
Source: CPAMCKPLCKCTBC045
The Solomon Island communities have, due to their views on leadership and the role of
government, been significantly disenfranchised from the ownership and control of their
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institutions.  This has been demonstrated over the last 30 years as each NGO,
multilateral and unilateral organization worked with the financial cooperatives to assist
them to strengthen and grow.  Firstly DFID worked to develop the financial cooperatives
and their league in the mid-1980s, when they phased out their project a significant
weakening of the movement occurred.  During the 1990s working through the Hans
Siedel Foundation, CUFA initiated over 300 cooperative savings clubs throughout the
Solomon Islands, again when that project phased out the institutional strength and growth
declined significantly.  In the mid-2000s CUFA began to work with the savings clubs and
credit unions.  After the three year project phased out there was some loss of the project
gains in terms of institutional quality and reporting and a definite decline in SICUL’s
capacity to supervise and support the financial cooperatives.  Now the UNDP is working
with the Savings Clubs through yet another project. All outside agents have not only
failed to build institutional autonomy but as the data indicates, actively worked against its
development.
“Leaders are the villagers, chief of village and commune. Most of them
are the elders in the community. There are no outsiders, or any NGO
managing the financial cooperative. And the quality of their leadership is
good because they have good communication with the villagers.”
Source: OPICBBOSOVM031
The Timor Leste financial cooperatives have survived through oppression and civil
conflict.  The communities have clung to the institutions throughout their country’s
turbulent times which speaks to the agency within the communities.  The Timorese
financial cooperative members are very vocal in terms of making demands of their
institution but they tend to be strongly influenced by available funding and quickly
displace their needs and voice over the ability to obtain external development funds.  The
data indicates that while they have strong local leadership there is a preference to defer
to the leaders higher up in decision making.  The data indicates that there is strong
participation by the membership even though the positioning of the institutional autonomy
is compromised, which may be because of the positioning of the decision making.
The data shows that institutional autonomy can be damaged by outside influences
especially when funding opportunities are presented while community agency is
sometimes supplanted by other agendas, despite this, the level of institutional autonomy
is demonstrably much higher in the Cambodian financial cooperatives where it sits in the
membership, unlike the Timorese or Solomon Island financial cooperatives where much
of the autonomy sits in the institutional leadership.
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Demographic
The social and economic success and the generation of social capital is influenced by
the demography of the financial cooperative. Given the nature of the data collection
there wasn’t the ability to carefully weigh the selection of financial cooperatives in terms
of urban versus rural, gender, income, age, education etc.  The selection was based on
where financial cooperatives were in operation. In the following paragraphs I will discuss
the demography of the research sites in context to other variables in the generation of
social capital.
The age groupings of the membership and volunteers of the financial cooperatives
(Figure 42) is varied across all three research locations and for differing historical and
demographic reasons.
Figure 42 Age
The reason the Cambodian population is skewed to an older demographic is due to the
survey being carried out in the rural areas.  As discussed previously there has been a
shift of younger people moving to urban areas for employment and education. While
there is an increase in growth of the youth population in Cambodia (C. Than June 2010)
there has also been significant growth in the Pacific region due to improved maternal
health care, and higher fertility rates and lower levels of urbanisation (UNFPA 2014)
which has also impacted on the variance of age the respondents.
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Availability also impacted on the selection of respondents.  In the Solomon Islands and
to a lesser extent in Timor Leste the survey was mostly carried out in the workplace due
to the industrially bonded nature of many of the financial cooperatives. In the rural areas
of Cambodia the survey was carried out early in the morning and later in the early evening
to capture as many people before they went out to the fields or left for work, as most of
the financial cooperatives were geographically bonded.  Unfortunately it was not always
possible to secure a balanced selection of both genders.  As many of the volunteers and
operational staff in the Cambodian financial cooperatives were female, this also skewed
the gender balance (Figure 43) of the respondents.
Figure 43 Gender
The income data is simply raw comparative data which needs to be viewed in context to
the relevant economic conditions in each country (Figure 44).  Wages and the cost of
goods are much lower in Cambodia due to the geographic positioning (Sachs 2005: 59)
and manufacturing industries are prevalent not only in Cambodia but throughout the
region.  Solomon Islands and Timor Leste both import much of their daily needs and do
not have a local manufacturing industry causing an increase in prices and therefore
higher salaries.
Many of the respondents in Cambodia derive their income from the land and are able to
grow much of the produce necessary for their consumptive needs.  The Solomon Islander
and many of the Timorese respondents were waged employees that lived an urban life
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without direct access to their land29. The income for the Solomon Islands respondents
reflect the public and private forms of employment.  The Cambodian respondents were
predominately from the land in rural areas, a large number of the Timorese respondents
lived in the city and worked for the government.  The Solomon Island respondents had a
significant proportion of respondents that were employed by the private sector and
therefore attracted higher salaries.
Figure 44 Income
The higher proportion of tertiary educated Solomon Islander respondents in the survey
is also reflective of the waged employment but may also be due to the location of the
survey respondents as well as the historical legacies of occupation in Timor Leste and
the genocide in Cambodia (Figure 45).
29 Many of the respondents have customary land however this was not easily accessible and in some
cases was several days boat ride away on another island.
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Figure 45 Education
Age, Income, gender, and education are all factors in the success or otherwise of the
financial cooperative.  Capacities, capabilities, experience, skill, appetite for risk,
willingness to cooperate, hierarchical roles, to name a few, all impact on not only the
development of the financial cooperative but its ongoing sustainability and growth. In
referencing Table 2 the Comparison of Financial Cooperatives and Microfinance it is
instructive to consider the level of responsibility and capacity that community members
have and need in order to operate their financial cooperative.  This data provides a small
snapshot of the socio economic background of the members and leaders of the financial
cooperatives. When this is put into context in relation to some of the challenges that they
face when operating their financial cooperative a deeper understanding of the reasons
for the slow development of the financial cooperative in comparison to top down
approaches start to emerge.  Unlike other forms of microfinance which is driven from a
top down, centralized approach, financial cooperative development is contingent upon
the capacities and capabilities of its community.  The community, certainly at the
beginning stages of the financial cooperative development, cannot afford to secure the
services of experienced and skilled human resources to operate their institution.  This
responsibility falls to the community and is reliant on the willingness of the local human
resources.
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Geographic
Throughout this chapter I have cross referenced issues relating to rural and urban
populations within the survey responses.  In this section I will provide more detail on the
research sites across the three survey locations.  This will assist in providing some
background on the positioning of the financial cooperatives and their membership in
relation to issues of access.
The Cambodian data was collected from three provinces, Battambang, Prey Veng and
Kandal.  Battambang is located in the northwest of the country and is often referred to as
the rice bowl of the nation.  The province of Battambang has a population of just over 1
million people (C. Than June 2010) and whose capital, also called Battambang is
Cambodia’s third biggest city (C. Than June 2010).  The locations of the data collection,
Chamkatamouy, Odambang and Sreae O Villages are over 10km from the city of
Battambang and would in other circumstances be classified as peri-urban however given
previously discussed issues of poor transport and roads as well as a lack of government
provided services these villages could be classified as rural.  Cher Teal and Along Tamei
Villages are within 5 to 10km from Battambang city centre, usually these would definitely
be classified as urban however in this situation I have classified these as peri-urban as
the respondents are able to access the services of Battambang city on a regular basis.
Prey Veng is in the south of Cambodia and shares a border with Vietnam.  The capital
city of Prey Veng is also called Prey Veng.  The locations of the data collection were
Rokaksok and Kyouk South Villages, which are both over 10km from the capital of Prey
Veng and suffer from poor roads and a lack of transport.  For the purposes of this
research both villages are classified as rural sites.
Kandal Province surrounds Phnom Penh city and also borders with Vietnam. The capital
city of Kandal Province is Ta Khmao.  Due to the smaller financial cooperative
populations it was necessary to include an additional data collection location.  The
villages surveyed in Kandal province were, Binbaor, Trapeing Bakou, and Pol Meav
Villages.  All of these villages were more than 10km away from any major urban centre
and were therefore classified as rural locations.
The Solomon Island data was obtained from two islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita.  Due
to the locations of the financial cooperatives an equitable spread between urban and rural
areas was not possible. The Guadalcanal data was collected from the capital of the
Solomon Islands, Honiara as well as in Lengalau which is approximately 40km from
Honiara.  In other circumstances this may be classified as a peri-urban location but in
this case it can be classified as a rural location.
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The Malaita data was collected from financial cooperative communities which were
located in the provincial capital of, or close to, Auki. With a population of just over 7,000
people (SINSO 2014) and very little infrastructure and services this location could be
considered as rural.
The Timor Leste data was collected from four districts, Dili, Baucau, Bobonaro and
Manatuto. Due to the larger number of both institutions and members in the Dili area the
data set is heavily weighted to urban financial cooperatives.  The Dili data was collected
from the towns of Bebonuk, Akadiru, Motael, Kuluhun and Bairopite. The district of
Baucau is located in the east of Timor Leste and data was collected from the towns of
Caibada and Tirilolo. The district of Baucau has a population of 111,694 (UNFPA 2011)
however the villages surveyed could be considered as rural.  Similarly the data collected
in Bobonaro in the towns of Odomau and Lolotoe, due to the small population and the
lack of services and the agricultural nature of the area, could also be classified as rural.
Due to the small sizes of the financial cooperatives a fourth district was included called
Manatuto where a financial cooperative in Aiteas was surveyed.  This district is
geographically diverse and touches both the north and south coasts of the country with
the financial cooperative located in the rural area.
Political
The political structures in each country are at various stages of maturation and are
constitutionally differently. Cambodia has a constitutional monarchy where the Prime
Minister is the head of government and the Monarch is the head of state similarly the
Solomon Islands is also a constitutional monarchy with the same structure whereas Timor
Leste’s head of state is the President and the head of government is the Prime Minister.
The structure of both the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste Parliaments are unicameral
whereas Cambodia enjoys a bicameral parliament with an elected National Assembly
and Senate.  Solomon Islands hold elections every four years with Cambodia and Timor
Leste every five years however the Prime Minister of Cambodia has now been in office
since 1998.
A high density of political affiliation was observed in Cambodia however this may have
been impacted by the observed resistance in discussing political affiliations with
outsiders.  This is in stark contrast to the Timorese environment where they articulate
their political affiliations proudly and where socially there has been an active effort of the
government and external actors to engender open political discourse within society.  The
Solomon Islands is more of a moveable feast where political affiliation is drawn along
geographical lines and is affected by patronage systems.  Political parties are not
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necessarily based on political ideology but on resources available to political candidates’
constituency (Dinnen 2009; Hameiri 2007).  This means that the barriers to access from
a political perspective are much lower in Solomon Islands as there is demonstrated
respect for diversity of political opinion within communities and resources are not as
defined based on political affiliation.
Economic
There is scant comparable economic data across the three surveyed countries.  Timor
Leste is a relatively new country and is only now establishing administrative systems
throughout the various government departments.  While there has been data published
there is not the consistency of methodology that would enable clear comparisons without
detailed mining of the raw data.
The data available from the World Bank (2014) on the GNI30 indicates that Cambodia
while enjoying the greatest growth of GNI of 10% from US$800 in 2011 to US$880 in
2012 is the lowest GNI of the three survey locations.  The Solomon Islands saw a minor
increase from US$1,120 in 2011 to US$1,130 in 2012 however Timor Leste having the
largest GNI of the three saw theirs fall from US$3,890 in 2011 to US$3,620 in 2012.
Cambodia in real terms is the only country surveyed that is enjoying above inflation
growth31 of their GNI. The use of the GNI is to gauge the health and growth of each
country’s economy.
This is a macro view and to some extent masks the realities of peoples lived experience.
Within the data there are disparities between the waged government employees in
Honiara and the subsistence farmers 40km away in Lengalau, similarly the economic
30 GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the
World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident
producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of
primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national
currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies,
although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally
large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and
exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion
factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences
in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
31 In the period 2011 to 2012 Cambodia’s inflation rate was 4.29 Anna Fedec and Antonio Sousa, ’Trading
Economics’, Cambodia Inflation Rate <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/cambodia/inflation-cpi>, accessed
24 June 2014 2014.
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differences are vast between the women in the Lanamona financial cooperative who are
mostly market sellers and those interviewed at Fini Sorumutu in Dili who as government
employees enjoy regular a income.
While the differences of the economic lived experience needs to be recognized within the
research, it is more salient to recognize the reasons for their participation in their financial
cooperative. While economic dis/advantage will inform the lived experience and the
decision making of individuals it is perhaps an area that needs to be acknowledged but
then putting it aside for further research at a later time as the SOCAT survey tool was not
able to accommodate these economic differences.  The Social Capital Framework and
resulting Social Capital Schematic would need further refinement to include economic
variations of respondent data.
7.4.2 Governance
It is within governance that we find the members voice most vocal and with the most
influence.  It is the actions, behaviours, motivations, capacities and capabilities that
influence this indicator of social capital.  While the environmental component is often
difficult for members to influence due to the macro structure, in the governance indicators
there is the capacity for localized agency.  It is within this localized agency that
opportunities for trust, leadership, reciprocity, norms and networks to develop.  Through
viewing indicators of democracy, participation, community voice, activism and solidarity
we can examine the sites of social capital generation at its most localized and personal.
Democracy
Democracy means different things to different people due to their everyday experience
of it.  How does participation in democracy affect their lives?  Are their experiences one
of benefit or disadvantage, does it empower or disempower them? For the purposes of
this section I have defined democracy in terms of equality, inclusion, voice and
transparency and frame the discussion using the aggregate model of democracy (Young
2010). As noted in Chapter Three financial cooperatives are horizontal organisations in
nature with a purpose to provide a social benefit through economic engagement (Goglio
and Alexopoulos 2013) however as the institution grows and matures the way in which
democracy works changes and it’s meaning to the membership adapts to one that
dictates a different form of member interaction.
The process of democracy moves from being informal to formal, the relationships within
the democratic structure move from intimate and personal to distant and based on benefit
and formal communications.  The personal links that informed the institutional democracy
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previously change to functional and professional.  The formal links change the interaction
between members and their institution.
To understand where each of the countrys financial cooperatives are in the maturation
process we can look to some of the data to understand how members are interacting with
their institution.  The maturation of the Cambodian financial cooperatives appears to be
greatest.  The data indicates that there is a formal process of consultation by the
leadership which is then acted upon.  While the Cambodian data indicates that there still
a high level of decision making through a consensus approach, the financial cooperatives
in Cambodia appear to now encompass a high level of formality in the decision making
process with the leaders, having been voted in, are now empowered to “manage” the
institution on behalf of their members.  While there is a consultation process to give voice
to the needs and demands of members, the management are now the instrument through
which the members’ demands are filtered rather than the group.  This professionalization
of the management of the institution does not see a lessening of the democracy but
simply a formalization of the process.  This formalization has occurred through growth.
The membership in many of the Cambodian financial cooperatives surveyed are now
large where the members don’t always know each other nor always live in the same
geographical location. The democratic process within the Cambodian context is moving
away from being an instrument of providing social benefit to becoming more of an
economic rather than social benefit to the members. There is a relationship between
democracy, efficiency, centralisation and professionalization (Wollebek and Selle 2003).
If social capital is to be developed within the communities a deeper understanding of how
the formalization of the democratic process impacts the social relationships and the
connectedness that members have with each other and with the mission and values of
the institution.
Each of the Timorese financial cooperatives have very small memberships in comparison
to Cambodia with a closeness of the members to the decision making process (Table
13).  The membership groups are closely connected to each other and usually in this
situation the democratic process is personal and provides an opportunity to build social
ties and reciprocity. The immaturity of the Solomon Island financial cooperatives sees a
lack of participation by the membership.  It appears that the membership vote in their
leadership and then the leadership is not held to account for the decisions through any
consultation or communication process.  The financial cooperatives in the Solomon
Islands are only slightly larger than those in Timor Leste so the membership would have
a connectedness and know each other however they appear not to be using the financial
cooperative as a vehicle to strengthen the social ties or to build reciprocity.
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Table 13 Democratic Forms of Decision Making
Participation
In the preceding paragraphs I provided an overview of the respondents’ participation in
the democratic process.  In the following paragraphs I will look at participation in view of
its effects on governance.
Membership is the primary form or participation in terms of financial cooperatives which
includes the foundation of “one member, one vote” principle of membership.  There are
secondary forms of participation such as volunteering, be that on the board or committee
or in the operations of the financial cooperative.  Members enact forms of participation
through their sense of “ownership” in the institutional decision making, assisting in
mobilizing new members, lobbying government, connecting with other civil society
organisations along with the formal and informal social and mutual aid activities that arise
from the relationships that are inherent within the financial cooperatives.
Participation can be inhibited or impacted by various influences: Influences such as
access, religion, politics, income, social status or gender.  In communities that exhibit
demographic homogeneity some of these barriers to participation become much lower.
There are barriers to participation that may be culturally implicit32 within the community.
Societies which are patriarchal may, for example, have some impact on the level of
participation of women.  In each of the sets of data it is clear that women participating in
leadership roles is somewhat limited. While the data demonstrates higher levels of
gender equality in Cambodia especially around economic activities, the Solomon Island
data indicated higher levels of exclusion of women in accessing services and participation
in groups and associations.  The data may have been different had the survey been
32 By the term “culturally implicit” it is not to infer cultural determinism – see discussion in Chapter Three.
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conducted in places where there the system is matrilineal and where inheritance is
through the mothers line such as on the island of Isabel and in parts of Guadalcanal (Kent
1973: 38)33.
Religion also impacted on the participation levels.  The surveyed communities in
Cambodia were highly homogenous in terms of their religion as were the Timorese to a
lesser extent as opposed to the Solomon Islands which had a moderate level of
heterogeneity within the religious beliefs of the membership. This diversity within the
Solomon Islands dataset may have been due to the location of the surveys.  With the
Solomon Island respondents predominately surveyed in the capital city of Honiara the
diversity of people that had come from villages around the country was religiously more
diverse than those surveyed in the villages.
The differences of income greatly affect participation in Cambodia.  The sense of
sameness also extends to that of income. When people see difference in wealth there
are jealousies that arise that cause division.  The data indicates that the Cambodian
respondents want to see all members of their community as equal in many areas of life
including income.  Differences in income also affect the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste
but to a slightly lesser extent.  In the communities where struggle is a daily reality their
sense of belonging is partially constructed through that struggle (Ishizuka 2010).  Once
the perceived level of struggle is lessened for community members the others within the
community may not identify with those that have more. Participation in financial
cooperative development is based on a lack of access to financial services and the
community coming together and volunteering their time and efforts to a common cause.
Access could be denied due to perceived benefits that are unavailable to others within
the community.  As the shared sense of struggle weakens, so too does the homogeneity
of the group.  Herein lies a tension between the social foundation of the institution and
the neo liberal approach which argues that if the financial cooperative is to be sustainable
then a diversity of community members is necessary. A diversity in terms of wealth
ensures that not all members require a loan and that there are a proportion of members
that are saving only that allows the poorer members to be savers at a lower level but with
an institution that has greater assets than just those of the poor (Cuevas 2000).
33 There were no financial cooperatives available to survey in these places.
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The level of wealth within a community also impacts on the perceived social status.
Social status is perceived differently in each of the countries surveyed.  The Solomon
Islanders perceive richer or the powerfully connected as a resource to be approached
and utilized (Moore 2008).  There is some level of mistrust but at the same time respect
is paid to those that enjoy wealth and power in Cambodia (Ear 2013). A patronage
system is incorporated into the hierarchies of the Cambodian social system (Ear 2013)
so that the benefits of connection can trickle down to those of a lower social status that
enjoy less power.  The system of patronage and informal fees in Cambodia is based on
a pyramid structure whereby bribes or what are often framed as facilitation or middleman
fees are passed up the hierarchy with a small percentage kept by those at the front line
of the process (Ear 2013; Vian 2008).  The amounts being passed back multiply across
the number of front line functionaries so the amount the person at the apex receives has
a multiplying affect.  Those at the front line are able to keep their position and the financial
benefits that flow from it through this process.  Whereas there are low amounts of street
level corruption within the Solomon Islands but those with social status and power are
able to instigate institutional levels of graft (Zaum and Cheng 2013) and then distribute
this for political, financial or commercial benefit and most importantly for their own
communities benefit (Richmond 2011).
Community Voice
The research data highlights the multiple ways in which Community Voice can manifest
itself, through collective, political and economic action, however the Community Voice or
agency within financial cooperatives always exhibits itself in one particular way, through
the exercise of institutional monitoring.  While there is some debate (Birchall 2013b) as
to the level of participation in the monitoring process and as to what level is adequate,
the voice of the community however, does help to regulate the action of others that have
been entrusted with the responsibility of governing a financial cooperative. While the
engagement may be through self-interest ‘ helping ones’ self can aid the collectivity and
contributing to the collectivity can benefit the individual’ (Maloney 2008: 311).
“Community Voice” or what has been called “Group Agency” (Pettit and Schweikard
2006) is problematic ‘because of a conflict between personal interests and a socially
optimal outcome’ (Zschache 2012: 539).  This tension is demonstrated in the research
data where personal expectations do not necessarily match the policies and procedures
of the institution. In all three research locations there were members of the financial
cooperatives that expected that they would automatically receive a loan when needed,
however this was not the case, often to protect other members savings, loans were
refused due to the rigor of the loan application process whereby it was determined that
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the member did not have sufficient income to repay the requested loan. While the
individual members had participated in the development of their financial cooperative and
through their participation in collective action around their community’s access to
financial services which had benefited their community, they had not directly benefited
as they had expected. Through being denied a loan by their financial cooperative, they
had benefited in a different way through not becoming over indebted and suffering
financially.  The intended individual agency of member participation had been redirected
and made to acquiescent to that of group agency.
Community Voice within the Cambodian, Timor Leste or Solomon Island financial
cooperatives cannot always be framed in terms of a majority position, or a sum of its
parts.  In context to these financial cooperatives it of course includes the membership of
the institutions but also includes organisational needs and requirements as well as the
collective benefit to be factored into the voice or agency.
Activism
The concept of activism in terms of collective identity can assist in understanding how
social capital is generated through social movements and how these not only generate
but also ‘sustain commitment and cohesion between actors over time’ (Fominaya 2010:
393).  Activism is also a location for the creation of in-group social norms (Jarley 2005;
Ostrom 2000) and brings together the ‘atomised mass of individuals’ (Wade 1988). The
following data contributes to the understanding of the level of activism in relation to the
Institutional and Community Social Capital and its effect on its creation.
The Cambodian data (Figure 46) indicates that the more frequent they engaged with
government officials and political leaders the higher the opportunity for success. This
may be based on building relationships with the individual officials or more likely the
government officials are positioned at a local level including the Village Chief and
Commune Chief where these people are part of the community.  Respondents indicated
that they intentionally did not seek out higher government officials due the possibility of
negative financial consequences of corruption.
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Figure 46 Activism – Cambodia
The Solomon Islander respondents were far less frequent in collective activity (Figure
47).  The data also indicates that they were less collectively active politically although
this may be due to their dislocation to their home province with many of the respondents
located in Honiara, sometimes up to 1 ½ days boat ride away from their home.  There is
perhaps less opportunity for them to seek the political engagement in relation to their
village due to their disconnection from the local politics.  While they would certainly have
the opportunity to engage with the politicians in Honiara they perhaps cannot speak to
the localized issues given their dislocation from home.
Additionally there is perhaps a less formal approach taken when seeking political support,
which is not necessarily undertaken through formal written approaches and petitions, but
through informal meetings and through personal relationships.
204
Figure 47 Activism - Solomon Islands
There was high levels of collective action in the Timor Leste data set (Figure 48). The
research findings indicate a high reliance on the government of the respondents.  This
has translated through to significant collective activity both in relation to lobbying the
government but also joining together around a common cause.  Influences around
cognitive solidarity may have predisposed the community to exhibit collective behaviours
in their daily life.
Figure 48 Activism – Timor Leste
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Solidarity
Solidarity was captured within the Cognitive Social Capital component of Individual Social
Capital and was viewed through scenarios to position people’s behavior in times of
difficulty for others. It may appear to be counterintuitive to frame solidarity within the
individual sphere of social capital however the intent is to gain individuals’ perceptions of
solidarity in their community and institutions.  Solidarity has a contested meaning
whereby it has elements of unity and universality with responsibility for others and a
sense of togetherness, however it contains the possibility of compromise (Wilde 2007).
There are tensions within this concept and the way that it functions and manifests itself
more broadly within a group of people.  If we consider solidarity in relation to the research
communities we also need to consider that within the financial cooperative there are
elements of exclusion and inclusion, as well as the level of homogeneity of the group in
terms of class, education, income etc. and what that may mean for the solidarity of the
members and the associated decision making that arises from the interaction.  The
principle underpinning the development of financial cooperatives is to ‘promote a form of
local development which privileges solidarity as an integral part of economic activity’
(Neamtan 2002: 4).  The very solidarity that emerges in the development of a financial
cooperative is prefaced on a struggle against discrimination and exclusion, in this case
having access to financial services. The respondents in each research location indicated
extremely high levels of solidarity within their communities (Table 14).
Table 14 Levels of Solidarity
This surprisingly was not accompanied with high levels of trust which is discussed further
in the chapter.  There is a mantra within the financial cooperatives based on the principles
of cooperativism whereby members are trained to understand that the institutions are
non-discriminatory, that there should be cooperation amongst cooperatives, there should
be mutual aid activity amongst members etc., each of these speak to a sense of solidarity
within the institution.  Solidarity is framed as functions and behaviours whereas trust is a
belief.  So while in each of the research locations we can measure high levels of solidarity
in function and behaviours we don’t have the corresponding levels of trust.
“No one was discriminated against, we educate our people to have solidarity,
and understand each other. No difference about social status in our village.
We educate our people to love each other.”
Source: CPAMCKPCYBVM104
$?K@MBG? 5GKMP-CQRC 4MJMKML*QJ?LBQ
4MJGB?PGRW   
206
“In my opinion, I think our financial cooperative have stability… we now
can run our financial cooperative by our self. The reasons why our
financial cooperative has stability are we use democratic style in
leadership, and we have a good governance, and solidarity. If there are
some member breaks the rule, we will have meeting in order to explain
and educate them.”
Source: CPAMCKPLCKCTBC045
In each case the members of the financial cooperative are exhibiting learned behaviours
and processes rather than a belief system.  All of the research locations have a
communal approach to living with others based on your first responsibility being to your
immediate family and then assisting your neighbours.  The concept of solidarity is
prevalent within the nationalist narrative based on the independence movement in Timor
Leste which may explain the high levels of solidarity reported in this location.  Of the three
Timorese locations there is performance of solidarity in the political sphere through a
resistance dance, through the language of politics, through the social agendas that run
through civil society.  At each level there is performance of the practices and behaviours
which is the closest to a “geography of solidarity” (Featherstone 2012) of the three
research sites.
7.4.3 Trust
Trust is important as it correlates to other variables outlined in this chapter. ‘At an
individual level, people who believe that in general most other people in their society can
be trusted are also more inclined to have a positive view of their democratic
institutions...and be more active in civic organisations’ (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 41).
Trust within a society generates a range of benefits to that society such as less crime
and corruption, better economic growth and more democratic institutions.  The benefits
to the individual manifest themselves in the form of greater tolerance and generosity
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Rothstein and Stolle 2008).
The data which focused on trust varied from country to country but forms a picture of the
solidarity of that country and a direct relationship with the responsibility to perform good
deeds including volunteering through to giving to charity, being politically, culturally or
just socially engaged collectively.
Governments and the institutional structures and property rights play a significant role in
developing policies that enhance trust within society (Fukuyama 1995).  Social trust is
affected ‘by two different, yet interrelated types of equality, namely equality and equality
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of opportunity’ (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 41).  The equitable distribution of
opportunities and resources will, according to Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), generate a
general trust within a society. The more equitable, honest and least repressive the
government the higher the trust. This position has not been evident from a comparative
analysis between each of the research sites. The Cambodian data consistently
highlighted the distance they have from their government and their sense of equality
across their community.
‘Equality and honesty in government stand at the beginning of our causal chain.  Both
are necessary to create trust and the universalistic social policies that lead to a greater
level of equality and social cohesion’ (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 44). It is at this
intersection that we need to look at the implications here for the financial cooperatives,
given that they are founded on trust.  What are the implications for the integrity of the
financial cooperative if the governance structure within which everyone lives their lives
suffers from “corruption” or “nepotism”? If trust is debased within the broader society
what are the effects for the financial cooperative whose very existence is premised on
trust? In answering this question, an understanding of the types of trust is important.
There are two different types of trust, that of generalised trust whereby we are linked to
people who are different from ourselves and that of particularized trust whereby trust is
located within the associated group (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).  If we look at
generalised trust we see common links that people share across society, the economy,
ethnicity, and religious spheres.  Whereas particularized trust focuses on the groups of
interest and does not necessarily place trust in outsiders to the group. Greater levels of
generalised trust is evident in more equitable societies.  Trust as a measure reflects both
bonds and boundaries with others to increasing or lessening degrees dependent upon
the level society enjoys in terms of equity.
Trust can be positioned depending upon ethnicity and culture and may be generated and
utilized differently subject to the socio-economic context.  There are often communities
that exist together that exhibit wide socio-economic disparity.  While they may live in the
same community they may not often come into contact with each other as those with
greater means may live in gated communities as for example some of the Chinese
Solomon Islanders. Their children go to different schools and they socialise in different
places. It is of little surprise that these two groups ‘have any sense of a shared fate’
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 46). Within the Chinese Solomon Islands community there
is evidence of low generalised trust and high particularized trust. Similarly, within the
Solomon Island indigenous community we see generalised trust fragmented and
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dependent upon spatial location and context.  For example, in Honiara the capital of the
Solomon Islands we see on one level integration in the workplace, or where people might
shop at the same shops or eat and drink at the same places, they may even participate
in the same civic associations however there are enclaves of people from the different
islands living in different locations around Honiara.  When interviewed, comments around
individuals and the islands they came from played an important part in discussions about
capability, trust, accountability and transparency.  The Solomon Islanders interviewed
had set ideas about people from different islands and ascribe certain characteristics of
trustworthiness and ability.
To be successful financial cooperatives in their early stages rely on the volunteer efforts
of their members.  Usually it is only after several years of hard work by the volunteers
that the financial cooperatives can then generate sufficient operating profit to begin to
have paid staff and eventually paid management to run their institution.  In order to
generate trust in the very early stages many of the financial cooperatives tend to emerge
from homogeneous groups of people, only to become more heterogeneous as the
institution grows and matures. The perceptions of trust are highlighted within the
homogenous communities surveyed in Cambodia and Timor Leste and less reflective in
the Solomon Island data (Table 15). This may be due to the larger percentage of
respondents coming from industrially bonded financial cooperatives where there is more
diversity in membership in terms of ethnicity and socio economic backgrounds.
Table 15 Comparative Levels of Community Trust
This trust is particularly evident in the data around one of the central functions of a
financial cooperative, that of a lending and borrowing (Figure 49).
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Figure 49 Comparative Levels of Trust in Relation to Lending and Borrowing
Trust appears to be situated in different ways for different items and contexts (Table 16).
In terms of institutional trust of others in relation to money there is higher levels in Timor
Leste and Cambodia.  In a community setting however the level of trust in relation to
money significantly lessens.  It remains unchanged for the Solomon Island respondents.
From a Cambodian perspective the rule of law is somewhat weak in the rural areas so
people understand that they have no recourse through the judicial system and no
oversight by regulators or assistance from the police.
The survey question of losing a pig and having people assist in the search is overt and
public in its nature, whereas losing a purse and asking if it would be returned is more
covert in its nature. People have to be publicly active in resisting the request to assist
finding the pig whereas to hand in a purse, the person has to be privately proactive.  Trust
is therefore positional in the relationship to the situation and the activity.
Table 16 Trust in Relation to Loss
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There are three components of social relations that are useful to consider in context to
the exchange in the scenarios above, which are trustworthiness, obligations and
expectations (Maloney et al. 2000).  Social capital both enables and constrains action.
There are two types of structure that enables social capital to accumulate.  The first
structure being closed social networks which is used to effect action, that is, to provide a
framework to enable sanctions and provide norms and values by which people’s actions
occur.  Within this there is a structure of trust that can be used to imply obligations and
create expectations.  The second being social organisations such as voluntary
organisations that are focused on a purpose (Coleman 1988).
Seligman (1997) argues hierarchal cultures cannot develop trust in their societies and
that the social order that has existed for generations have definite class divisions that
make it difficult for trust to materialize.  Seligman argues that in societies organised
around circumstances of birth people’s ability to cross those thresholds of social norms
is near impossible.  Within these stratified societies trust cannot be generated as people
see others with unfair advantage in terms of the economic resources. Other factors that
affect trust are those that have recent memory of civil war.  In this example there will be
low on levels of trust (Brune and Bossert 2009). Societies that come from protestant
background tend to have much higher levels of trust. ‘Protestant societies, which have
more individualistic political cultures, are also more trusting.  The collectivist and
hierarchical cultures of Catholic societies lead to less generalised trust (and more in-
group trust)’ (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 49).
All of the research communities are to some extent hierarchal in their social relationships
although each of the communities, particularly those in Cambodia in the rural areas are
isolated from significant social stratification within their communities.  Those respondents
in Timor Leste (Dili) and the Solomon Islands (Honiara) were mostly waged educated
“middle class” and so the stratification of their society in terms of economic disadvantage
may not have been as evident to them.
Moral Legitimacy/Economy
In conceptualizing and observing the position and role of the financial cooperative within
a community an examination of the forms of social résistance and protest is useful.  The
moral economy or legitimacy (Chaudhry 1993; Kanazawa and Still 2001; Rose 2011) is
a useful concept as it incorporates other disciplines and categories such as solidarity and
economics to assist in exploring the foundation of the protest or résistance in many forms
including political and social action. The ‘key concept is the exchange of socially related
non-monetary properties…which are sought as part of the desire for mutual support and
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cooperation with others’ (Nitagai 2012: 82). It helps to understand the ‘behaviour which
puts the long-term values of community before the short-term maximization of individual
utility’ (Hann 2010: 196).  The concept has also been translated in terms such as
Solidarity Economy (Neamtan 2002) and is often conceptualised as a form of self-
defense against the market and at the same time has also been used to frame the
absence of morality within the market. The realization of the Solidarity Economy is
reflected in comments of the research respondents in the way in which they work together
to resolve issues.
“We never have a problem because we always sitting together to solve
problems and ask each other’s opinion. The leader always opens himself
up to listen to our opinion and love us. They call us as a member to
participate in events in the cooperative. The leader is smart and
empowers us to have solidarity to make our cooperative strong.”
Source: OPITLMNLM458
It is here we will find the communities perceptions of their financial cooperative, not just
as a provider of financial services but also the meaning that it brings to the community in
the form of equality, access, inclusion and resources where each of these are a right and
a way of countering the ‘hegemonic utilitarian’ (Hann 2010: 196) forces at play.
“We take decision by ourselves and trust each other that for the future we
believe it will carry us out of our troubles.”
Source: CPAMTLDKUKM188
There is however a contradiction between that of the moral economy model and human
behavior. It is the space between rational universal human needs and the cultural
construct of those basic human needs which are often driven by tradition and custom
(Wilk and Cliggett 2007).
“When we vote in the election we want our candidates to compete with
each other and hope when they are selected they must collaborate and
be a strong leader. It is our important responsibility to try to select a leader
by the majority of the community that we trust because of the important
responsibilities of our leadership to serve and attended our needs. They
are our driver and whenever they go we must follow them.”
Source: CPAMTLDKUKM186
212
7.4.4 Leadership
For the purposes of this section leadership is defined as both the governing body, that of
boards and/or committees as well as management of the financial cooperatives.  There
is much evidence in the literature (Brian Branch and Baker 2000; Gash 2013) that
highlights the benefits of good quality leadership within financial cooperatives.
Leadership plays an important part not only in the rallying of community members in the
initial stages of starting the financial cooperative but also in mobilizing and growing the
membership, building trust among the membership, mobilizing savings and ensuring that
during the stage of growth members feel a sense of comfort that their institution and by
extension their savings are being properly managed.
The framework of leadership in the survey tool was constructed to categorize three main
types of leadership, that of a collective approach whereby the group discusses the issues
and then makes a decision collectively which is a more communal approach.  The second
is that of a consultative leadership which sees the leader consult widely and then make
a decision based on the analysis and feedback.  The last approach is that of an
independent leader that undertakes no consultation or discussion with those in the
community but makes a decision independently.
Leadership
Leadership manifests itself in different forms depending upon the stage of development
of the institution.  Many of the Cambodian financial cooperatives that were surveyed were
at a stage of financial development that enabled the committee to employ dedicated staff
to undertake the day to day management and operational duties.  The committee of these
financial cooperatives were also able to pay a small sitting fee or stipend to the members
of the committee for their time.  The Timor Leste financial cooperatives relied on
volunteers for the operation of their institutions however they were able to pay sitting fees
to the board when they met.  Similarly a couple of the Solomon Island financial
cooperatives were able to pay a stipend to the board members. In the case of Cambodia
the leadership first sought to ensure that any operating profits went to paying operational
staff and then to pay for professional management.  It was only after the organisation
was generating the sufficient funds to cover these costs that the committee examined the
possibility to pay themselves a sitting fee.  Conversely both the Solomon Islands and
Timor Leste leadership ensured that their interests were addressed first in priority of the
any operational volunteers.
During the field research stage of collecting the data, interviews were conducted with the
leaders of the financial cooperatives.  In some cases those interviewed were also Village
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or Commune Chiefs as well as being leaders of the financial institutions. The position of
a financial cooperative leader is demanding and requires the leadership to undertake a
range of regular technical tasks and make decisions that impact the membership. Often
the membership do not fully understand the rationale behind some of the decision making
nor is it sometimes communicated effectively so the level of satisfaction will sometimes
not necessarily reflect the technical skills and expertise of the leadership but will reflect
the institutional experience of the members and the communication skills of the
leadership. The respondents indicated varying levels of satisfaction with their leadership
(Table 17).
Table 17 Comparative Levels of Effective Leadership
The comparative results around the level of effectiveness and by extension the level of
satisfaction in terms of the leadership of the financial cooperatives may speak to some
of the issues raised in earlier in this chapter.  The Cambodian respondents have indicated
that the level of effectiveness of their leadership is mostly neutral, that is, the majority of
respondents believe that their leadership is neither very effective nor not effective,
whereas both Timor Leste and Solomon Island respondents indicated their leadership
was very effective.  Within the process of professionalization in financial cooperatives
beginning to occur in Cambodia the members are less connected to the leadership of
their institution however this process had not occurred in the Solomon Islands and Timor
Leste so the committee and volunteer management and staff come from the membership
which were much smaller than that of the Cambodian financial cooperatives and
potentially better known to the membership.  The high rating of the leadership may be
based on a closer relationship and the appreciation of others taking up the work on behalf
of the membership.  Conversely the Cambodian financial cooperatives had
professionalized and through this process had lessened the once strong social ties that
where initially the foundation for the development of their institution.  The members’
personal connections to the financial cooperative had been removed with the relationship
with staff moving from personal to one of service delivery.  The functional nature of the
relationship was demonstrated in the comments from the Cambodian respondents:
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“Members understand the policy of saving. The leaders work to monitor
and organize good reporting. Financial records are well-prepared. There
is no member objection to any changes, there is coordination on any
changes means that there are no problems. All members participate in the
financial cooperative that give other members confidence. Overall the
leadership is good and members are happy.”
Source: OPICBBOSOVM030
“The leader understands and practices good governance, and they are
able to manage the credit union very well.”
Source: CPAMCKPCYBVM099
We see the leadership viewed not in a personal or relational manner but in a functional
and technical language.  The Timorese respondents highlighted the leaders personal
rather than technical skills in their responses:
“The leadership has empathy, transparency, and solidarity with the
members and the community. This cooperative has the potential, ability
and capacity to be better in the future because the organisation has the
capacity and experience of good leaders.”
Source: OPITLMLOBC46
The financial cooperatives were at different stages of their development which affected
the decision making process around leadership rotation which was also affected by the
availability of good quality leadership (Table 18).  In small newly developing financial
cooperatives there is less focus on securing professional management and staff and
more focus on simple operational functions.  The financial products are simple as are the
methods of bookkeeping.  In the beginning stages of development the institution relies
on the good will and existing relationships of the members to work cooperatively together
to meet the operational challenges that emerge.  In the early stages volunteers are
appreciated and encouraged.  The skills and experience are not viewed as important as
the commitment and the connections to the community and the institution. The
Cambodian financial cooperatives pay their staff and management so the relationship
between the board and the operational staff changes from appreciation in the case of
volunteers to that of accountability with paid staff and with this accountability comes a
level of stability.
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The Solomon Island and many of the Timorese financial cooperatives had limited ability
to re-elect existing leadership.  This is often incorporated into the by-laws or constitution
of the financial cooperative to ensure other people get an opportunity to participate in the
leadership structure as well as ensure the financial cooperative has broad representation
at a governance level.  The Cambodian financial cooperatives at their more mature stage
and in need of skilled and experienced leadership incorporated clauses into their by-laws
and constitutions to be able to reselect successful leadership.  The rotation of leadership
is high during the developmental stages and lessens within more mature stages.  The
Solomon Island by-laws and constitutions include very short term limits for board
directors and committee members whereas the Cambodian financial cooperatives still
had term limits as well as limits to the number of times a person could stand for re-election
but were more generous in terms of the length of term to ensure that people with skills
and experience were fully utilized but at the same time provided ample time to develop
future leadership successors.
Table 18 Availability of Leadership
The Cambodian and Solomon Island respondents indicated that the pool of people within
the financial cooperative that have acquired the capabilities and qualities to be effective
leaders was limited (Table 18).  The Cambodian technical requirements of selected
leaders were at a higher level than that of those of the Solomon Islands.  The Solomon
Island response may have been due to the limited interaction between members as
demonstrated within other areas of the data so when they reflected on suitable
candidates they may have had limited knowledge of other members and their capabilities,
similarly the comparative levels of trust were lower (Table 15) which may have affected
the response.
7.4.5 Culture
Culture is the met-narrative that surrounds everyday life both at an individual, community
and institutional level.  It both informs and influences how and why social capital is
generated at the various levels. The ‘notion that values, beliefs, and attitudes are a key
but neglected component of development and that the neglect of cultural factors may go
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a long way toward explaining the agonizingly slow progress toward democratic
governance, prosperity, and social justice in a great many countries...’ (L. E. Harrison
and Berger 2006: xi).  Culture is not genetically defined but is acquired within community.
It is within the community that it is transmitted from person to person and from generation
to generation albeit morphing over time. This is done through what has been called
‘socialising instruments’ (L. E. Harrison and Berger 2006: xii) such as church, family,
school, and the workplace etc. The sites of assimilation are perhaps easier to identify
than to understand the various factors that affect behaviours of actors during the
development of an individual’s cultural practice.  An understanding of the factors would
be useful to use as levers to generate the required changes within a cultural context to
allow for institutional development and social capital to occur.  That is, what are the
triggers or the points of behaviour through which enables or disables a peoples’ ability to
adapt or modify their cultural understanding when operating a financial cooperative.  In
early discussions I identified the three research sites being located within an Adaptive
Pluralism paradigm yet financial cooperatives need to also operate within a Neo-
Newtonian framework.  It is within this conceptual meta-narrative that we can position
and examine culture and the impact it has on generating social capital within a financial
cooperative.  The neo-Weberian renascence, that the economic and political cannot be
understood without their reference to culture (L. E. Harrison and Berger 2006) is perhaps
salient in relation to the success or otherwise of financial cooperatives. Perhaps another
way of looking at this is to frame it as an “economic culture”.
The ‘“Westphalian fallacy”; that is, the notion that cultural boundaries coincide with
political ones, so entire societies can be analysed and compared in terms of their value
systems...In actual fact, though, the values operate within any society deemed “national”
are rarely monolithic’ (L. E. Harrison and Berger 2006: xx). Variations need to be
considered for religious, ethnicity, and other sub cultures and even consider other values
that emerge from organisational norms. There is a pluralism within countries that seek
to fragment any arguments of hegemonic culture as a concept from which it would be
easy to capture and draw grand narratives as to the way culture interacts with the
economic being within those societies or communities. That being the case some
historians have argued that European capitalism grew out of the Protestant ethic (or
something analogous to it) and that it is an important element towards economic
development. Perhaps contrary to this argument it is perhaps timely to note that many
of the financial cooperatives in Europe, North America and Australia grew out of the
Catholic Church. There are comparisons of Catholic asceticism or temperance and self-
denial similarly that of the Chinese values of hard work and thrift over immediate
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consumption and instant gratification. These values do not operate in isolation and are
invariably linked to non-cultural factors which are based in the political and economic
environment.
Causal questions can be raised: ‘the way in which culture impinges, positively or
negatively, on modern economic and political developments.  But…also whether and how
these developments, if successful, act back on culture’ (L. E. Harrison and Berger 2006:
xxvi). Democracy also impacts culture as ‘democracy creates citizens, as capitalism
creates consumers and both human types assert themselves against traditional
hierarchies.  Consumers demand customer service, citizens insist on civil rights’ (L. E.
Harrison and Berger 2006: xxvi). This reminds us that both have cultural consequences
outside of the political and economic spheres.
Using the Adaptive Pluralism paradigm of Concepts and Ontological Assumptions,
Values and Principles, Relationships, Roles and Behaviours and Methods Procedures
and Processes provides a gateway to examine each research location in a more
complete way to provide an understanding of the complexities and ambiguities of the
research data albeit through a cultural lens.
Concepts and Ontological Assumptions using Chambers (2010) paradigm frames this as
non-lineal and on the edge of chaos. Chambers argues that people living in poverty and
in uncontrollable and unpredictable situations drive ‘much adaptive behaviour’
(Chambers 2010: 45) with values and principles creatively versatile and ambiguous but
which fit the situation at hand.  The relationships within this framework are personal and
reciprocal as well as being democratic within behaviours that are facilitating and founded
in improvisation that ensure that the methods, procedures and processes are iterative
and fitting to circumstance.
The Adaptive Pluralism paradigm enables us to understand the ambiguity within the
research data, why the Timor Leste respondents reported high levels of solidarity and
cooperation yet had very low levels of trust.  Why institutional failure in the Solomon
Islands has not prevented the community from continuing to place their savings with the
financial cooperatives. That each of the financial cooperative movements within this
research have taken essentially the same model of institutional development but it is
taking different periods of time to mature.  Why leadership is viewed differently in each
research location.  Each research country, and for that matter, each research location
within those countries will apply their own cultural and environmental context to their
financial cooperative and adapt their approach according to their circumstances.
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7.4.6 Reciprocity
Reciprocity as defined by Jarley (2005) within the context of financial cooperatives, at its
most fundamental level, is situated within membership. The value of cooperative
behavior is the resultant mutual aid that emerges from the act of reciprocity within the
community and institutional collective action.  The act of reciprocity and possible
outcomes within the context of a financial cooperative are not lineal in their construction
and require the participants to navigate the complex relationship between the social
mission of the institution and the institutional sustainability requirements and financial
structures where these agendas are not always aligned.
The areas of participation in group focused activities speaks to the level of importance
and the ways in which the respondents seek to build their social relationships and
practice reciprocity.  The Solomon Island respondents indicated that they strongly
focused on youth and sporting type organisations in which to build relationships whereas
the Cambodian respondents overwhelmingly flagged economic types of organisations as
the most important to their household.  The types of economic organisations were
dominated by financial cooperatives but also included other types of microfinance
organisations as well as farmer and fishing associations. Timor Leste respondents also
indicated that their financial cooperative was critical to their household but religious
groups were also of importance to the household along with, to a lesser extent, cultural,
youth and women’s groups. The data revealed how religious groups were of most
importance to the Solomon Island respondents followed by youth groups and then the
financial cooperative group.
The primary participatory outcomes for the Timorese and to a much lesser extent the
Solomon Islands are health and fitness as well as activities that will ensure youth
engagement whereas the Cambodian focus was predominately economic.  The outcome
for all of these activities were the social connections within an environment where
common language, experiences emerge and norms particular to that group and
environment start to develop. The commonality of shared experience builds trust,
cooperation along with actions of reciprocity.  For the purposes of this thesis I will focus
predominately on the reciprocity that emerges from the activity flowing from the
engagement in a financial cooperative.  Social capital can emerge from all of these types
of groups but the tensions that arise from engagement in activities around financial
cooperatives more often include financial issues and more stringent requirements in
organisational operation.  Operating a financial institution with other members hard
earned savings has particular risks and opportunities that do not exist in sporting or
cultural organisations.   Board and management of a sporting club may manage some
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club finances and a number of sporting events but the board and management of a
financial institution have a high level of trust placed upon them as they are managing
members’ wealth and in doing so access to health or education services. The
relationship is imbued with a level of importance that is perhaps unequalled by the other
types of organisations.  The reciprocity is underpinned with trust on the behalf of member
and responsibility on behalf of the board and management.  That relationship is
underpinned in the case of this research by close community and individual social ties.
The reciprocity is tied to a personal relationship in the first instance which then, as the
institution matures, is reinforced by Neo-Newtonian systems and processes.  The
reciprocity of pure membership is also embedded in the institution through the act of
placing savings into the financial cooperative whereby other members, can draw down
upon other peoples savings in the form of a loan.  There is a sense of trust that not only
has the financial cooperative undertaken its due diligence in assessing the ability of the
borrower to repay the loan but trust in the other members that when they borrow from the
financial cooperative they will ensure that they repay the loan.
In newly developing financial cooperatives they often struggle to manage the liquidity of
the organisation and they run out of funds for people withdrawing savings and they rely
on informing members that they are unable to provide their savings back to them in the
short term.  In this situation the management rely on personal relationships to ask that
the members wait to withdraw and that they trust them that they have not lost their
savings.  The reciprocation travels in various directions and encompasses certain
tensions that are unique to a financial setting.
“Related to the benefits and difficulties as cooperative members, I think
the benefits are if we want to borrow the money we don’t have to queue
on a bank. Long ago we went to Bank in Maliana to save and loan money.
Now we just go to the cooperative to save and lend because it is easier
and also on quicker. The interest in the cooperative when we borrow
US$100.00 is US$3.00. The interest is 3% lower. The other benefit is the
members are able to borrow up to US$500. Every month we just save
US$2 with the cooperative. The weakness is some members who
borrowed the money from the cooperative return the money late. It makes
the other members unable to borrow money because there is limited
funds.”
Source: CPAMTLMNLM474
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The reciprocity that emerges from interaction of members both at a horizontal (member
to member) and vertical level (member to institution and institution to member) embraces
both personal and technical relationships, that is, the relationship is in the first instance
a personal one that has technical facets as the focus of the interactions. They also
contain themes of public or community agendas as well as private or individual agendas,
that of ensuring the institution is sustainable and the individual receives a return on their
savings.  For example, the leadership of the institution needs to structure financial
products with interest rates that are both reasonable and fair to both borrowers and
savers.  The member will want to receive the highest amount of interest on their savings
but pay the lowest amount possible if they borrow. Unlike a shareholder owned retail
bank where the motive is profit for the shareholder, there is a tension within the reciprocal
relationship the financial institution has with their members.
“First, they provided financial support. Next, they provided a loan, but they
required us to save the money in order to become the member in financial
cooperative. If we are not a member, we are not allowed to borrow.
Financial cooperative charges lower interest rates than the local money
lender. For example, you borrow US$25, our financial cooperative charge
an interest rate of 3%, but local money lender charges 10% to the
borrower.”
Source: CPAMCKPTCTBM152
The multiplicity of possible locations of reciprocity was reflected when respondents were
asked if there was overlap with the membership of the three groups self-identified within
the survey.  Respondents’ answers varied greatly in terms of the level of overlap with
Cambodia appearing to have the most overlap between the groups with 49% with the
Solomon Islands having the least with 10%. This may be due to the number of groups
identified which community members can join.  The Solomon Islands identified across
the three sections of the question an average 15.6 groups of which they could belong to
where was Timor Leste respondents were able to identify an average of 10 groups and
Cambodian respondents 7.6 groups.
7.4.7 Networks
Networks as an indicator of social capital speak to the potential of individuals,
communities and institutions.  Potential that is based on social connections, the ability to
organize and the desire to participate and influence.  Networks speak to a resource that
is held at the three levels either separately or conjointly. The network connections need
to be established, nurtured, and continually nourished for them to be durable and long
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lasting.  They come into being due to effort and participation and through a desire or need
and similarly if they become undesirable or when the need is no longer evident the
network as a resource becomes obsolete and discarded.
The very foundation of financial cooperatives relies on mobilising membership which
would otherwise be impossible without the development of a dense social network. A
network gives “permission” to act as a group, to come together as a group.  It provides a
platform where members not only know one another but have shared values and norms
that can be called upon in a mode of action that if these dense networks did not exist
then the resulting activity may be chaotic and outcomes less than efficient or productive.
Responsibility & Ownership
Behavioural economics is a field of study that has grown significantly over the past few
decades and has particularly focused on judgment and decision making (Tyler 2011) and
the associated motivation and cognition which work together as people cooperate
(Higgins and Kruglanski 2001). The social motivations for cooperation is not just a sum
gain or loss calculation but is influenced by issues of reputation that shape and influence
people’s actions and through which cooperation can be influenced by social settings
(Tyler 2011).  The very nature of cooperation and the resulting responsibility and
ownership contains tensions within the act of cooperation to maximize personal interests.
The success of cooperation is the ability of the group to follow and obey rules and
procedures.  This often limits the maximization of self-interest for the benefit of the group.
This form of regulation ensures a focus on tasks and performance that are group focused
and which assists in the effectiveness and sustainability of the group.  The behaviours
are categorized as one that limits the damage to the group and has a positive effect on
the group (Tyler 2011).  There are both sanctions and an incentives and together are
used to shape cooperation.  In situations of either sanction or incentive people factor their
investment into the social group and the resulting calculation around reputation and loss
of trust (Burt 2007). Responsibility and ownership is also influenced by the reputation
and attitudes towards the institutions as well as its legitimacy within the community and
the moral values and social identity within the community that is participating.
To gain a sense of the ownership of the financial cooperative in the various research
sites I have used the voice of the participants to unpack their motivations and sense of
commitment.
When we examine the Timor Leste financial cooperatives we see that the responsibility
for some of the decision making is placed firmly in the hands of the government. The
government is seen to take a paternal role within the community.
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“…we cannot do anything because there is a government responsibility
so sometimes we collaborate or take action with the local government staff
who has the authorization in this community…..When problems happen
we just discuss with each other but we can do anything because it is
government responsibility not ours. We just have solidarity in prayer
together.”
Source: CPAMTLDEBPBC232
“I think it is the government that overcomes problems to help the
community … It’s the government’s responsibility to get feedback from the
community ...”
Source: CPAMTLDFSBSV041
The way decision making occurs within the financial cooperative is predominately
through group discussion and consultation (Figure 50). Many of the financial
cooperatives within this study were government bonded institutions and so many of the
surveyed members worked within the government.
Figure 50 Networks - Responsibility and Ownership - Decision Making – Timor Leste
The Cambodian respondents place the responsibility of their financial cooperative firmly
in the hands of the community.  The community in a Cambodian context also includes
strong local leadership, that is, people from their community that provide leadership and
someone for the group to follow (Figure 51).  Given the structure of communities in
Cambodia with Village Chiefs and Commune Governors at a local level it is unsurprising
that leadership, while being hierarchical, is also seen as part of the community.  The
power elite in this context are seen as a resource to the community and therefore the
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community has some sense of ownership of their leadership.  The leadership is therefore
able to represent their interests as they are of the same community and accountable from
a personal relationship perspective.
“I think our financial cooperative is stable because I have never seen any
conflict or problems because the leaders and members are honest, lovely,
and cooperated with each other and they have good responsibility. From
the start of our financial cooperative, the members have been increasing.”
Source: OPICKPKSPMSV184
Figure 51 Networks - Responsibility and Ownership - Decision Making – Cambodia
The responsibility is firmly positioned within the hands of the leader in the Solomon Island
financial cooperatives (Figure 52).  The leader speaks with elected authority on behalf of
the community.  While the membership may understand their role, responsibilities and
their ownership of their financial institution, the final decision making is without question
abrogated to the leader.  The social relationship between the leader and the community
inform the broader cultural interaction (Kent 1973; Oliver 1955).  The members of the
financial cooperative look to their leaders to take control as they understand that the
leader will look after them in more ways than institutional governance.
“In this case, the leader should be well known, he was fashion by the word
of god, must have a good and fair responsibility towards members and
transparency to all the members.”
Source: OPISIGSCSHCHM283
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Figure 52 Networks - Responsibility and Ownership - Decision Making – Solomon Islands
Collective Action
Collective action manifests itself in many forms within a community, some are formal or
structured and others are informal or ad hoc.  It is within the site of collective action that
relationships and trust can develop.  In the following paragraphs I will outline the forms
of collective action surveyed at the research sites and discuss the comparative impacts.
I will also examine the frequency of the collective action and gauge the comparative
outcomes and success and look at how the community articulates its desire to engage in
collective action.
For the purposes of this research collective action has been categorized into four key
areas, 1. Political collective action, 2. Influencing collective action, 3. Localized collective
action and 4. Charitable or welfare based collective action (Figure 53). These categories
were chosen on the basis of the features and traits that are highlighted within the data.
The political component of a community’s collective action demonstrates their cognitive
and structural capacity to seek empowerment.  The capacity to undertake influencing
collective action demonstrates the community’s networks and their bonding and bridging
capacities.  The localized collective action provides a view into the community’s sense of
autonomy and control. The charitable or welfare forms of collective action are an
indication of the cognitive forms of reciprocity and structural forms of mutual aid within
the community. The act of collective action can be undertaken as a group or individually
in the form of a role within a groups’ broader collective action activities.
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Figure 53 Forms of Collective Action
All countries enjoyed high levels of participation in formal structured political activities
however the level of engagement significantly dropped for informal activities.  Other data
presented previously speaks to why the Cambodian respondents are reluctant to
participate in political activities outside those sanctioned by the state.  There is indication
of a higher level of informal engagement in the political space by Solomon Island
respondents but as stated previously this may be due to the system of patronage. In all
survey locations the practices of influencing is firmly positioned locally. While the
respondents undertake localized activities of talking to people in their area about issues
they appear to have less appetite for reaching out with the exception of the Solomon
Islands.  The bridging and bonding between organisations and individuals outside of the
immediate community is limited in Timor Leste and Cambodia.  There is a high level of
localized collective action in Cambodia as long as it doesn’t involve the authorities. The
Solomon Island respondents engaged in localized collective action both within the
community and with authorities.  The charitable/welfare collective action was particularly
high in Cambodia and Timor Leste, especially around giving donations.  This may be due
to the central role that religion plays in everyday life in each of these countries. While
each group of respondents indicated some level of voluntary engagement it was highest
in Timor Leste.  It is perhaps important to note that the respondents did not see their
voluntary participation in their financial cooperative as charitable nor framed from a
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welfare perspective regardless of the social outcomes and the community benefits that
they were able to articulate that flowed from the institution.
Figure 54 Requests to Participate in Collective Action
The requests to participate in collective action (Figure 54) broadly mirrors proportionally
the forms of collective action being undertaken by the surveyed communities with the
exception of two areas of political collective action in Cambodia and Solomon Islands
where the request to actively participate in election campaigns and demonstrations was
greater than actual participation.  The reluctance to participate from the Cambodian
perspective may stem from their preference to only engage in the formal structured
political obligations.
Having discussed the type and opportunity of engaging in collective action the frequency
of collective action (Figure 55) speaks to the close bonds of the community and the
manner in which they address both positive and negative issues within their community.
The frequency will assist in understanding the positioning of action, either mainly in the
individual or in the collective community.  The frequency can also be viewed in terms of
level of the connectedness of the community.  It contributes to our understanding of trust
and cooperation and may speak to the strength of cooperation within the financial
cooperative.
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Figure 55 Frequency of Collective Action
Timor Leste has the lowest frequency of collective action with Cambodia indicating high
levels.  This is perhaps reflective of the lower levels of opportunity to participate as
outlined above in Figure 55.  Opportunities for participation give rise to openings to
generate social capital through mutual aid and reciprocity as well as build trust.  The
frequency is one of the variables that will assist the community to build the strong
relationships.
The frequency of collective action may be affected by historical success (Table 19).  If
previous attempts with collective action have failed there may be reluctance to undertake
further attempts or the community members may become more tactical in any future
approaches.
Table 19 Success of Collective Action
Respondents indicated high levels of success and relatively low levels of failure. If we
overlay this success with the sites of interaction we see that the political aspects of
interaction were formal locations with other informal locations of collective action located
in a localized context.  Additionally other areas of collective action did not rely on external
factors (those outside of the community) for success.  That is, the charitable/welfare
aspects of collective action were successful due to their own endeavours.  The
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respondents across the three locations tended to engage from a very tactical position
and to only seek out external collective activity that was either formally or informally
structured which was localized.
Participation
I have discussed participation from an institutional perspective in previous chapters and
I have discussed participation from the view of governance in this chapter.  I want to now
view participation from the perspective of networks in relation to the development of the
financial cooperative.  That is, what type of participation, who is involved and how is the
participation manifesting itself?  The dimensions to this network participation have been
adapted from John Cohen and Uphoff (2011) basic participation framework.
The network participation is viewed through the groups that the communities participate
in and the personal connections of members outside of the financial cooperative.  This
bridging social capital is useful to not only the individual but also the institution.  The
interconnection of organisations and individuals can bring tangible benefits that enhance
the social capital of the community, individual and institution.  For example, the
Cambodian data indicates a reluctance of the membership to be close to government
officials however the Timorese financial cooperatives have no hesitation in working
closely with their government.  This has brought recognition of the financial cooperative
movement in Timor Leste which is much smaller than that in Cambodia.  It has also
brought resources both financial and technical to the institutions along with increased
reputation and prestige of the financial cooperatives because of this political association.
This has in turn facilitated greater trust within the community which has led to greater
membership with existing members increasing their savings in the institutions.  The
connections of the committee in Timor Leste to their government and the development
of a relationship has generated social capital both inside the institution as well as between
the government and the institution as well as the institution and the community.  The
relationship in this situation has generated and expended social capital between different
networks of people and institutions.
From this perspective the three research sites based on the data sit in different locations
in relation to their participation in networks (Figure 56).  The broader the scope of
networks the broader the development of social capital.
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Figure 56 Network Participation
The Timorese financial cooperatives have a greater reach of network activity. The
regional and international networks are linked to the board of the federation of financial
cooperatives who have reached out through their government relationships to the
Portuguese government.  Both the Timorese and Solomon Island financial cooperatives
belong to the regional cooperative body, the Oceania Confederation of Credit Union
Leagues (OCCUL) with the Timorese financial cooperatives engaged with the World
Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU).  The Cambodian financial cooperatives at the time
of writing belong to a province based federation although some were looking at joining a
national federation at the time the research was being conducted.
Influence
Networks of associates and colleagues are only a resource if the individual or institution
has influence within those networks. Relationships are variable and the dimensions are,
‘ecological, in terms of the space and time they occupy; social structural, in terms of the
interpersonal networks and institutional density within them; and symbolic/cultural, in
terms of the extent to which they confer a common identity and culture’ (Taylor 2010:
237).
Influence was exercised differently in each of the research locations.  The Solomon Island
data indicated respondents exercised their influence with both formal authorities and
external organisations as well as personal networks and groups.  Cambodian
respondents tended to only use personal networks and contacts and looked to their
Village and Commune Chief to use their influence with higher authorities.  This correlates
to the Cambodian respondents’ cognitive economic leanings whereby they see their
personal economic success tied to those closest to them.  Similarly both the Solomon
Island and Timor Leste respondents are heavily reliant upon their government and
elected institutional officials to address their economic and community needs.
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Bridging and Bonding
Bridging and bonding within a social capital context can be discussed as a resource and
also as conceptualized in networks. Bonding is the relationships or networks between
similar persons, those that have similar demographic characteristics, whereas bridging
are the linkages across levels of hierarchy and positions of power (Kim et al. 2006: 116).
Bridging is thought to benefit communities as it links them to others that may not be of
the same class, education, or even ideology (McKenzie 2009; Putnam 2000) although
this is seen to be a horizontal connection.  Bridging social capital is seen as being a weak
tie due to the lack of similarity whereas bonding social capital is understood as being a
strong tie due to the close relationships, sense of belonging and ownership that is
inherent in this form of capital (Brandtzaeg et al. 2010). While there are difficulties in
generating bridging social capital across religions and cultural divides and state ‘that
bridging social capital is much easier to build when we are dealing with agents with similar
cultural and religious backgrounds …[but] becomes increasingly difficult as the number
of common norms decline’ (Svendsen and Svendsen 2004: 3). While there is debate as
to the accuracy of using a bridging and bonding typology (McKenzie 2009; Middleton et
al. 2005) for the purposes of this research it is useful to understand the strength of the
linkages both inside and outside of the financial cooperative.
Bridging and Bonding as a resource of financial cooperatives occurs through the linkages
the sector has created through its federated worldwide system.  That is, while local
financial cooperatives may be federated in a type of a formal or informal association to
other financial cooperatives within their region, they also may be federated through
regional bodies to a national body which in turn is federated to either a regional body i.e.
Asian or Pacific confederation which is then federated to the world body for financial
cooperatives.  This then serves to disseminate the philosophy and fellowship and a sense
of cooperation amongst cooperatives (Table 1).  The relationships that flow from these
associations leverage both Bridging and Bonding Social Capital for individuals,
institutions and the communities.
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Figure 57 Type of Organisation and Level of Participation – Cambodia, Timor Leste, Solomon
Islands
Cambodia
Timor Leste
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Solomon Islands
The data indicates that there is a strong variance of the type of bridging social capital
across the three research sites (Figure 57).  The Cambodian respondents are very active
in organisations that affect their daily economic existence but actively resist engaging
and developing political links. The Timorese and Solomon Islander respondents seek
out civic opportunities to link with other organisations.  Both of these positions ultimately
have an effect on the financial cooperative and its access to networks and other
resources.  Being politically linked has brought financial resources to the Timorese
financial cooperatives which can be seen as positive however conversely the political
links also have seen the financial cooperatives agenda being hijacked to fit with the
governments agenda, particularly in terms of the government’s country wide financial
inclusion development strategies (UNDP 2007).  Similarly the Cambodian financial
cooperatives, due to their lack of political bridging social capital, have seen them being
unregulated and ignored by the government.  At the initial stages being unregulated has
allowed the financial cooperative thrive and grow.  While this is positive during the early
stages of financial cooperative development it is more perilous as the institution matures
due to the inherent risks of asset size that growth brings.
Low and high levels of bridging social capital has both positive and negative effects on
the institution depending upon the objectives of the organisation. Having low levels of
bonding in a financial cooperative can only be viewed as negative as this will inhibit the
development of social capital if opportunities for reciprocity and mutual aid along with
ways to cooperate and build trust and solidarity are not available.
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The Cambodian research locations had reasonably high levels of bridging social capital
albeit with some gaps however their levels of bonding social capital is declining.  This
may be due to the growth in membership of many of the financial cooperatives where
many of the members of one institution may be now from different villages and therefore
not known to each other.
Similarly the Solomon Islands respondents also have lower levels of both bonding and
bridging social capital which may be due to the very slow development of the institutions.
The weak ties within bonding social capital is due to a lack of capacity of the leadership
to develop opportunities for the members to build norms and ways of behavior within the
institution.  There are no mutual aid activities nor are there opportunities for them to
participate and undertake forms of collective action to address this situation.  The bridging
social capital is also weak but is due to slow institutional development where the financial
cooperative is not at the stage of being able reach out nor has the membership
opportunities to assist in this process.
The Timorese financial cooperatives have the highest levels of both bonding and bridging
social capital.  They have not grown their membership dramatically so the membership
have strong social ties.  The leadership in most cases is purposeful and seeks linkages
with organisations outside of their immediate membership.
7.4.8 Norms
Norms are a central component of social capital as the shared norms or values that
promote social cooperation for common ends and are founded in social relationships
(Fukuyama 2002). ‘the development of shared norms and values [are] based on
cooperation, trust, reciprocity, and obligation’ (Ville 2005: 185-86). Defining and
identifying norms has assisted in the development of the concept of social capital ‘as the
networks and norms that facilitate collective action has worked its way into the market
place of economic ideas’ (Isham et al. 2002: 4). Social capital is not formulaic and is
generated from accepted norms and values and ‘frequently originates in phenomena like
religion, shared historical experience, and other deeply embedded cultural traditions’
(Fukuyama 2002: 32).
Social capital can also be used as a tool to look at how social networks and norms of
reciprocity change. Governance is also impacted by shared norms of trust and
reciprocity. The impact can be negative such as those with exclusionary practices or
positive in the case of access to financial services. The shared norms can be founded
on cultural practice as is the case with the Solomon Island respondents where there are
both benefits and drawbacks in terms of the social obligations that impact on the
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governance of their institutions. Social capital in this case is not automatically conducive
to democratic governance (Putnam 2002) because of the social obligations inherent in
cultural systems. The social obligations can also be exclusionary in their practice
especially for those that do not belong to the dominate group.  ‘Social capital might be
most prevalent among groups of people who are already advantaged, thereby widening
political and economic inequalities between those groups and others who are poor in
social capital’ (Putnam 2002: 9).
The production of norms and the creation of sanctions also emerge from the activity
within the defined network.  The structure of closed social networks is used to effect
action, that is, to provide a framework to enable sanctions and provide norms and values
by which people’s actions occur.  Within this environment there is a structure of trust that
can be used to imply obligations and create expectations (Coleman 1988). ‘the kinds of
social structures which make possible social norms and the sanctions to enforce them
do not benefit primarily the persons whose efforts are necessary to bring the norms and
sanctions into existence, but all those who are part of the particular structure’ (Coleman
1990b: 316).
The data indicates that the financial cooperatives in Timor Leste were not willing to
impose sanctions but were willing to talk about sanctions and punishment but their
discourse was always framed around forgiveness whereas Cambodia being consensus
driven and communal were perhaps not willing to confront each other. Solomon Islands
was not interested in discussing sanctions, as the concept of repayment was often linked
to ability rather than the rules.  The sanctions in some of the financial cooperatives was
based on not being able to access savings or access further loans if previous loans were
not repaid.  In the case of the Solomon Island financial cooperatives it often was based
on relationships.
“Members know their obligation to make regular compulsory savings prior
to borrowing money from the cooperative. Members also need to deposit
based on the repayment schedule with the interest that the cooperative
has decided. Members follow the regulation sensibly. When a problem
occurs in regard to the loans the leaders would arrange a mediation to
resolve the problem therefore there is no sanction that needs to be given,
as leaders understand that sometimes members haven’t got money to
repay the loans.”
Source: OPITLDKUKBC166
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“All members are familiar with the internal regulation of the credit union.
In this process we all decide, it is not the responsibility of only one person
but all members come together to make the decision. The type of sanction
that is given depends on the discussion.”
Source: OPITLDTFAHM268
“If we have some members that do not repay their loan in the right amount
of time the cooperative will give a sanction like confiscate their things. So
far a sanction like this has never happened because the members know
their responsibility to repay their loans within a determined time. If they
are late to repay for 1 or 2 days we will do mediation with them and ask
why they repay late then we may have tolerance depending upon their
situation.”
Source: OPITLMNLM459
‘A prescriptive norm that constitutes an especially important form of social capital within
a collectivity is the norm that one should forgo self-interests to act in the interests of the
collectivity’ (Coleman 1990b: 311).  This type of norm is encouraged and strengthened
by the social recognition and the status and associated rewards and honor the
participation brings.  It is this type of social capital which young nations are built upon
and the type from which families are strengthened and assists in the development of
‘nascent social movements from a small group of dedicated, inward-looking, and mutually
rewarding persons, and in general leads persons to work for the public good’ (Coleman
1990b: 311).  These norms are internalized and other times they are supported by
external recognition for the selfless nature of the acts.
“As a society we have always lived a collective life, but there are others
who do not care about each other. …, so we need awareness of how one’s
life in society should be of mutual help, not to sit and laugh at the problem
of suffering, and I want to say again that all problems can be resolved but
they cannot be resolved by fighting.”
Source: CPAMTLDFSBBC040
“.Before Lanamona most of us joined the "Moris Rasik" but the payment
needs to be made every week on the loan.  The mission of that
organisation is to help women and widows but they cannot comply with
the system because sometimes they are late with their payments and
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Moris Rasik sometimes confiscate our goods. With this fact we shared
with Mrs. Domingas so we established this cooperative. The
establishment of the first group in Maliana with the group name "Fo Liman"
with a total of 25 people with the amount of funds of $250.00…..  This
group continues to grow until 2008 and the funds collected is increasing
therefore there is the initiative of Mrs. Domingas and both Economic and
Development Ministers to form a credit union.  We developed the
paperwork of cooperative governance and we were given three days to
prepare the establishment of cooperative training for the groups
mentioned. On 19 July 2008 the groups join the cooperative under the
name "cooperative Lanamona" the office was inaugurated by the Minister
of Economy and Development with a ribbon cutting ceremony. ….The
number of total members of the cooperative since the founding has
increased to 636 members by the end of July 2011 with the amount of
US$72,784.00 in assets.”
Source: CPAMTLMLOM427
So while this form of social capital facilitates action, it, like other forms of social capital,
can also constrain action.  When examined from a cultural perspective, the norms
contained within the village system in Cambodia prevent the volunteers from embezzling
funds from the financial cooperatives.  The norms within the social networks contained
in the organisations provide the staff and management ways of behaviour that constrain
negative consequences.   Similarly the Solomon Islands social networks have inherent
ways of behaviour that see negative externalities arise from the norms, which see loans
not given on merit but on kinship or along clan lines.  The personal relationships and
networks of the Solomon Island financial cooperatives demonstrate the ‘embeddedness
of economic transactions in social relations’ (Coleman 1990b: 302).
This is the location where trust is generated and where norms are developed, established
and enforced. While norms are established to reduce the externalities which benefit
those who establish them they can be affected by individuals within the group.  That is,
while one actor does not necessarily have control over the norms they can be affected
by another’s actions.  It is within the integrity of the structures capacity to maintain and
sustain the norms where the risk lies by individual actor’s actions.
The destruction of social capital also needs to be considered in context to norms.  This
often happens usually through certain events and processes in financial cooperatives.
What I have called the embezzlement of social capital (Mason 2010) through the merging
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of financial cooperatives and through the expansion and growth of membership with the
resulting distillation of “community ownership”.  Within this process there is a destruction
of those frequent links where shared values and norms are created and a much reduced
ability to participate in activities of reciprocity sees a degradation of trust within those
institutions and their membership.  The members are essentially sidelined from the
operation of the business and then lack the forum and opportunity to develop and build
relationships and common ideas and values around that interaction, that of norms.
People who live, work, and socialise together form very strong bonds.  Bonds that
produce shared visions of problems and solutions, facilitate the development of trust, and
instill generalised reciprocity norms (Jarley 2005). ‘Generalised reciprocity norms help
to improve the durability of social capital, making it less vulnerable to erosion through
[the] exit of any single individual from the network’ (Jarley 2005: 4).
Equality
In this section I wish to look at a number of key influences on issues of equity.  The first
being that of institutional inequity and the perhaps unintended consequences of financial
cooperative development.  I will also examine the level of gender inequality and access
to financial cooperatives by the poor. As Habib (2008: 291) has argued, there is ‘a
complex interrelationship between poverty, social exclusion and human development’
where members of microfinance institutions are in better economic shape that those that
are excluded and ‘are found to have better social links and better representation in social
and political processes…’
“In principle, we don’t have any discrimination against members or other
organisations as everyone is equal. At the meeting we are honest with
each other, to put the credit union interest above all else.  We also are
sympathetic to each other by helping each other to contribute to the credit
union based on the plan.”
Source: OPITLBFNCM316
‘Networks and associations can lead to social exclusion’ (Streeten 2002: 45). ‘Tight
group consciousness and solidarity can be and often are accompanied by hostility to or
exclusion of other groups.  Even in associations that are not aiming at exclusion, the fact
that they are ethnically or economically homogeneous can reinforce social stratification
and inequality’ (Streeten 2002: 45). The levels of directly experienced exclusion where
highest in Timor Leste for many services such as education, health services, housing,
employment, transportation, sanitations and water distribution.  There was however high
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levels of access in justice and conflict resolution. The reasons for exclusion were stated
as being income, occupation and lack of education. The Cambodian experience was that
of high levels of access throughout all areas of services and although there was only
medium levels of exclusion experienced by the Solomon Island respondents they
indicated that the main reasons for exclusion were income and occupation.
While the respondents in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands experienced some
degree of exclusion there were acts of exclusion through many of the financial
cooperatives contained within this research.  Both members and non-members were
included in the survey.  Many of the financial cooperatives in Timor Leste and the
Solomon Islands were industrially bonded34 which excluded people that were outside the
bond of the institution, that is, the Melanesian Crusaders in Honiara only allowed the
Anglican staff of their church to be members, the SIPEU Credit Union which is a
government bonded financial cooperative only allows the staff of government
departments to become members.   Some geographically bonded financial cooperatives
often put barriers in the way of membership to limit it for reasons of control, or due to
limited resources to service the needs of a bigger membership. Non-members in some
research locations indicated a sense of exclusion from the financial cooperative.
“I see the Village Chief having a meeting with the financial cooperative
members. I never join the meeting because I am not a member and no
one me invites to join.”
Source: OPICBBOSOVNMN042
“I am afraid to join it because I feel that they will not allow me to join
because I do not have enough money to save.”
Source: OPICKPCYBVNMN096
“Some other people are not able to join the cooperative because of the
lack of the information and I am not able to join as a member of the
34 Industrial bonds are outlined in the constitution or bylaws of the institution and restrict the membership as
defined.
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cooperative because I don’t have the capacity or understanding about the
cooperative.”
Source: OPITLDEBPNMN227
While financial cooperatives espouse the principles of open and voluntary membership
the reality is often very different.  There is a tension in the practices and the performance
of financial cooperatives to generate social capital in terms of outcomes of homogeneity
or heterogeneity with the outcomes different for the generation of social capital within a
bound group and the social capital outside that group but within the community.
Exclusion and the inequality that emerges from this can both generate and destroy social
capital (Arneil 2006): generate it within the institution between socially connected groups
but destroy it within the community in which the financial cooperative is located through
exclusionary tactics.
“Some people who live around this place are poor, whenever they need
power and water, we provide it to them. Education is another area.
Children that are not part of our church community are welcomed to attend
our school, join the soccer team and make friends with our children.
Therefore, I do think that we have touched and influenced the lives of
people in the community and lessened many crimes and improved the
attitude of youth in the area, so we do have equal access to community
services.”
Source: CPAMSIGDHEHM462
Having a more inward focus and examining the practices within the financial cooperative
in terms of equality of voice and participation we find that there is vast gender inequality
across the three sites of research particularly at a governance and management level
with low numbers of women in leadership roles within the institutions.  Additionally there
was low institutional participation at a governance and management level of women in
all research sites although there was some reporting that there was a growth of
participation.  The membership in Cambodia of financial cooperatives has higher levels
of women whereas those in the Solomon Islands due to many of the institutions bonded
waged membership had higher number of males with Timor Leste having greater gender
balance.  The gendered inequality across the research sites is due to structural
influences.  Structural influences of the financial cooperatives that are dominated by male
waged employees, by male government staff, essentially labour market structures that
are inherently gender biased.  These biases are culturally performed and evident
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throughout the society whereby men are given preference over women for certain
positions ensuring the financial cooperatives are reflective of these imbalances.
While there are influences of power relationships through all levels of society it is perhaps
felt most keenly in relation to the resulting inequality by the poor in developing states.
The data across all research sites indicated that there was a reasonable level of
participation by the poor with respondents noting an increase in the level of participation,
however the respondents indicated high levels of exclusion based on the level of income
with Timor Leste respondents indicated that the social status was also a contributing
factor of exclusion.  With many of the financial cooperatives initiated by international
NGOS in Cambodia and the Solomon Islands the institutions were structured to contain
strategies to include the poor as a main membership constituent.  Many of the rural
Timorese credit unions were also set up to meet the needs of the poor and excluded in
those communities.
“They save their money in the cooperative, because cooperative is for the
poor people not for rich people, so the poor people can help each other,
because the poor people cannot access microfinance. This is for poor
people to participate and save money for the future. The cooperative has
principles of no discrimination, all of people can join this cooperative…”
Source: CPAMTLDDAMSV137
In should also be noted that the elite within the communities surveyed did not participate
in great numbers in the financial cooperatives.  While the survey did not seek answers
as to the reasons, it may be that they preferred to access financial services from the
formal financial sector however it cannot be discounted that there is a level of exclusion
to the elite within the community and it is important to note that inequality in relation to
access and exclusion can occur at all levels of society.
Rent Seeking, Patron Client Linkages, Opportunistic Behaviour, Corruption, Nepotism
I briefly discussed the system of patronage within a governance context in Cambodia and
the Solomon Islands in sections above.  In the following paragraphs I would like to explore
the linkages with the dataset and the possible impacts and outcomes that these types of
social relationships and the resulting environmental conditions may have on the financial
cooperatives and the communities in which they are located.
In the first instance it is worth reflecting upon Chambers (2010) model of Adaptive
Pluralism and the mindset that emanate from the environments within which this study is
based.  The personal relationships, the ambiguity of values and principles, uncertainty in
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the ontological assumptions and the iterative adaption of methods, procedures and
processes.  It is here that we find room for actors to open up a space that maximizes
available opportunities to meet their needs.  To meet their material needs, their social
status needs, to have their power recognized and respected, to forge connections with
those hierarchically above them to open further opportunities.
The practice of rent seeking or patron client relationships exist in all of the countries within
this research, in different forms and in differing degrees.  The implications and the
impacts also vary in each location but as a principle the structure of financial cooperatives
and the resulting social capital generation regardless of the level in some way
ameliorates some of the opportunities and helps narrow the space available in which
these practices can either take root and/or grow.  Social capital can also reduce
monitoring and transaction costs (Birchall 2013b) through quasi-voluntary compliance,
monitoring and sanctioning by peers (François 2002).  A lateral control regime spreads
the control costs amongst members as common third parties limit opportunistic behavior
and enforce obligations between partners (Huppi and Feder 1990).  The likelihood of
corruption and opportunism decreases as social relations among members are the key
to mutual adjustment as social cohesion reduces rent seeking (François 2002). Close
knit communities with forms of mutual support and regular interaction encourage
cooperative behaviour and guard against opportunism through informal monitoring
(François 2002).
While these are the positive benefits of a model that has broad ownership and control
there is also opportunities for rent seeking anywhere the state is active in society (Spector
2012). ‘Equality and honesty in government stand at the beginning of our causal chain.
Both are necessary to create trust and the universalistic social policies that lead to a
greater level of equality and social cohesion’ (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 44). It is at
this intersection that we need to look at the implications for the financial cooperatives,
given that they are founded on trust.  There are implications for the integrity of the
institution if the governance structure within which everyone lives their lives suffers from
corruption or nepotism. ‘Corruption feeds upon economic inequality, low trust, and poor
government performance’ (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005: 71). If trust is damaged within
the broader society there are impacts for the financial cooperative whose very existence
is premised on trust.
Hierarchal cultures cannot develop trust in their societies and tthe social order which has
existed for generations has definite class divisions that make it difficult for trust to
materialize (Seligman 1997).  Societies which are organised around circumstances of
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birth limit peoples’ ability to cross those thresholds, ‘cleavages point to the
embeddedness of trust’ (Fennema and Tillie 2008: 353).  Within these stratified societies
trust cannot be generated as people see others with unfair advantage in terms of the
economic resources (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). As previously stated, other factors
that affect this include those societies that have recent memory of civil war will be low on
levels of trust, societies that come from protestant background tend to have much higher
levels of trust. (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005).
In varying degrees and forms all of the research site respondents live with and within a
system of patronage, corruption, nepotism, and rent seeking. The Cambodian
respondents make informal payments to teachers to allow their children to attend school.
When interacting with the Cambodian bureaucracy they are required to pay middle men
to “get and fill out forms” and “take it to the right person” and therefore pay a fee for the
service.  The financial cooperative is required to file business operation reports with the
district government.  These processes are often smoothed over by the facilitation of the
commune officials and the payment of a small “administration fee”.  At each step there
are “fees”, and middle men “costs” to be paid.  The Solomon Islands works differently
and certainly some of the payments that are made are based on relationships and are
seen as a cultural obligation rather than a form of corruption. When this is considered in
context to the Adaptive Pluralism framework we are reminded of the ambiguity of the
values and principles and especially the personal relationships within the orientation of
the mindset.
The financial cooperative, due to the nature of the institutions operational requirements,
needs to live within Chambers (2010) binary opposite of the Adaptive Pluralism, that of a
Neo Newtonian practice where there is order, a linear predictability, clarity and
measurement which this provides. While this is the optimal environment in which a
financial cooperative may thrive and survive, the reality must be acknowledged where
the institutions within this research actually live, which is somewhere in-between.  The
environment of patronage in Cambodia and Solomon Islands are a reality that the
institutions need to navigate through, sometime offering resistance and asserting their
agency and at other times complying and at other times in the case of Timor Leste
capitalizing on the system for the members benefits in the case of offers of government
funding.
Government interference and political patronage are not necessarily unidirectional.
Often financial cooperatives seek out the financial support of government that make them
operationally reliant.  The government almost purchases the social capital that has been
243
generated through the financial cooperative through its financial support. And while the
government has a role in economic matters at a macro level, often when they seek to
become engaged at a micro level this is usually for electoral purposes rather than
economic development.  The Timorese government has recognized the political value of
the financial cooperatives and seeks to maintain forms of control and influence through
the National Directorate of Cooperatives.  The cooperative sector ideologically fits with
the Timorese narrative of national identity and independence where solidarity forms part
of their history through the violent struggles.  It also allows the government to be seen at
a localized level as the benefactor of financial aid to communities albeit through the
cooperative framework.  Conversely the Cambodian government does not interact at a
political level with the financial cooperative movement.
7.4.9 Consequences
The consequences or outcomes are the concrete and abstract results of the social capital
that has been generated.  When the eight main areas are synthesized for each of the
research sites there are some key matters that are evident that affect both the institutions
and the communities and affect the social capital in each of the research locations. The
consequences or outputs are reflexive and feed back into the Community, Institution and
the Individual.  And while the process is perpetual, the influences and effects are varied
at different points of time and at different stages of the development of the financial
cooperative.  The perpetual and reflexive effect may also change the source and level of
social capital that is generated.  The social capital may be generated in different locations
and in varying amounts dependent upon the outcomes that are feeding back into the
framework.  For example if the financial cooperative leadership mechanism which is
informed through a cultural understanding of the role of leadership is producing benefits
for the financial cooperative and therefore for individual members, the institution will
continue to perpetuate the same form of leadership, and the members will continue to
support the way it functions.  The endorsement generates trust at both an institutional,
individual and community level perpetuating the behaviours and the strengthening of
bonds between the members, community and the institution which in turn assists in the
generation of social capital.  While this is a simplified example, the complexity lies in the
way this leadership then informs the norms and governance of the institution and may
inform the participation, either through increased membership due to the increased social
capital (and tangible individual benefits) or it may lessen participation as the members
have an understanding that the institution is in good hands and does not need its active
oversight.  The consequences can be both good and bad, positive outcomes can create
social capital or deplete social capital.  Conversely negative consequences flowing from
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this Social Capital Development Framework may induce positive outcomes through
actions of solidarity or behaviours of collective action to therefore increase social capital.
Consequences, either positive or negative can create or deplete social capital which then
transition into either positive or negative behaviours that feed back into the Social Capital
Development Framework which then at points of intersection modify or enforce the
constituent elements.  And so the cycle continues.  It must also be noted that the Social
Capital Development Framework is not self-perpetuating in the sense that it is isolated
from outside influences such as government or economic conditions etc. External
influences also have an effect on the constituent elements of the Social Capital
Framework and also feed into and affect the consequences and the resulting behaviours
that result from this process.
7.5 The Lifecycle of a Financial Cooperative
I have used the phrase lifecycle as it accurately articulates the journey that a financial
cooperative faces during its life.  Similar to a human lifecycle there are periods of growth
and development, periods of vitality, periods of maturation, periods of stagnation and a
time of death. In an earlier chapter I used the conceptual metaphor of the body to
demonstrate the vital parts of the Social Capital Schematic to demonstrate their function
and their connection with other parts of the schematic. It is fitting then that we frame the
concluding discussions in the broader context of the cycle of life.
The lifecycle approach helps to identify where on the scale the institutions are and what
the future may potentially hold for them.  Due to the narrow focus of this thesis I can only
present a consolidated view of the lifecycle in each research country, perhaps further
papers can be written utilizing the same data set that can further fragment and identify
where either individual financial cooperatives sit on the scale or alternatively where
groups of financial cooperatives sit according to their province or district.
In this thesis I have not endeavoured to develop any grand theories around the concept
of a financial cooperative lifecycle simply some tools to understand the research sites.
Perhaps the development of a theory around this could be elaborated with more
research, especially given the decline that the Australian credit unions (Mason 2010) are
currently experiencing.  It may be useful to develop a grand theory as a way of positioning
the institutions and explaining what has happened.  I do however want to differentiate
between the economic and the social components of the lifecycle.  That is, I have used
the word economic to encompass not only the financial aspects of the institution but also
the growth components.
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The financial cooperatives that are contained within this research can be categorized in
three ways.  Those that are emerging and developing or are in their infancy, those that
are perhaps young adults and are socially strong although perhaps not financially
independent and those that are on the road to maturity.
The social and the economic may be positioned differently on the lifecycle continuum for
the institution.  For example the financial cooperative may have strong social bonds, lots
of trust and cooperation and participation and therefore be seen to have high levels of
social capital but at the same time might not be growing and strengthening financially.
Conversely a financial cooperative could have good growth in membership and assets
but at the same time their social capital is dissipating (Mason 2010).
The research data demonstrated that the financial cooperatives in each of the research
locations were clearly in different stages of their lifecycle in terms of their social capital
and institutional development.  The Solomon Islands financial cooperatives were the
oldest in terms of the time they had been in existence however they were the most
immature of the three locations.  They were operationally immature but more importantly
they were immature in terms of their development of social capital.  During the data
collection phase and interviews there was ample evidence as outlined in Chapter Five
that the institutions operationally were suffering from a lack of capacity and technical
skills. This is further confirmed from INGO project monitoring and evaluation reports
(Drummond 2008, 2013).  The data collection confirmed that the social capital within the
Solomon Island research communities was underdeveloped.  While the communities of
the Solomon Islands have a very sophisticated social system (Government of Solomon
Islands 2002b, 2002a; Oliver 1955) and intricate ways the community interacts, it was
evident from the data that the financial cooperative does not necessarily benefit or
leverage off this existing social system as well it might.  There are obvious tensions
between a rational, process driven approach necessary for a financial institution and a
social system that is relationally constructed.  They both follow rules however the local
social system is adaptive and not always lineal in its approach to the environment
whereas operating a financial institution must be rigid in the execution of its operational
processes and procedures and especially its rules and regulations.
The Solomon Island financial cooperatives can be viewed as in their infancy and are on
a (albeit slow) pathway to developing.  This is in direct contrast to the Cambodian
financial cooperatives where they have been in operation the shortest number of years
but have now reached a crossroads of maturity where social capital is on the decline due
to their expansion and growth outside of their immediate communities.  The Cambodian
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financial cooperatives are operationally and financially strong but the social capital
between the community and individuals and the institution is dissipating.  The Timor Leste
financial cooperatives enjoy higher levels of social capital than Cambodia or the Solomon
Islands however they are much weaker operationally and financially.
It would appear from the data that the Cambodian financial cooperatives will continue to
grow and mature both financially and operationally but the social ties which were the
foundation of the institutions when they were established will be weakened and the social
capital which was integral to their initial success will be supplanted by financial capital
and a Neo-Newtonian paradigm (Chambers 2010).  The institutions will most likely
continue but their institutional mission and vision as well as their positioning of members
within the decision making and the operations will change.  The generation of social
capital within the development of the financial cooperative may lessen as the institution
matures however this does not infer that the community is not generating social capital
in other forums and institutions, only that opportunities for this to occur within the financial
cooperative has reduced.
The Solomon Island financial cooperatives have demonstrated that they develop their
social capital and operations at a very slow pace.  It will be some time before the Solomon
Island financial cooperatives reconcile their cultural and social practices to those
necessary to operate a financial cooperative.  It is only then that stocks of social capital
can be developed and utilized for the benefit of the institutions.
The financial cooperatives in Timor Leste face a different set of challenges to those of
Cambodia and the Solomon Islands.  They have the highest levels of social capital of the
three research locations however they are operationally and financially weak.  While their
stocks of social capital are high their ability to institutionally capitalize on it is weak.  This
means that while the members enjoy high levels of reciprocity, participation, cooperation,
trust and solidarity, they have not been able to leverage this to strengthen their
institutions.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter provided a detailed comparative analysis of the structural and cognitive
characteristics of the communities within the research.  Utilising the Social Capital
Schematic results and the Social Capital Development Framework I have compared and
contrasted the similarities and cleavages in the location and creation of social capital.  I
have also provided analysis of where social capital is deteriorating and being destroyed
within the financial cooperatives of the research locations.
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The perceived and real structural differences between each of the research countries’
financial cooperatives further assisted in locating and positioning the generation of social
capital.  By examining the constituent parts of trust, participation, leadership, culture,
reciprocity and networks etc. across the three research locations it confirms the
importance and role of these elements in the production of social capital and the effect
on the institution, the community and individual.
The responsibility for everyday life was positioned differently in the research locations.
The Cambodian data indicated a high level of self-reliance however both Timor Leste
and the Solomon Islands draw heavily on their governments to provide for their needs.
This motif carried through to general decision making and forms of democracy that saw
the Cambodian respondents engaged at all levels of decision making.  The other two
research sites tended to authorize elected leadership to represent their interests in
totality.  Economic success for the Timorese and Solomon Island respondents was firmly
the responsibility of their governments whereas the Cambodian respondents tended to
see their economic success closely linked to their immediate communities. In the
research locations where the positioning of responsibility was away from the immediate
community and family, saw governments and other development partners hijack the
financial cooperatives agenda weakening community agency and voice to satisfy other
needs.
The research data presented unexpected results due to the geographical location,
demographic and economic positioning of the institution. This chapter demonstrated
surprisingly, that there is gendered participation within the financial cooperatives whereby
in some locations the financial cooperative membership is made up of females yet the
governance structures are populated with men.  The chapter discussed the capacity for
financial cooperatives to be exclusionary in nature and the resulting destruction of social
capital which can occur through these practices.  It is also surprising that even though
financial cooperatives are localized institutions the political environment could sometimes
impact on the institutional decision making of the community and, in most cases, affect
the financial cooperative’s willingness to reach out and actively lobby the government on
behalf of their community and institution. Political expression was either enhanced or
constrained depending upon the cognitive and structural experiences of the community
and individuals.
The role of institutional homogeneity in the developmental stages of a financial
cooperative was seen to be beneficial in generating social capital, binding the group
together and building trust however as the institution grew it became more
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heterogeneous in composition which was shown to weaken the social ties between the
membership.  As the institution moves from a homogeneous group so too does the type
of trust.  Developing financial cooperatives enjoy a particularized trust but as the financial
cooperative becomes more heterogeneous in membership the trust moves from being
situated between the individuals to becoming a generalized trust situated between the
member and the institution.
The institution and the community’s ability to generate trust is also affected by corruption
which was shown to have a detrimental effect on the ability to generate social capital.
Corruption was positioned differently for each of the research countries however its
negative effect on the development of social capital was evident especially in relation to
the development of trust, an essential component of social capital.
The role of solidarity featured heavily in the comparative data.  The financial
cooperatives, as an expression of a Solidarity Economy, were in most cases either a form
of self-defense against the market or a remedy for market failure. The structural
economic and institutional benefits of the development of financial cooperatives also
brought a number of cognitive benefits to the communities.  These included behaviours
and understandings of reciprocity as well as opening up multiple locations for actions of
mutual aid and cooperation. The cognitive benefits outlined in this chapter demonstrated
the locations for the generation of social capital, where norms were able to emerge from
the relationships, values and ideas.   The chapter also validated the way in which norms
and ways of behavior assisted in individual self-monitoring to ensure the benefits and
interests of the group were protected over the interests of the individuals within the
membership and leadership roles.
Some forms of cooperation were limited in this research data.  Collective action in the
three countries surveyed was not as evident as would have been expected.  When
examined through the four filters of Political, Influencing, Localized and
Charitable/Welfare, the results indicated résistance for different reasons in each research
location.  While the role of collective action in the communities surveyed was not
substantial, cooperation in within other forms of activity was more prevalent.  The
Cambodian respondents cooperated in networks that had economic benefits while the
Timor Leste and Solomon Island respondents participated in cultural, civic and sporting
associations.  The networks were not always localized, with the Timor Leste financial
cooperatives demonstrating bridging capabilities at both a national, regional and
international level.
Research Contribution
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This research has shown that financial cooperatives can have varying levels of social
capital and yet it not necessarily impact on the economic success of the institution.
Conversely the long term success in meeting the original social goals and the resulting
social capital may be impacted by the institutional growth and economic success.  It is
evident from the data that the institutions struggle to balance the social agenda of the
organisation and therefore have adequate levels of social capital, and the need for
operational and financial sustainability.  Often the economic needs of the institution take
priority over the broader needs of building social capital.  In the initial stages of the
development of the financial cooperative the social development is valued over the
economic development.  Over time as the institution professionalizes the valuing of the
economic over the social begins to occur. It may be argued that the neo-liberal economic
agenda (Fine and Green 2000; Fine 2010) takes priority over the social mission of the
institution.  The findings of this research indicate that social capital can develop unevenly
and be influenced by different factors.  It can develop slowly or alternatively can suffer
atrophy if the institutional conditions are not fitting.  The research has also shown that
the financial cooperative is affected by the social capital of the community within which it
is situated as it is also affected by the social capital within its own membership.
The research has demonstrated the benefits of financial cooperatives and the associated
social capital that they generate and how they can contribute to strengthening not only
the institution but also the community.  The benefits that arise for the individual members
are far in excess of simply having access to financial services.  The individuals develop
forms of interacting with other community members as well as those outside of their
community in a way that enhances and contributes to their everyday life.  It also enhances
their lives in an economic sense through not only having access to financial services but
strong social links to others within the community.  They develop reserves of social capital
that may be called upon in times of need.  The social capital is not just a commodity that
can be exchanged for financial assistance but can be utilized at other times to elicit
informal non-monetary economic help and support.  The financial cooperative may be a
foundation to rally people together to develop stronger social ties that permeate other
areas of their lives.
The focus of this thesis is on the generation of social capital however it should be noted
that this research has identified other more tangible outcomes which occur during this
process.  As both active and passive participants in the development of social capital the
community and individuals develop skills and experience that can affect other aspects of
their lives.  Skills and experience that are transferable such as leadership, collective
action, community mobilization, and technical skills.  While these skills may be possessed
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by individuals and often realized when working collaboratively they can benefit the
community and contribute to further development of community social capital.
Chapter Three provided a cohesive approach to linking the distinct social capital
component theories together to provide a way of examining all of the facets that
contribute to the generation, destruction and expenditure of social capital.  This cohesive
approach took into consideration both the cognitive as well as the structural features of
the individual, community and institutions in the form of financial cooperatives.  It provides
other researchers with a holistic view of a research site in relation to social capital and
additionally it provides a way for financial cooperative development practitioners to look
outside of their usual functionalist and isolationist framework of institution building.
There is also a methodological contribution made by this research through linking the
SOCAT tool to the Social Capital Schematic.  Articulating a research tool such as the
SOCAT into the Social Capital Schematic analytical tool will assist other researchers to
combine individuals, community and institutions to understand the location, and the
contribution of, developing social capital whether that is within individuals, community or
institutions. While this research has focused on financial cooperatives with the
adaptation of some of the SOCAT questionnaires there would be the ability to utilize the
Social Capital Schematic in a range of different community owned institutional settings.
Implications of the Study
This study provides a third way of viewing financial cooperatives.  They no longer need
to be viewed in duality, that of both a social and a financial artefact but as an entity that
encompasses and relies on the interconnectedness and unified nature of both elements.
I have demonstrated that social capital can fuse in varying quantities with the economic
elements of the financial cooperatives but when social capital declines the institution’s
founding social raison d’être weakens.  The study also demonstrates that institutional
development encompassing both the social and the economic develop at different
speeds depending upon the environmental context.
The consequence for financial cooperative development practitioners is that financial
cooperatives cannot be simply just “implemented” they arise from the expressed desires
and vision of the community.  Nor can they be “developed” at a particular pace.  They will
develop only in line with the community’s capacity.  They must operationally and socially
develop in ways that are contextually contingent to fit the needs of both the community
and its cultural landscape of the institution. This will mean that development will be
uneven and subject to failure from time to time as the community navigate their way
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through, and reconcile, the environmental context with the needs of the institution and its
membership.
Further Research
This study has uncovered opportunities for further research.  The first of those being
more research into the variances of social capital in relation to economic development to
understand the relationship between both influences on financial cooperatives.  Further
examination of the lifecycle of the financial cooperatives may uncover indicators and
provide insights into the weighting or importance of those influences.
In Chapter Five I identified that there was a strong sense of solidarity which was in direct
contradiction to the low levels of collective action reported which given the strong social
relationships evident within the communities surveyed, did not align with the expected
results.  Perhaps further work in this area could be undertaken to understand if collective
action is positional, that is, if it is not found in the larger group could collective action be
found in family groups, is collective action contingent on familiar relationships rather than
geographical or groups of common interest?
A significant question that deserves further examination as I unpacked my research data
was whether a social and economic agenda could ever comfortably sit together
indefinitely.  Would one always need to be subservient to the other?  There are many
social enterprises as well as cooperatives that hold within them the tension between
these two competing agendas.  How is a balance achieved, and how does an
organisation or group of people navigate a way of achieving this balance? Is this
culturally or environmentally contingent?   This could be framed in a broader question of
whether a social agenda can sit alongside an economic agenda in this neo-liberal era.
Furthermore, how can financial cooperatives meet the agendas of governments and
multilaterals who have neo-liberal approaches to financial inclusion strategies:  where
the success of those strategies is often measured by number of loans given and assets
of the institution, where little to no value is placed on the social outcomes of the
community and all value is placed on economic efficiencies and scales of economies and
regulation?  This research has demonstrated these influences can be in direct opposition
to the requirements necessary to develop social capital.
Summary
In summary I will provide a recap of the content of each chapter of this thesis.  The first
chapter provided an outline of the purpose of the study and the relationship between
financial cooperatives and social capital and both the parameters and limitations of the
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research.  In Chapter Two I provided a detailed literature review that covered both the
history, structure and philosophy of financial cooperatives as well as their place within
the broader economy.  In this chapter I provided a review of the contested nature of social
capital and the main proponents of the various positions of social capital.  I also sought
to provide a review of the components of social capital and its affects and durability within
institutions, communities and individuals.  The third chapter provided an outline of the
theoretical framework leveraging off the work of a great many theorists to ultimately
provide a framework and schematic that was suitable to analyze the environment of
financial cooperatives from a social capital theoretical perspective.  Chapter Three also
provided an explanation of the survey tool and its implementation in the field as well as
the challenges faced and the strategies and tactics employed to ameliorate the impacts.
Chapters Four, Five and Six each looked at the research findings in Cambodia, Solomon
Islands and Timor Leste respectively.  The data was examined and discussed from three
perspectives: Community, Institution and Individual as well as from a structural and
cognitive view.  A comparative analysis was provided in this chapter along with a
discussion around the consequences of the social capital that has been generated in
each of the countries surveyed.
As the chapters unfolded with the exploration of the data, I found from the research that
I needed to understand the role of social capital in relation to the institutions differently.
I also found it useful to position the financial cooperative within a lifecycle due to the
complexity of influences on the institution.  Positioning the financial cooperative within a
lifecycle helps to view the social capital within a broader environment of both internal and
external influences.  The lifecycle of a financial cooperatives needs to be considered and
evaluated in context to both the social and economic forces which are at the heart of the
institutions.  There is a need to clearly delineate between the social and the economic
and understand how the two different forces work together.  Both forces having a role to
play and definite impact on the institution and its position within the lifecycle.
If financial cooperatives are to realize their full potential, the tension between the
competing forces of the economic and social needs of the institution must to be
reconciled.  This study clearly demonstrates the social capital generation which occurs
both within and outside of the financial cooperative has greater benefits over and above
the basic provision of financial services to a community.  The power of cooperation,
solidarity and mutual aid, the building of trust, and the strengthening of social connections
permeate into other areas of community life and interaction.  The influence of the financial
cooperative to play a role in transforming and empowering communities through the
generation of social capital is evident in this research.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 - Cambodian Social Capital Schematic Data
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Appendix 2 – Solomon Islands Social Capital Schematic Data
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Appendix 3 – Timor Leste Social Capital Schematic Data
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Appendix 4 – Community Questionnaire
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$MMNCP?RGTCQ 
-MA?JQRMPCQ?LBQFMNQ 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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MPAMMNCP?RGTCQ 
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1PGT?RCGLBGTGBS?JQ 
&VNMPR@SQGLCQQCQ 
1?AIGLE@SQGLCQQCQ 
1PMBSACP?QQMAG?RGMLQ 
8?PCFMSQCQMPKGBBJCKCL 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
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 %MRFC?EPGASJRSP?JNPMBSACPQMDRFGQAMKKSLGRWPCACGTCJM?LQMPAPCBGRQDPMKGLBGTGBS?JQMPGLQRGRSRGMLQGL
MRFCPAGRGCQMPPCEGMLQ!
:CQ < = 
/M < = 
 8F?R NCPACLR?EC MD RFC ?EPGASJRSP?J NPMBSACPQ GL RFGQ AMKKSLGRW SQC JM?LQ MP APCBGRQ RM QSNNMPR RFCGP
?ARGTGRGCQ!
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 8F?R ?PC RFC RUM NPGLAGN?J NPM@JCKQ D?AGLE RFC ?EPGASJRSP?J NPMBSACPQ MD RFGQ AMKKSLGRW GL RCPKQ MD
PCACGTGLEJM?LQ?LBAPCBGRQ!
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 *LRFCJ?QRRFPCCWC?PQRFCF?PTCQRQWGCJBQF?TC
*LAPC?QCB < = 
%CAPC?QCB < = 
3CK?GLCBRFCQ?KC < = 
 *LRFCJ?QRRFPCCWC?PQRFCQ?JCQMD?EPGASJRSP?JJGTCQRMAINPMBSARQGLRFGQAMKKSLGRWF?TC
*LAPC?QCB < = 
%CAPC?QCB < = 
3CK?GLCBRFCQ?KC < = 
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 8FGAFMD RFCDMJJMUGLEMPE?LGX?RGMLQCVGQRGLRFGQAMKKSLGRW!
:CQ /M
?$MKKSLGRWBCTCJMNKCLR
AMKKGRRCC < =  < = 
@$MMNCP?RGTC	DGQFGLE
?EPGASJRSPCAP?DRQ
 < =  < = 
A1?PCLRRC?AFCP?QQMAG?RGML < =  < = 
B)C?JRFAMKKGRRCC < =  < = 
C:MSRFEPMSN < =  < = 
D4NMPRQEPMSN < =  < = 
E$SJRSP?JEPMSN < =  < = 
F$GTGAEPMSN < =  < = 
G0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  < = >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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 8FGAFNCPQMLQMPMPE?LGX?RGMLQFCJNMPQSNNMPRRFCQCAMKKSLGRW@?QCBMPE?LGX?RGMLQ!
:CQ /M
?-MA?JEMTCPLKCLR < =  < = 
@/?RGML?JEMTCPLKCLR < =  < = 
A1MJGRGAG?LQ < =  < = 
B3CJGEGMSQMPE?LGX?RGMLQ < =  < = 
C4AFMMJRC?AFCPQ < =  < = 
D/MLEMTCPLKCLR?J
MPE?LGX?RGMLQ < =  < = 
E#SQGLCQQEPMSN < =  < = 
F4CPTGACAJS@ < =  < = 
G1PMQNCPMSQAGRGXCLQ < =  < = 
H5FCAMKKSLGRW?Q?UFMJC < =  < = 
 8F?R@SGJBGLEQBMNCMNJCGLRFGQAMKKSLGRWPCESJ?PJWSQCDMPKCCRGLEQ?LBE?RFCPGLEQ!
:CQ /M
?$MKKSLGRWACLRCP < =  < = 
@1CPQML?JFMKCQ < =  < = 
A)MKCQMDNMJGRGA?JJC?BCPQ < =  < = 
B)MKCQMDMRFCPJMA?JJC?BCPQ < =  < = 
C$FSPAFCQMPPCJGEGMSQ
@SGJBGLEQ < =  < = 
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E(MTCPLKCLR@SGJBGLEQ < =  < = 
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"BSJRQ < = 
0JBCPNCPQMLQ < = 
:MSRF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?LBCJBCPQ
COS?JJW < = 
/MLCN?PRGAGN?RC < = 
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 #WCKNJMWKCLRQR?RSQ
8MPICPQ < = 
6LCKNJMWCBMPLMLUMPICPQ < = 
8MPICPQ?LBLMLUMPICPQ
COS?JJW < = 
/CGRFCPN?PRGAGN?RC < = 
 *LRFCJ?QRRFPCCWC?PQF?QRFCAMKKSLGRWMPE?LGXCBRM?BBPCQQ?LCCBMPNPM@JCK!
:CQ < = 
/M < = 	EMRMOSCQRGML

304
 "PMSLBUF?RGQQSC	Q
BGBRFC AMKKSLGRWMPE?LGXC!
	
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
	
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8?QUCPCRFCGLGRG?RGTC	Q
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:CQ /M 0LEMGLE
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 %M?LWMDRFCDMJJMUGLENPM@JCKQ CVGQRGLRFGQAMKKSLGRW!*DWCQUFMGQRFCKMQR?DDCARCBMP?RPGQIEPMSN
	@W?ECECLBCPCRFLGAEPMSNCRA
!
.MQR?DDCARCB
:CQ /M EPMSN
? #SPEJ?PGCQ < =  < =  >>>>>>>
@ 3M@@CPGCQ < =  < =  >>>>>>>
A "QQ?SJRQ < =  < =  >>>>>>>
B (?LEQ < =  < =  >>>>>>>
C 7?LB?JGQK < =  < =  >>>>>>>
D 7GMJCLRBGQNSRCQ < =  < =  >>>>>>>
E "JAMFMJ?@SQC < =  < =  >>>>>>>
F 4S@QR?LAC	BPSE
?@SQC < =  < =  >>>>>>>
G 5CCLNPCEL?LAW < =  < =  >>>>>>>
H %MKCQRGATGMJCLAC < =  < =  >>>>>>>
I $FGJB?@SQC < =  < =  >>>>>>>
J 1PMQRGRSRGML < =  < =  >>>>>>>
K0RFCPNPM@JCKQ	QNCAGDW
 < =  < =  >>>>>>>
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5GKCRCPKGL?RCB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 1PMTGLACQR?RC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 %GQRPGAR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 4S@BGQRPGAR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 5MULTGJJ?EC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 5WNCMD?PC? 6P@?L < =
3SP?J <=
%GDDGASJR?AACQQ	3CKMRC
 < =
 -MA?RGML (PMSN >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
4GRC >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 "BBPCQQMDQCJCARCBFMSQCFMJB
$MKKSLGRW >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
0RFCPBCR?GJQ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
*LRCPTGCUCP>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>4SNCPTGQMP>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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 5WNCMDFMSQC	=0A3@D/B7=<=<:G

*LBGTGBS?JFMSQC < = 
"N?PRKCLR < = 
3MMKUGRFGL?J?PECPFMSQC < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8F?RAMLQRPSARGMLK?RCPG?JGQSQCBDMPRFCK?HMPGRWMDRFCCVRCPGMPU?JJQMDRFC FMSQCMP@SGJBGLE!
$GLBCP@JMAI@PGAIQRMLC
AMLAPCRCACKCLR < = 
'G@CPEJ?QQ < = 
8MMB < = 
"BM@CU?RRJC?LBB?S@ < = 
$?LCQRP?UQRGAIQ < = 
/MU?JJQ < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8F?RGQRFCAMLQRPSARGMLK?RCPG?JMDKMQRMDRFCPMMDMDRFGQFMSQC!
306
$MLAPCRCACKCLR < = 
5GJCQ < = 
.CR?J	XGLA?JSKGLSKCRA
 < = 
8MMB < = 
4RP?UMPRF?RAF < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8F?RGQRFCAMLQRPSARGMLK?RCPG?JMDKMQRMDRFCDJMMPMDRFGQFMSQC!
$MLAPCRCACKCLR < = 
5GJCQ@PGAIEP?LGRC < = 
8MMB < = 
7GLWJ < = 
&?PRFQ?LB < = 
$?LC < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 )MUK?LWPMMKQ?PCSQCB@WRFGQFMSQCFMJBDMPQJCCNGLEMLJW!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8F?RRWNCMDQ?LGR?PWQCPTGACQBMCQRFGQFMSQCFMJBSQC!
$MLLCARCBRMQCU?ECQWQRCK < = 
$MLLCARCBRMQCNRGAR?LI < = 
-?RPGLC < = 
/MLC < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8F?RGQRFCNPGK?PWQMSPACMDU?RCPDMPRFGQFMSQCFMJB!
1GNCBU?RCPQWQRCK < = 
1PGT?RCUCJJ < = 
1S@JGAUCJJ < = 
0NCLR?NMPD?SACR < = 
3GTCPMPQRPC?K < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 )MUBMCQRFGQFMSQCFMJBBGQNMQCMDKMQRMD GRQE?P@?EC!
1S@JGAE?P@?ECQCPTGAC < = 
1PGT?RCE?P@?ECQCPTGAC < = 
5FPMUGLT?A?LRJMRQ < = 
5FPMUGLPGTCPQRPC?KMAC?L < = 
#SPL?LBMP@SPW < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
 8F?RRWNCMDJGEFRGLEBMCQRFGQFMSQCFMJBSQC!
&JCARPGAGRW	NS@JGAQMSPAC
 < = 
&JCARPGAGRW	NPGT?RCQMSPAC
 < = 
&JCARPGAGRW	AMK@GL?RGMLNS@JGA
?LBNPGT?RC
 < = 
0LJWICPMQCLCE?QA?LBJCQ < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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 5FGQFMKCGQ
0ULCB ?LBAMKNJCRCJWN?GBDMP < = 
0ULCBUGRF?KMPRE?EC < = 
3CLRCB < = 
(GTCLGLCVAF?LECDMPQCPTGACQ < = 
'?KGJWMULCB	ASQRMK?PWJ?LB
 < = 
0RFCP	QNCAGDW
 < =  >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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$%*  !7AB/::B63>3=>:37< B636=CA36=:247@AB/<2B63</A9?C3AB7=<A	B=		
 )636=CA36=:27A2347<32/A/::B63>3=>:3CAC/::G:7D7<5B=53B63@7<B67A2E3::7<5/<2A6/@7<53F>3<A3A	
Number
(Roster
Code)
2.11 List names of all
individuals in household
(List household head
first, use first names only)
Name
2.12What is
"_____"'s
relationship to
household
head?
(use code box)
Code
2.13 Sex
Male........ 1
Female .... 2
2.14 How
old is
“____”
?
Years
2.15 What is “___”’s marital
status?
Married ................. 1
Common-law ........ 2
Divorced ............... 32.17
Widow(er) ............ 42.17
Never married ....... 52.17
2.16 Is “_____”’s
spouse
currently a
member of
the
household?
If  yes, use number
of spouse
If no, write 99
2.17 Occupation
(Use code box)
Code
2.18Currently
employed?
Yes...........1
No............2
2.19 Completed
education level?
(Use code box)
2.20 How long have
you lived in this
community?
Years
01
02 (etc.)
Code box for Question 2.12 Code box for Question 2.17 Code box for
Question 2.19
Head ............................01 Grandchild ........................... 08 Cousin ..................................... 15 Farmer.............. 1 Private sector: Illiterate, no schooling...1
Wife/husband ..............02 Grandparent ......................... 09 Other relative........................... 16 Fisherman......... 2 Unskilled .......6 Literate, no schooling....2
Son/daughter ...............03 Father-in-law/mother-in-law 10 Children from another family.. 17 Trade ................ 3 Skilled............7 Primary incomplete .......3
Father/mother ..............04 Son-in-law/daughter-in-law. 11 Other relative........................... 18 Manufacturing: Public sector: Primary complete ..........4
Sister/brother...............05 Sister-in-law/brother-in-law 12 Renter ...................................... 19 Artisan........... 4 Unskilled .......8 Secondary incomplete ...5
Stepson/stepdaughter ..06 Nephew/niece ...................... 13 Other non-relative ................... 20 Industrial ....... 5 Skilled............9 Secondary complete ......6
Stepfather/stepmother .07 Uncle/aunt............................ 14 Other...............10 Vocational college ........7
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!:1'0(03)#/+;#5+0/
'?PKCPQaDGQFCPKCLaQEPMSN  /(0 
'GL?LAG?J$MMNCP?RGTC  3CJGEGMSQEPMSN 
5P?BCPQa?QQMAG?RGML $SJRSP?J?QQMAG?RGML 
@SQGLCQQEPMSN  1MJGRGA?JEPMSN 
1PMDCQQGML?J?QQMAG?RGML  :MSRFEPMSN 
5P?BCSLGML  8MKCLaQEPMSN 
.GAPMDGL?LACEPMSN  1?PCLREPMSN 
8?RCPU?QRCEPMSN  4AFMMJAMKKGRRCC 
/CGEF@MSPFMMBTGJJ?EC )C?JRFAMKKGRRCC 
?QQMAG?RGML  4NMPRQEPMSN 
$GTGAEPMSN  0RFCP 
')3''0(1#35+%+1#5+0/
-C?BCP 
7CPW?ARGTC 
4MKCUF?R?ARGTC 
/MR?ARGTC 
 8FGAFMDRFCQCEPMSNQGQRFCKMQRGKNMPR?LRRMWMSPFMSQCFMJB!
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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> < =
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Appendix 6 – Financial Cooperative Profile
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Appendix 8 – Community Profile and Asset Mapping
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